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ABSTRACT
PIVOTAL DETERRENCE AND U.S. SECURITY POLICY 
IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Charles D. Pasquale 
Old Dominion University, 2007 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp
This dissertation presents a model of pivotal deterrence— a version the 
author loosely terms holistic pivotal deterrence— based on the model originally 
presented in Crawford’s Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the 
Pursuit o f Peace, and applies it to a regional case study of U.S. security policy in 
the Taiwan Strait; placing particular emphasis on the crisis junctures of 1954-55, 
1958, 1962, and 1995-96. By contrasting this with other models of deterrence, it 
provides an alternative perspective with which to consider the empirical data on 
the United States-China-Taiwan relationship and developments in the Strait. By 
viewing the data through this lens, this research presents an assessment as to 
the validity of the holistic pivotal deterrence model in preventing an escalation in 
conflict, and also tests four hypotheses:
Hi: If either China or Taiwan had wished to engage in behavior contrary to the
interests of the United States, they would have been more likely to do so if 
the United States had insured them against the risks of that behavior.
H2: Deterrence was more likely to succeed when China’s and Taiwan’s
alignment options were scarce.
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H3: With the United States as a preponderant-power pivot, holistic pivotal
deterrence was more likely to be applicable when interests in the Strait were 
secondary.
H4: Holistic pivotal deterrence was likely to succeed when China and Taiwan
each wanted to get or keep what benefits the United States could give or 
take away more than what they wanted to take from their rival.
The first two hypotheses reflect Crawford’s original model, addressing the 
roles of insurance and alignment options. The third hypothesis contradicts the 
original model’s views on the role of interests, and the fourth hypothesis goes 
beyond the original model—which focuses on elements of military power as a 
primary factor—to incorporate the role and effect of non-military power.
By examining these hypotheses in the full context of the political, military, 
social, and economic dynamics present in the Strait throughout the second half 
of the 20th century, this research identifies the strengths, weaknesses, and 
conditional factors of this modified pivotal deterrence model.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The Taiwan Strait between 1949—when the Chinese Communists 
overthrew the ruling Nationalist Government of China, forcing them to flee to 
Taiwan—and 1996 has been the scene of four crisis periods involving the United 
States as a third-party deterrent force between mainland China (PRC) and 
Taiwan (ROC). Throughout these periods of crisis, the United States has tried to 
play a constraining role vis-a-vis the two aggressors. While China and Taiwan 
engaged in limited military operations against each other on several occasions 
these actions never escalated to full-scale conflict.
The leadership of both the Communist Chinese Government on the 
Mainland (in Beijing) and the Nationalist Chinese Government on Taiwan (in 
Taipei) believed they were the rightful rulers of all the Chinese people on both 
sides of the Strait. Because both considered themselves the legitimate rulers of 
all of China, neither would concede to the other and each developed a 
commitment toward reclaiming and assuming control over the territories and 
peoples of the other.
This dissertation examines U.S. security policy in the Taiwan Strait by 
introducing a new deterrence model and applying it to the United States-China-
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements of The Chicago Manual 
of Style: The Essential Guide for Writers, Editors, and Publishers, 15th ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003).
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Taiwan trilateral relationship during several periods of crisis in the Strait; the 
purpose being to determine whether the model can account for the lack of full- 
scale conflict during the periods of high tension. This chapter introduces the 
basic concept of pivotal deterrence as applied to the relationship in the Strait 
since 1949, as well as early U.S. ties to the Strait and the junctures selected as 
case studies. It also introduces the general concepts and contexts under which 
the remainder of this research is presented, and concludes with an outline of the 
remaining chapters.
What were the factors that played into the trilateral relationship to maintain 
the degree of relative peace demonstrated in the Strait? How did U.S. security 
policy in the region create a constraining deterrent effect between these two 
actors— ideologically opposed to one another and dedicated to the other’s 
downfall—without having to become militarily engaged in direct combat 
operations? What factors must be considered in designing a pivotal deterrence 
strategy for this type of situation? What factors might cause the strategy to 
succeed or to fail? These are the questions upon which this research will focus.
The United States prefers the status quo because it equals stability, and 
also because it incurs the least cost. For both China and Taiwan throughout this 
period, maintaining the status quo was a second-best option; the best option 
being to defeat and assimilate the other under their respective systems of 
government. For China or Taiwan to attain their best option by disrupting the 
status quo would have entailed the traditional costs of war—consuming 
expensive military resources, losing many lives and suffering many casualties,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and the accompanying damage to China’s and Taiwan’s infrastructure from 
bomb and rocket attacks— but would also have potentially resulted in 
strengthening divisions between China and the West. The second-best option 
for China and Taiwan, therefore, became more acceptable—at least until either 
one could devise a strategy to obtain its goal without incurring the associated 
costs. These costs helped to reinforce the foundation for the U.S. deterrent 
posture in the Strait.
The overarching regional goal of the United States since the early 1950s 
has been to maintain this status quo. While committing a limited—quantitatively 
and qualitatively—military force to the protection of Taiwan during the periods of 
crisis, U.S. intervention in the Strait was relatively benign in comparison to the 
force at the United States’ disposal. The reasons for maintaining the status quo 
shifted overtime from containing Communism in the 1950s to political and 
economic interests in the 1990s, but the status quo had remained the goal of, 
and the dependent variable in, U.S. security policy in the trilateral relationship.
There have been many instances in the United States-China-Taiwan 
relationship when U.S. military intervention was used as a direct response to 
hostile actions, but the model presented in this research posits that other factors 
may have been equally or more significant than the explicit use or threat of force 
in maintaining stability. In addition to military factors, one must consider a myriad 
of diplomatic, political, and economic factors when assessing the reasons for 
conflict prevention or avoidance. This is why the model presented here is termed 
holistic pivotal deterrence. Through a presentation of the empirical data, this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
research seeks to illustrate the dynamics between each of these factors and 
security in the Strait.
Traditional models of deterrence generally emphasize transparency as a 
key factor in communicating one’s intentions to another in the hopes of 
influencing the other’s actions. These intentions usually imply that actor (A) 
would apply some sort of pressure—whether diplomatic, informational, economic, 
or military— upon actor (B) if (B) were to do something that (A) did not want it to 
do. This usually entails clearly communicating the boundaries and limits within 
which (B) can act without crossing the line, at which point (A) would carry out its 
threats.
The problem with these traditional models of deterrence is that, in many 
instances, they may provide (B) with too much information as to what actions it 
can get away with, and to what extent, while not provoking (A) and risking the 
consequences. There may be times when (B) is less inclined to take specific 
actions toward this end, such as if the boundaries are not clearly defined and if 
the consequences remain somewhat ambiguous. This problem is compounded 
when trying to deter more than one actor at a time, and even more so when 
trying to act as a third-party deterrent force between two actors with whom the 
deterrer’s involvement is indirect. This is important in situations where clearly 
defined policies may actually encourage one actor or the other to take aggressive 
actions against the desires of the third party, which is trying to maintain stability 
between the other two.
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This dissertation examines how ambiguity can provide a more effective 
role than clarity can provide in extended third-party deterrence, as well as the 
importance of a holistic deterrence strategy. It describes the key factors and 
considerations behind this approach and applies them to U.S. security policy as it 
relates to the situation in the Strait during several crisis junctures over a nearly 
50-year period in the later half of the 20th century. It achieves these goals by 
applying a pivotal deterrence model to the Strait in order to provide an alternative 
perspective as to how one might approach and understand ambiguous, extended 
security relationships.
This research is significant because many traditional approaches to 
deterrence consider clarity of threats and potential actions as fundamental 
factors in preventing others from undertaking specific actions. But because this 
model emphasizes the role of ambiguity as a critical factor in maintaining control 
of a situation, it presents an alternative approach to understanding third-party 
deterrence relationships that has not been widely addressed. It also expands the 
original pivotal deterrence model to consider additional variables. This research 
assesses the relevance and validity of the model by applying it to scenarios in a 
region of the world where U.S. security policy has relied on an element of 
ambiguity to maintain relative stability between two antagonistic, yet indigenous, 
rival subsets of the same national group.
This research presents and addresses four hypotheses, using a 
qualitative, logical presentation of the evidence to support the central arguments. 
It does not, however, attempt to present quantifiable, statistical proof that this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6pivotal deterrence model prevented full-scale conflict in the Strait. While this 
dissertation aims to present a competent, empirical case to support these 
arguments, the author recognizes that its conclusions are subjective and are 
likely to remain open to debate and subject to interpretation. Moreover, while the 
research supports and advances pivotal deterrence as one of many explanations 
and perspectives in understanding peace and conflict among states, it does not 
claim to present an exclusive and incontrovertible argument over deterrence in 
the Strait or other regions.
Linking U.S. Policy to the Strait
The late 1940s and early 1950s brought American foreign policy into a 
new era as Communism established itself as the primary threat to global security, 
challenging Western efforts to maintain peace and spread democracy after 
WWII. A protracted Chinese civil war resulted in Mao Zedong’s Communist 
People’s Party (CPP) taking power in Peking— renaming it Beijing— in 1949. 
Chiang Kai-shek’s ruling Nationalist Kuomintang Party (KMT), of which the 
United States in favor, was forced to retreat to the island of Formosa (Taiwan)1—  
approximately 100 miles off the coast of mainland China—where it reestablished
1. “Taiwan” may be used interchangeably with “Formosa,” “the Republic of 
China,” and “ROC”; as may “Taipei” and “Tai Bei” in reference to the capital city and 
Government of Taiwan. Furthermore, “Kuomintang”—the ruling party during the 
junctures under study—may be used interchangeably with “Guomindang,” “Nationalists,” 
and “ChiNats.” “China” may be used interchangeably with “the People’s Republic of 
China,” “PRC,” “the Mainland,” “mainland China,” and “Communist China”; as may 
“Beijing,” “Peking,” and “Peiping” in reference to the capital city and Government of 
mainland China. Furthermore, “Communists” in the Chinese political context refer to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7a second, parallel, Chinese Government in Taipei, with the goal of eventually 
reclaiming the Mainland and reunifying China.
This split effectively brought an end to China’s civil war—at least in regard 
to direct confrontation on the Mainland—which had been raging for years 
between the two parties. But the United States maintained its support and 
diplomatic recognition of the KMT as the official Chinese Government, and of 
Chiang as the legitimate ruler of China; providing economic, political, and indirect 
military support. Not long after this split, however, the United States found itself 
in a tense situation with China over developments in the Strait.2 In contrast to 
U.S. actions in the Korean War, however, direct offensive military action was not 
the primary tool with which the U.S. chose to control this situation. Rather, by 
adopting a policy of deterrence through ambiguity, the United States worked to 
prevent Beijing and Taipei from engaging in full-scale conflict while seeking to 
find a way to resolve the conflict and avoid escalation of limited military 
operations that had been occurring between the two rivals.
Following WWII and the start of the Cold War, by the late 1940s and early 
1950s, the United States was beginning to recognize the threat that Communism 
presented to peace and security throughout the world, and that U.S. foreign 
policy needed an approach for dealing with hostile states and preventing others 
from falling to Communism while avoiding being pulled into military conflicts. As
Communist People’s Party (CPP), and may also be referred to as “ChiComs” (Chinese 
Communists).
2. “Formosa” is the original name for the island of Taiwan, and also includes the 
Pescadores (or Phengu) Islands, which are situated off Taiwan’s west coast.
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such, U.S. policy in 1949 was “to prevent China from becoming an adjunct of 
Soviet power.”3 But by this point, the U.S. military was weary and its resources 
stretched thin, and the American public probably felt little motivation to become 
involved in another confrontation anytime soon. Most argue that preventing war 
is generally preferable to engaging in it, and the advent of the Cold War spurned 
alternative theories of conflict prevention, which started to gain popularity in both 
academic and policymaking circles.
The U.S. initially intended to avoid becoming militarily involved in the 
Strait, pledging that “the United States will not provide military aid or advice to 
Chinese forces on Formosa.”4 But in June 1950, Communist North Korea 
(DPROK) invaded the South (ROK); an area that Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson did not include in his publicly stated list of areas deemed vital to U.S. 
security.5 Although the ROK was on the defensive, the Soviet Union claimed that 
the ROK provoked the DPROK into making a preemptive strike—despite a 
survey reporting that the ROK had no concentrations of troops, armor, air 
support, heavy artillery, or military supplies necessary to mount such an offense.6
3. United States Department of State, “Note by the Executive Secretary of the 
National Security Council (Souers), on United States Policy Regarding Trade with 
China,” 28 February 1949 (Executive Secretariat Files), Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1949, Vol. 9, China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978): 827.
4. Harry Truman, “The President’s News Conference of January 5th, 1950,” 5 
January 1950, The American Presidency Project, http://presidency.uscb.edu/ws/index 
.php?pid=13678&st=formosa&st1= (accessed 11 December 2006).
5. M.A. Fitzsimmons, “Fifteen Years of American Foreign Policy,” The Review of 
Politics 23, no. 1 (January 1961): 11.
6. Harry Truman, “Special Message to the Congress Reporting on the Situation 
in Korea,” 19 July 1950, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency 
.ucsb.edu /ws/index.php?pid=13560&st=truman&st1=korea (accessed 1 January 2006).
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Stating that this attack made it “plain beyond all doubt that Communism 
has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and 
[would] now use armed invasion and war,” President Truman sent the United 
States Navy’s Seventh Fleet into the Strait as a blockade force to prevent any 
attack on Formosa, while also calling upon Taipei to “cease all air and sea 
operations against the Mainland.”7 This was intended to maintain stability and to 
prevent Communist China from launching an amphibious assault to take control 
of Taiwan, which many still considered a strategic point in the region for sea 
lanes of communication and for air control in and around Korea, Japan, and the 
Philippines. By inserting itself—both physically and politically—between Taiwan 
and the Mainland, the United States became involved in maintaining regional 
stability for the foreseeable future.
When U.S. forces pushed north toward China’s border near the Yalu River 
in late 1950, however, Beijing perceived the move as threatening to continue into 
Chinese territory, prompting China to send People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
forces to intervene on 3 November of that year.8 This event turned the tide of the 
Korean War against the Allied forces and presented Communist China as a 
growing threat to regional stability. While the United States did not take direct 
military action against Communist China in retaliation for its intervention in Korea,
7. Harry Truman, “Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea,” 27 June 
1950, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.uscb.edu/ws/index.php 
?pid=13538&st=formosa&st1= (accessed 11 December 2006).
8. Harry Truman, “The President’s News Conference of November 16th, 1950,” 
16 November 1950, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb 
,edu/ws/index.php?pid=13664&st=china&st1=korea (accessed 11 December 2006).
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however, it did take an alternative course of action intended to signal its 
resentment toward Beijing; President Eisenhower lifted the naval blockade of 
Taiwan in February 1953, arguing that the United States had “no obligation to 
protect” those who were killing U.S. troops in Korea.9 While the order instructed 
that the Seventh Fleet “no longer be employed to shield Communist China,” 
however, Eisenhower emphasized that it implied “no aggressive intent” on the 
part of the United States.10 This effectively “unleashed” Chiang and provided an 
opportunity to deploy his Nationalist forces to reclaim the Mainland in the name 
of the KMT; a move that remained one of Chiang’s primary goals. These events 
set the stage for U.S. regional security policy, which was applied to the four 
periods of crisis that serve as the junctures for this research.
Four Crises as Case Studies
While there are many significant events in Sino-American relations 
throughout the second half of the 20th century, this dissertation focuses primarily 
on the four crises in the Taiwan Strait between 1954 and 1996. It applies a 
pivotal deterrence model to these junctures in order to test its validity and to 
explain the events from a theoretical perspective. By doing so, it presents an 
argument for understanding why events unfolded the way they did, and presents
9. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the 
Union,” 2 February 1953, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb 
,edu/ws/index.php?pid=9829 (accessed 19 December 2004).
10. United States Department of State, “Message from the President to the 
Congress,” 2 February 1953 (Extract), Foreign Affairs of the United States, 1952-1954, 
Vol. 14, China and Japan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985): 140.
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alternative perspectives on deterrence and power distribution. Additionally, it 
identifies flaws or weaknesses in the model, and suggests modifications for 
future application. While the four crisis junctures are briefly introduced below, 
subsequent chapters will provide more specific details on each event.
The first crisis started in 1954. The United States’ role as a guarantor of 
stability in the region became apparent as events began to escalate after the 
United States withdrew many of its military forces from the region. Not long after 
Eisenhower lifted the Seventh Fleet’s blockade, the PLA began an artillery 
bombardment of ROC forces that had taken up position on the island groups of 
Quemoy and Matsu; each situated approximately 10 miles from the Mainland and 
claimed by both Communist and Nationalist China. Many perceived this 
offensive as a Communist attempt to take control of the islands and to use them 
as a step toward invading Taiwan—a move that U.S. policymakers most likely 
perceived as furthering Beijing’s hopes of becoming a reunified, hegemonic 
power in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Seventh Fleet soon returned to the Strait to reinstitute the blockade 
and to ensure delivery of supplies to the Nationalists, but it did not become 
involved in direct conflict with PLA forces. The risk of inadvertently provoking 
American military intervention may have been enough to convince Mao that the 
United States held an unequivocal interest in maintaining stability in the region, 
and the Communist assault stopped in 1955 as a result. But this cease-fire held 
only temporarily.
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The second crisis occurred in 1958; although some consider this crisis an 
extension of the first, this research treats it as a separate juncture. Under the 
perception of American protection, the KMT continued its low-intensity raids 
against the Mainland after the first crisis ended. In response, China again 
declared its intent to “liberate” Taiwan, resumed its shelling of Quemoy and 
Matsu from August through October 1958, and used patrol boats to blockade 
Nationalist resupply efforts of forces on the islands. As a protective measure, 
President Eisenhower again sent the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet to the Strait to 
serve as escorts to the Nationalist ships that were resupplying ROC forces on 
Quemoy and Matsu; U.S. naval aircraft also helped Chiang reestablish control 
over the region’s airspace.
While the United States once again avoided direct conflict with PLA forces 
during this crisis, the risk of escalation most likely created a heightened sense of 
caution. By providing only a limited degree of military power to shield KMT 
military resupply lines, the United States was probably attempting to deter a PLA 
attack on Taiwan while simultaneously limiting U.S. military support in an effort to 
discourage any potential Nationalist plans to liberate the Mainland. Any such 
plan might have ultimately forced the United States to take a strong military 
position and to risk encouraging all-out war.
The third crisis followed Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” of 1958-60, which 
left mainland China in a state of famine, chaos, and turmoil. By 1962, its 
economy had all but collapsed and its agricultural production had suffered a 
severe loss. In mainland China’s weakened condition, Chiang most likely viewed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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it as being in an ideal position for liberation. But when the United States learned 
that Chiang was making preparations to attack, President Kennedy on 23 June 
1962 used diplomatic channels during the Warsaw Talks as an opportunity to 
assure Mao that the United States would not support any such assault.11 Chiang 
was forced to back away from his plans to attack the Mainland.
Kennedy’s reassurance to Beijing most likely created the impression 
within Communist China that the United States was playing both sides of the 
Strait without explicitly stating the U.S. position regarding which side it favored 
and which it would support in a conflict. While this third potential crisis was 
averted before requiring the United States to intervene militarily, it clearly 
demonstrated Chiang’s reliance on American support for implementing any plans 
of liberation or of reclaiming the Mainland. While similar approaches had been 
employed effectively during earlier crises, this juncture provides perhaps the 
most powerful indicators as to the formal beginning of America’s “strategic 
ambiguity” policy in regard to security in the Taiwan Strait.
Although there were no military crises in the Strait between 1963 and 
1994, this period is extremely important for context because the regional 
dynamics experienced considerable change during this timeframe. The 1970s 
brought a shift in Asian strategic relationships: China and the Soviet Union had 
fallen apart from one another politically, and President Nixon officially opened
11. United States Department of State, “Telegram from the Embassy in Poland to 
the Department of State,” 23 June 1962, (Document 131: Telegram), Foreign Affairs of 
the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1996).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
relations with Beijing in 1972. Washington in 1979 shifted diplomatic recognition 
from Taipei to Beijing as the legal seat of the Chinese Government, but all the 
while maintaining quasi-official relations with Taipei through the American 
Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Although the United States finally recognized mainland 
China, Washington maintained an interest in peaceful relations with Taipei.
Steps forward in Sino-U.S. relations would later be demonstrated through the 
three Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982, and the Taiwan Relations Act of 
1979—all of which will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
This monumental shift in the trilateral security relationship placed new 
pressures on both sides of the Strait, and the new dynamic presented 
opportunities that neither side was likely to ignore. While Beijing recognized 
Washington’s desire for closer relations, the United States maintained a strong 
commitment to Taiwan, thereby complicating the balancing act required for 
diplomacy, while increasing the effectiveness of the ambiguous security policy. 
Ultimately, more prospects for cooperation translated into more “sticks and 
carrots” for the United States to leverage against both China and Taiwan.
The political environment in the mid 1970s significantly affected United 
States-China relations. After Mao died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping took power and 
instituted major reforms within Communist China, “leaving no institution or Maoist 
practice untouched,” as Schell and Shambaugh note: “Not only did Deng have to 
resurrect the institutions and personnel of the party, state, and army but China 
was also faced with a profoundly alienated and lethargic populace numbed from 
three decades of unrelenting Maoist political campaigns, persecutions, and
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catastrophes that had cost tens of millions of lives.”12 This surely would be no 
simple or minor undertaking. The damage to China’s infrastructure was much 
more than superficial, and the “culture of Mao” probably cut even more deeply 
into Chinese society.
The fourth crisis came as retaliation for Taiwanese President Lee Teng- 
hui’s 1995 speech at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, where he made 
explicit reference to Taiwanese independence. In an attempt to influence Lee’s 
upcoming re-election, China fired ballistic missiles—albeit without their explosive 
payloads— into the waters off of Taiwan, held a series of military exercises 
practicing amphibious assaults, and later fired two more unarmed missiles that 
landed in the water near two strategic Taiwanese ports. Once again, the U.S. 
Navy deployed ships—this time, two carrier battle groups—to the region to 
“monitor” the events, which ended without further escalation. Some observers 
posit that, while employing a strong show of military force, China’s actions were 
not actually a prelude to attack; they were merely a form of “saber rattling” to 
remind the world that the PRC would not accept Taiwan’s declaration of 
independence from the Mainland. The empirical data is inconclusive on this 
issue. In neither case, however, did China or Taiwan take significant steps to 
escalate tensions by mobilizing their forces once the U.S. military intervened.
In an ideal representation of the holistic pivotal deterrence model, this 
research would show that the United States’ policy toward Taiwan maintained an
12. Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, eds., The China Reader: The Reform 
Era (New York: Random House, 1999), 5.
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adequate level of uncertainty and contradiction so as to prevent either aggressor 
from becoming overly confident in what the pivot would do if the aggressors 
disrupted the status quo. This would be observable by noting incongruences 
between policies and actions—applying support to best suit a particular situation, 
despite any other promises—and by the absence of military escalation to full- 
scale conflict between the aggressors. The research would also show that 
neither China nor Taiwan could avoid the United States’ influence, and that at 
least one of the aggressors was heavily dependent upon the United States.
Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter II discusses the research methodology and how it is applied, how 
the hypotheses are framed, the resources that were utilized, how the information 
was analyzed, and other factors related to the body of this dissertation. In 
supporting the research, this chapter identifies the indicators of success or failure 
as the model is applied to the crisis junctures. It illustrates how the research 
uses the empirical evidence to address each hypothesis and the linkages 
between the expectations and results of the data presented herein.
Chapter III presents the theoretical framework within which this research 
approaches the topic. It discusses the mainstream schools of thought on 
deterrence, and illustrates how they differ in explaining the absence of war 
between the PRC and ROC. It discusses some significant theories of 
international relations in order to provide the reader with an understanding of how 
they explain power, state behavior, and security. It also introduces the
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fundamentals of pivotal deterrence and presents the key concepts by which it 
differs from many other approaches. Another purpose of Chapter III is to further 
illustrate what the dissertation seeks to explain; specifically, how pivotal 
deterrence can help clarify what is already known about security in the Strait.
This dissertation presents a realist-centric approach to deterrence, based on 
factors such as interests and power, but it also seeks to demonstrate that while 
realism and balance of power remain relevant to pivotal deterrence as applied in 
the Strait crises, so do perceptions and interests.
Chapter IV presents the literature on the United States-China-Taiwan 
relationship throughout most of the second half of the 20th century, noting a 
variety of books, journals, and articles that have been published on the 
development of the trilateral relationship and the regional security situation. This 
chapter is an important element in the research, as it presents the reader with a 
broad understanding of contemporary concepts in the literature, and also 
illustrates the academic perspective of the relationship and the factors that affect 
security policy in the region. It concludes with a presentation of how this 
research on pivotal deterrence contributes to the existing literature by providing 
an alternative lens through which to view the security relationship.
Chapter V  sets the political background for the region, presenting an 
understanding of the shifting balance of power, influence, and alliances, and 
illustrating how these factors affected U.S. security policy in the Strait over the 
years. Examining the 1954-55, 1958, and 1962 crises, this chapter focuses upon 
the empirical data available on the three primary actors throughout the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
relationship—the United States, China, and Taiwan. The information presented 
in this chapter formulates the main arguments to support the research agenda, 
and presents the data so that the reader can comprehend how the pivotal 
deterrence model explains the events in the region. These data present the 
historical framework, which demonstrates how the security situation “fits” the 
pivotal deterrence model presented in this research, and vice-versa. This is also 
where the story comes together to create a clearer understanding of the linkages 
that exist between the United States, China, and Taiwan, and how they function 
together in designing both a policy- and a theory-oriented approach to security.
Chapter VI is a continuation of Chapter V, examining many of the same 
factors, but it does so within the framework of a changing United States-China- 
Taiwan relationship from the 1962 crisis through the 1995-96 crisis. This is set 
apart from the previous chapter because it marks a turning point in the political 
relationship and discusses the new political framework in which old friends and 
enemies found themselves trying to compete for legitimacy and security.
Finally, Chapter VII revisits the original hypotheses to provide an 
assessment of how the pivotal deterrence model functioned when applied to the 
Strait, and demonstrates how the data supports the model in explaining stability 
in the region. It illustrates this pivotal deterrence model’s strengths and 
weaknesses, and presents some explanations as to why the model did or did not 
support the hypotheses. It then builds upon the basic tenets of pivotal 
deterrence to present alternative propositions for expanding, reinforcing, and 
supporting the model.
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
There are many approaches to discussing and understanding deterrence; 
each possessing its own strengths and weaknesses. This study does not seek to 
show that one is necessarily any better or worse than another in every situation, 
but rather to introduce, and to illustrate the application of, an alternative version 
of pivotal deterrence— itself a relatively new deterrence approach—for 
understanding a region of complex and longstanding tension: the Taiwan Strait. 
While many deterrence models have been widely discussed throughout 
contemporary history, pivotal deterrence, which Crawford coined in his doctoral 
dissertation in 2001 and subsequently published in 2003 as Pivotal Deterrence: 
Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit o f Peace, is a more recent model based 
upon a combination of extended and dual deterrence. The foundation of the 
holistic pivotal deterrence model presented in this dissertation is based on the 
general concepts found in Crawford’s, but presents some alternative hypotheses.
This chapter sets the framework for the dissertation by introducing the 
specifics of pivotal deterrence: what it is, its fundamental qualities, how it differs 
from other approaches to deterrence theory, and how it applies to the role of the 
United States in maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait. It presents these 
fundamental factors in the context of U.S. security policy in the Taiwan Strait and 
presents the four hypotheses this research seeks to support.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
THEORETICAL APPROACH
While the hypotheses presented herein largely call for explanatory or 
descriptive methods, the research also is partially exploratory, since pivotal 
deterrence is a relatively new and underdeveloped concept that has not been 
widely or methodically applied to the Taiwan Strait region. As this research 
progressively presents the totality of the data, it will identify the salient emerging 
features that fit the model and that help to explain the role of holistic pivotal 
deterrence in the United States-China-Taiwan security relationship. Utilizing a 
grounded-theoretical approach, this research analyzes the qualitative aspects of 
the security relationship along several key junctures, and does so in the context 
of the four hypotheses. It also incorporates some quantitative factors as they 
apply to the overall situation.
The data for this research comes from a wide variety of sources on U.S.- 
Chinese-Taiwanese relations between 1945 and 1996. Due to the dearth of 
translated Chinese documents, however, this research relies heavily on English- 
language primary documents and secondary documents— including diplomatic 
transcripts, books, journal articles, and policy papers written by academic and 
professional experts in the field; some of whom are fluent in the Chinese 
language and have researched primary documents in Chinese. While secondary 
documents are generally subject to more interpretation and biases toward a 
particular authors’ viewpoint than are primary sources, they nevertheless provide 
a valuable perspective on key events, and serve as important resources.
Utilizing a variety of these documents, this research examines the events at each
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key juncture, as well as the periods in-between, in developing a significant 
amount of data with which to conduct and support the associated analysis.
About the Methodology
Grounded theory, which Glaser and Strauss initially presented in 1967, 
follows a general, continually evolving methodology for developing theory that 
constantly compares data to the hypotheses as it is gathered and analyzed.
Using this methodology, theory can be elaborated and modified as incoming data 
are meticulously played against them.1 Like other qualitative research theories, 
Strauss and Corbin note, this is an interpretive approach that can combine 
qualitative and quantitative analytical techniques. While including the 
perspectives and voices of the people under study, the researcher accepts 
responsibility for interpreting what is observed, heard, or read, rather than simply 
giving voice to the viewpoints of the people, groups, or organizations studied. 
Strauss & Corbin argue that grounded theory is a general methodology—a way 
of thinking about and conceptualizing data—and is easily adapted to studies of 
diverse phenomena.2
Strauss and Corbin also argue that “theories are interpretations made 
from given perspectives as adopted or researched by researchers,” and “to say 
that a given theory is an interpretation—and therefore fallible— is not at all to
1. Ansalem Strauss and Juliet Corbin, “Grounded Theory Methodology,” in 
Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln, eds., Handbook of Qualitative Research 
(Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications: 1994), 273.
2. Ibid., 274-75.
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deny that judgments can be made about the soundness or probable usefulness 
of it.”3 They expect that researchers will combine grounded theory with other 
methodologies, such as with “quantitative methods on predominantly qualitative 
or predominantly quantitative projects, or on projects of equal emphasis.” And 
they state that researchers can use a variety of adaptations of the methodology 
without invalidating it.4
Utilizing this methodology to synthesize and analyze the data related to 
the key junctures in the Strait allows this research to take a broad view of the 
events and factors involved in each of the crises. By utilizing this grounded- 
theoretical approach, the research seeks to provide an enlightened perspective 
on the value and validity of ambiguity in third-party security policies. Because the 
best decisions and analyses are often based on the weighing of alternative 
options, this research may later serve others in further arguing the merits of such 
an approach in this and other scenarios.
Conducting this type of research requires identifying those factors that 
constitute success or failure in adequately addressing the hypotheses. Because 
this dissertation presents primarily qualitative analytic assessments rather than a 
quantitative statistical analysis, however, its findings will be more subject to 
interpretation. But for the purposes of this paper, if the data is found to support a 
logical, credible argument based on consistent patterns in support of the pivotal 
deterrence hypotheses in light of possible alternatives, then this research will
3. Ibid., 279-281.
4. Ibid., 283.
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consider the hypotheses adequately verified. While not attempting to present 
one specific universal approach as superior to all others, it attempts to show how 
the factors in the crisis junctures either support or refute the hypotheses.
As with any theory-based analysis, the conclusions of this research are 
largely subjective and must accept some fundamental assumptions, since much 
of what is generally understood about the crises in the Strait is based upon non- 
verifiable accounts and second-hand perceptions—specifically, those that 
historians believed the actors’ held at the time of the selected junctures. This 
research recognizes the lack of primary information available on Chinese military 
matters during many of the earlier junctures addressed herein, which will 
inevitably affect any analysis. But an increasing amount of such information 
coming available on the Internet, combined with previous findings from other 
researchers, does help to validate the research for the purposes of this 
dissertation. Ultimately, however, the author recognizes that this research is 
necessarily conducted primarily from a Western perspective.
This methodology can be a complex task to apply to deterrence, which 
can take many forms, and is widely argued from numerous perspectives. There 
is no universal consensus on what deters one actor or another, since mitigating 
factors must be considered for each unique situation and for each unique 
personality involved in the decision-making process.5 Additionally, determining
5. The role of personality is often noted as a key factor in international politics, 
but it can be a difficult factor to quantify when assessing its effect in the decision-making 
process. Robert Jervis has written extensively on the role of personality and political 
psychology.
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whether or when an actor has been deterred involves inherently vague 
parameters, which may not always be proven or refuted. In making this 
determination, observers often must make subjective decisions based on their 
own beliefs and perceptions, as well as on factual data. This research seeks to 
determine whether pivotal deterrence does in fact apply to the crises in the Strait, 
and discusses the defining characteristics that can be identified as contributing to 
its success.
In presenting its main arguments and hypotheses, this dissertation 
addresses both the international and domestic aspects of the relationship 
between the United States, China, and Taiwan throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century. In addition, it attempts to deconstruct the individual 
relationships to expose the divergent perceptions among the participants—each 
supporting their own beliefs, fears, and political agendas. By doing so, it helps to 
illustrate the factors that permitted the model to work.
This research seeks to identify how the U.S. security policy constrained 
China and Taiwan from going beyond limited military operations to engaging in 
full-scale war. To explain this, it is necessary to describe how China, and Taiwan 
each perceived and presented their relative positions during each of the crises, 
and how those perceptions may have influenced their decisions to take military 
action or to refrain from advancing hostile intents. In order to develop a qualified 
perspective on the Chinese position, for example, this study draws upon official 
government documentation, public statements, and the works of numerous China 
scholars and specialists. It approaches this subject from a variety of angles to
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present a well-rounded picture of how American, Chinese, and Taiwanese 
policymakers might have thought about developments in the Sino-American 
relationship during these critical junctures.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE RESEARCH MODEL
As described above, the purpose of this research is to examine the 
trilateral security relationship in the Strait through the lens of holistic pivotal 
deterrence, with the goal of demonstrating whether, and how well, holistic pivotal 
deterrence explains the absence of war between the China and Taiwan as an 
element of U.S. security policy. This research is significant to the field of security 
studies because it helps to identify strengths and weaknesses of pivotal 
deterrence models in the context of trilateral security relationships and builds 
upon a relatively new approach to deterrence theory. Furthermore, it may also 
provide the reader with valuable insight as to how pivotal deterrence can be 
applied to other regional conflicts—such as between India and Pakistan, or Israel 
and the Palestinians—which other researchers may subsequently examine at a 
later date.
Having discussed this research topic with Crawford, this author discovered 
that, beyond those examples addressed in Pivotal Deterrence, there has been 
little exploration of the model in regional case studies, including in the Taiwan 
Strait. In approaching this subject, this dissertation assesses the model’s 
applicability to the Strait by applying the research to four hypotheses, each
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relating to a specific element of holistic pivotal deterrence: moral hazard, 
alignment, interests, and benefits.
Based on Crawford’s model, four necessary conditions must be met for 
this pivotal deterrence model to succeed: (1) the pivot must possess power at 
least roughly equal to the adversaries (i.e., it must possess a preponderance of 
power); (2) the pivot must prefer that the adversaries maintain the status quo, or 
that any changes are made peacefully; (3) the pivot must believe that both 
adversaries hold revisionist aims toward each other and that they will risk war to 
achieve those aims if they are assured of the pivot’s support or acquiescence; 
and (4) each adversary must perceive the other as more threatening than the 
pivot.6 These will be addressed again in Chapter VII.
Why must the pivot posses a preponderance of power? Would it not be 
sufficient that it simply possess power equal to the difference between the 
aggressors? The deterrent relationship must provide some realistic expectation 
that the pivot could find itself militarily involved between the two aggressors. The 
pivot must possess preponderant power because it must be able to maintain a 
military advantage even if the aggressor that is less closely aligned with the pivot 
absorbed the military capabilities of the other, or if the aggressor with which the 
pivot is more closely aligned loses some of its military capability. If this was to 
occur and the more hostile aggressor got the upper hand on the other, it would 
then militarily outmatch the pivot, which would then become the target of a
6 . Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of 
Peace (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 28.
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superior military power. Therefore, if the pivot’s power only matched the 
difference, it could find itself at a disadvantage. Also, a preponderant-power 
pivot can join the fight at any time, thereby avoiding an immediate commitment, 
but a peer pivot—one which does not possess power at least equal to the 
aggressors— if it is to make up the difference to a point where the combined 
power of the pivot and the aggressor closer to the pivot could present an 
adequate counterattack, would have to convince the aggressors that it would be 
willing and able to jump in at the start of a conflict. This is essential for the pivot 
to maintain credibility. For this model, therefore, equal power between the 
aggressors makes the deterrent weaker; an imbalance strengthens it.
AMBIGUITY IN THE TRILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
Every deterrence relationship brings with it some degree of ambiguity, but 
with traditional deterrence models, which provide relatively clear threats and 
cause-and-effect relationships to a potential aggressor, the ambiguity lies in the 
effect, or outcome, of the relationship; when a potential aggressor is deterred 
from taking action (i.e., the action never occurred), there is often little or no 
evidence to prove that the absence of action was the direct result of a specific 
deterrent, and not some other—or combination of—alternative factors, such as 
the aggressor changing its mind about what actions to take.
While all deterrence models share this ambiguous quality as a passive 
factor in their outcomes, pivotal deterrence employs ambiguity as an active factor 
in its application. This is different from uncertainty in perceived intentions
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created by a haphazardly applied traditional deterrence policy; there are bound to 
be flaws in any theory-based security policy, since there is no realistic way to 
consider how every factor will interact and react with every other factor. But 
whereas a security policy based on deterrence is likely to involve many inherently 
ambiguous elements as part of an inherently imperfect system, pivotal 
deterrence deliberately engineers ambiguity into its fundamental structure, front- 
loading the ambiguity into the cause-and-effect relationship: By not providing 
clear boundaries at the start, the aggressors must make subjective assessments 
based upon what they perceive as the pivot’s true intentions vis-a-vis any action 
the aggressors may take toward one another.
Whereas traditional deterrence theories are largely based on threats, 
capabilities, and communicating intentions among and between the involved 
actors, they do not fully capture all aspects of geopolitical conflict or explain its 
avoidance. These traditional theories rely much more than pivotal deterrence 
upon an aggressor clearly understanding the defender’s intentions and 
recognizing what actions are likely to result in specific reactions from the 
defender. There may be many instances, however, in which not knowing how 
another actor will respond can be more influential than if the defender’s potential 
responses were clearly communicated. Where a power imbalance exists, 
ambiguity provides the possibility that the pivot will not step in to fill the gap. This 
is seen as maintaining neutrality, which is shown to be a factor in the scenarios 
for pivotal deterrence as discussed below in this chapter.
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Ambiguity in a deterrence relationship can be the result of any number of 
factors, such as introducing deliberately vague parameters (relating to potential 
cause-and-effect), acting inconsistently on relatively clear parameters (stating 
one set of parameters, but acting on another), or accidental results from 
mistaken perceptions or miscommunication (attempting to communicate one set 
of parameters, but the aggressors misunderstanding their intended meaning).
Following this concept, this dissertation examines the role of ambiguity as 
a key factor in pivotal deterrence— particularly as it relates to U.S. security policy 
in the Taiwan Strait in the second half of the 20th century—arguing that the 
relative peace and stability in the Strait is the result of an ambiguous, rather than 
transparent, U.S. security policy toward both China and Taiwan. Understanding 
the role of ambiguity— particularly when used intentionally— requires some 
context. Whether something is perceived as ambiguous depends on both the 
presenter and the receiver of the information. While Webster’s defines ambiguity 
as something that is “doubtful or uncertain [especially] from obscurity or 
indistinctness,” and “capable of being understood in two or more possible senses 
or ways,”7 this definition could be interpreted to meet any number of scenarios. 
But in the context of this dissertation, it primarily describes a situation where one 
actor cannot be certain of the true intentions of another’s actions. It is a constant 
dilemma wherein security relationships are based on the hope that actors will act 
predictably and according to their word, rather than on a solid foundation of trust.
7. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Ed., s.v. “ambiguity."
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In most cases, it might not be unreasonable to assume that clarity would 
be preferable to ambiguity when dealing in international politics, since 
misunderstandings under pressure very well could run the risk of states going to 
war under false pretenses. But on many occasions, such as when an aggressor 
state is actively contemplating taking action against another, it may, in fact, be 
the lack of clearly defined boundaries and consequences that prevents an 
aggressor from knowing whether any given action is worth the potential risk or 
cost involved.
Operationalizing Ambiguity
The concept of ambiguity lies at the heart of pivotal deterrence. It can 
take many forms and may be applied at many levels, which might not be 
immediately apparent to an observer. Communicating ambiguity entails an 
inherent contradiction: The deterrent relies on making the aggressor closer to the 
pivot believe the pivot will support it in some, but not all, situations; 
simultaneously preventing that aggressor from knowing how much it can rely on 
the pivot. This depends upon establishing and maintaining a both a sense of 
dependence of the aggressors upon the pivot, and distance of the pivot from the 
aggressors.
To identify the indicators of ambiguity, one should consider its antonym: 
clarity. Recognizing where and when ambiguity is in play requires first identifying 
those indicators that would otherwise be familiar in such a situation of clearly 
defined intentions. In the context of U.S. security policy in the Strait, clarity would
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entail explicitly stating to China and Taiwan those interests that the United States 
considered vital, which it would unequivocally defend, what it would consider 
unacceptable actions on the part of both China and Taiwan, and what actions it 
would carry out if either actor pursued those actions. As such, if either China or 
Taiwan took any of those actions deemed unacceptable toward violating any 
interest the United States considered vital, then the United States would have 
responded by taking those actions which it previously threatened.
Clarity would also entail more tangible actions, such as pre-positioning 
U.S. owned and operated materiel—aircraft; amphibious carriers and landing 
craft; tanks; troops; radar; ordnance; medical, logistical, and other support 
personnel; command, control, and communications systems, and other traditional 
tools of warfare—on Taiwan in such quantitative and qualitative measures as to 
be able to respond to a Communist Chinese attack on the island with an effective 
counterattack. A U.S. counterattack would incorporate Taiwan’s military 
resources as a force multiplier, but U.S. military analysts confirm that large-scale 
American military operations would never be undertaken under the command 
and control of the military structure that Taiwan could have provided.8
In addition to the complexities inherent in matters of deterrence, this 
section shows that U.S. security policy in the Taiwan Strait involved even more 
intricacies in relation to the concept of ambiguity. Whereas the United States 
clearly used military power to intervene in the crises between mainland China
8 . This position is based on discussions with China-issue military analysts from a 
variety of U.S. military and other government agencies.
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and Taiwan, there are significant differences between degrees of intervention. 
This presents a lens through which one must view U.S. actions in the Strait. 
Degrees of intervention can be described as a spectrum, with complete 
disassociation at one end, full-scale military operations at the other, and a range 
of options in-between (see Figure 1). In the Strait, the United States used limited 
military operations to “raise the stakes” of Chinese or Taiwanese aggression 
toward each other, but did not offer any definable guarantees of support. This 
left each side to weigh the probability of U.S. escalation or reduction of support in 
response to their own actions; the U.S. could change course at any given time. 
So, while the “obvious” U.S. military actions in the Strait may be construed as 
having sent a clear message of intent and support, the ambiguous nature of U.S. 
commitments left a wide range of options on the table. These will be discussed 
in greater detail in the following chapters.
Pivotal Power and Applied Ambiguity
Bush illustrates many ambiguous factors in the U.S. policy toward Taiwan, 
noting that, in the early years, the U.S. saw little or no alternative to pure 
deterrence in the traditional sense, but by 1955, “American thinking had 
changed; Beijing might be part of the solution,” and that “U.S. policy makers 
understood that Taiwan had no military value,” relating the memories of the 
French attempts to maintain an outpost in Dien Bien Phu, which was also of no
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Figure 1. Examples of possible military options reflecting levels of U.S. support 
to Taiwan.
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military utility.9 He notes that in April 1955, Ambassadorial talks with Beijing 
discussed the renunciation of force in the region, which raised profound concerns 
with Taipei. And by the fall of 1954, the ROC Permanent Representative to the 
UN complained that a ceasefire would amount to a truce that would freeze the 
status quo. In the ROC’s eyes, Bush notes, U.S. talks with the PRC “[shifted] 
emphasis from technical issues like repatriation to an agreement on a mutual 
force renunciation in the Taiwan area, which, Taipei concluded, transgressed its 
‘rights, claims, and essential interests’; something Washington said it would 
avoid.” The U.S. pursued these talks with Beijing again following the 1958 crisis, 
still attempting to get Chiang to renounce force. “The UN tide was running 
against the ROC, in part because it engaged in provocative actions against the
PRC; renouncing offensive operations would improve Taiwan’s international
»10image.
Dennis Hickey also notes the ambiguity of America’s policy toward 
Taiwan, stating “The United States pledges a gradual reduction of arms sales to 
the ROC, but it does not claim that such a reduction will be readily apparent to an 
observer.... [and] the United States pledges to eventually terminate arms sales to 
the ROC, but [as of 1986 had] given no indication as to when this might
9. Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 100-101.
10. Ibid., 101-102.
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happen.”11 This type of language seems deliberately crafted to leave room for 
maneuvering to suit U.S. interests at any given time.
Traditional extended deterrence, as discussed further in Chapter III, is a 
well-established approach that generally suggests that a third-party defender (D) 
deters an aggressor (A) from attacking a protege (P). This is often achieved by 
establishing in advance specifically in what instances it will and will not become 
involved in an interstate conflict, and to what degree it will become involved. 
Clarity is a key element in defining these boundaries. For example, (D) may 
proclaim that it would defend (P) against unprovoked aggression by (A), but 
would not defend (P) if (P) recklessly provoked (A) into engaging in conflict. In 
this case, clarity is a fundamental element in upholding (D)’s role as the protector 
of the protege (see Figure 2), which implicitly assumes a victim’s role in this 
relationship.
While one can argue that even the terms described above are wrought 
with uncertainty, they serve here as clearly-defined boundaries for the purposes 
of this research. Taken as such, a potential criticism of the clarity espoused by 
extended deterrence remains; specifically declaring what actions serve as “red 
lines” that an aggressor must not dare to cross may actually encourage 
aggressive or antagonistic actions that approach, but do not cross, these lines. 
Clarity provides an opportunity for an aggressor to effectively “slice the salami”; a 
term referring to taking small steps toward aggressive behavior that, while not
11. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Institutionalized 
Ambiguity,” Asian Survey 26, no. 12 (December 1986): 1335.
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(A) wants to attack (P)  ^  Will (D) protect (P)?
(A) attacks (P)
Figure 2. Traditional extended deterrence model.
Yes
(A) does not attack (P)
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violating established boundaries individually, constitute violations when viewed 
collectively.
Whether domestic or international, however, such issues of politics are 
rarely black and white; they generally involve a gray area that is open to 
interpretation. Understanding the defined boundaries beforehand may 
encourage actors to enter into this gray area without fear of repercussion. This is 
analogous to a child who, having been told to stop touching his younger brother 
“or else,” tauntingly holds his hand in front of his sibling’s face, saying: “I’m not 
touching you....” The letter of the law has not been broken in this example, but 
tensions are likely to run high, with a risk of immediate escalation at any moment.
In contrast to the disadvantages of clarity noted above, pivotal deterrence 
relies on the power of ambiguity in playing two potentially hostile adversaries 
“against the middle.” It argues that the third-party “pivot” (P) acts as a dual­
defender that prevents two potentially hostile states—“aggressors 1 and 2” (A1, 
A2), which can alternate in the role of the more aggressive actor depending on 
the circumstances—from attacking each other by intentionally avoiding clarity in 
its intervention policy. As an example, (P) may threaten military intervention 
against (A1) if (A1) attacks (A2) without substantive justification, while 
simultaneously threatening (A2) that (P) would not defend (A2) if (A2) 
intentionally provoked (A1). In this approach, (P’s) position promotes peace 
between the aggressors by creating uncertainty as to whether it will support 
either side in a given situation. By threatening both sides simultaneously, this
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also encourages concessions by each aggressor to avoid isolation from the pivot; 
this is known as the “ingratiation effect.”
A central aspect of pivotal deterrence is the insurance-based “moral 
hazard” (illustrated in Hi); a situation that arises when the pivot’s pledge of 
protection encourages those who receive it to behave more recklessly than they 
would behave without it. In other words, if an aggressor believes that its actions 
can be undertaken safely from behind the shield of a strong third party, there is 
more incentive for the aggressor to do so. The moral hazard, therefore, is a 
critical element of the pivotal deterrence model. Other factors include the 
aggressors’ alignment options (illustrated in H2), the pivot’s interest in the stakes 
(illustrated in H3), and the benefits available to the aggressors (illustrated in H4).
An underlying premise of pivotal deterrence simply posits that each 
adversary would rather that the pivot were aligned with it than anything else, or 
that the pivot were neutral than aligned against it. In the Strait crises, both China 
and Taiwan would prefer to have the United States on their side, but if it is not, 
they would both prefer it to remain neutral than support their adversary. This 
premise assumes that: (1) the United States believes that both China and Taiwan 
harbor aggressive aims toward the other, and (2) that under some more or less 
favorable condition, they would use force to achieve their goals.
THREE SCENARIOS FOR PIVOTAL DETERRENCE
Using the concepts described above, Crawford described three basic 
“triangular scenarios” wherein pivotal deterrence can help to illustrate the role of
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the United States in affecting the actions of the two aggressors.12 In each of 
these, the best course of action is to avoid making firm commitments to either 
side. In all three, the United States as the pivot (P) has three options in regard to 
China and Taiwan (aggressors [A1] and [A2] respectively and/or alternately): to 
align with (A1), to align with (A2), or to remain neutral. In practice, the situation 
may shift between the three scenarios depending on the state of the trilateral 
relationship over time, as illustrated in the three scenarios below. Each scenario 
presents unique challenges for a pivotal deterrence model.
Scenario 1
This first scenario assumes that both China and Taiwan would be deterred from 
aggression at any given time only if they each thought that the United States 
would align with their enemy against them. The trick here is for the United States 
to convince each side individually that it would join their rival and fight against 
them if either were to instigate aggression. To accomplish this, the United States
i
must avoid making any commitments that would embolden either side while 
simultaneously trying to avoid giving the impression that it would stand aside if 
they were to provoke war (see Figure 3). This is the heart of the dilemma, and is 
what makes this strategy so difficult to enact successfully; by refusing to choose 
what it would do before aggression takes place, the United States may 
inadvertently send a signal that it would also not intervene after the fact.
12. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 5-9.





Will the U.S. remain neutral?
/ \
Yes No
U.S. would align 
with me
Take action
Figure 3. Scenario 1.
U.S. would align 
against me
Do not take action
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Alternatively, however, this strategy also is very likely to fail and to lead to conflict 
if the aggressor falsely assumes the pivot will support it.
Scenario 2
In this second scenario (see Figure 4), either China or Taiwan would 
undertake hostile action only if they would have the United States’ firm 
allegiance; each needs the power of the pivot. If, at any time, they were certain 
they had the support of the United States behind them, they would be much more 
likely to assert their aggression and would be more confident of success than if 
they did not. In this situation, the United States may effectively deter both 
aggressors simply by denying either of them clear assurances of American 
support in the event of war.
To illustrate this scenario, the United States may attempt to immobilize 
China with the prospect of not intervening if it attempted to “liberate” Taiwan by 
force, while also attempting to immobilize Taiwan with the prospect of not 
supporting Taipei if it instigated conflict by declaring independence from 
mainland China. All else being equal, this is the scenario in which pivotal 
deterrence appears easiest to demonstrate.
Alternatively, the United States in this scenario also has the option of 
deciding that it does not want to intervene at all. It can threaten to essentially de­
commit from the relationship with a “pox on both your houses” policy— branding 
both sides as aggressors or arguing that the situation is too close to call, thereby 
negating the rationale for maintaining the alliance. In this context, it shows that




Will the U.S. remain neutral?
No Yes
Will the U.S. align with me? Do not take action
No Yes
Do not take action Take action
Figure 4. Scenario 2.
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pivotal deterrence works because of, not in spite of, the essential ambiguity at its 
core.
Scenario 3
This third scenario (see Figure 5) is perhaps the most difficult case for 
pivotal deterrence, as the conditions for taking action are not equal for both 
aggressors; the threshold for taking action is lower for one than for the other. 
Here, (A1) would go to war whether the pivot supported it or remained neutral, 
but (A2) would only take action with the firm allegiance of the pivot. The role of 
ambiguity in the pivot’s policy is not eliminated in this scenario, but the range of 
possible strategies is significantly narrowed.
To illustrate this point, for example, the United States never committed to 
defend Taiwan under all circumstances. It refused to support Taiwanese 
independence in order to deter any provocation from Taipei, but maintained its 
commitment to ensuring a “peaceful” solution to the conflict and to helping 
Taiwan defend itself against an unprovoked Mainland attack; thereby deterring 
Beijing while restraining Taipei.
The central problem here is that the United States must instill contradicting 
fears in both China and Taiwan simultaneously. It must accomplish this by 
convincing them that it may shift its support for either side to the other, or 
withdraw, deciding upon its alignment depending upon the conditions. To the 
aggressor who would choose war only with the United States’ support, 
Washington would hold out the threat of neutrality. To the aggressor who would
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Aggressor 1 Aggressor 2
(more aggressive) (less aggressive)
Will U.S. remain neutral?
(A1) would take action 
(A2) would not take action
U.S. aligns with me U.S. aligns against me
/  \
(A1) would take action (A1) would not take action
(A2) would take action (A2) would not take action
Figure 5. Scenario 3. A commitment to remain neutral or to support 
either side results in war. The only option is to make each aggressor 
believe that the pivot may align with the other side.
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go to war if the United States remained neutral, Washington would hold out the 
threat of an alliance with the aggressor’s enemy. Therefore, a firm public 
commitment to either course of action would negate the United States’ leverage 
over one side, requiring that its deterrence position remain ambiguous. This 
scenario assumes that (P) would not fight a two-front war against (A1) and (A2).
THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The section below presents the four hypotheses of the research.
Whereas the dependent variable is presence or prevention of full-scale military 
conflict, each hypothesis addresses one of the independent variables: 
insurance/moral hazard, alignment options, interests, or benefits. The four 
intervening variables, as mentioned above, are the pivot’s power relative to the 
aggressors, the pivot’s preference for maintaining the status quo, the pivot’s 
belief that both aggressors hold revisionist aims toward each other, and each 
adversary’s perception of the other as more threatening than the pivot. These 
will all be addressed again in Chapter VII.
Hypothesis One: the Moral Hazard
A key element of pivotal deterrence, the moral hazard is a problem that 
arises when one actor insures another against the consequences of its actions. 
For example, a person may be more likely to attempt a risky stunt, such as 
walking on a high ledge or swinging from a trapeze, when there is a net or airbag 
below them to ensure their protection if they fail in their attempt. Without the
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security provided by the net (the insurance), the person may be much more 
cautious or flatly refuse to engage in the activity.
Similarly, states fall prey to the moral hazard when they believe they can 
act recklessly toward another state because a third party insures them against 
retaliatory actions. Believing that the United States will protect it, for example, 
Taiwan may feel secure enough to instigate actions it knows mainland China will 
find unacceptable. The first hypothesis presents the following argument: 
hh: Holistic pivotal deterrence was more likely to fail when the United States
insured China or Taiwan against the risks of their behavior. Conversely, 
holistic pivotal deterrence was more likely to succeed when the United 
States did not insure China or Taiwan against the risks of their behavior.
This element is a factor of the original pivotal deterrence model, and seeks 
to demonstrate a correlation between levels of aggression and perceived support 
from the pivot. If it holds true, then it would support pivotal deterrence’s 
argument against strategic clarity in favor of ambiguity. As an example, if the 
United States had insured Taiwan against the risks of the Nationalist forces’ 
attack on the Mainland, it most likely would have specifically stated that it would 
use offensive military force against Communist Chinese military actions in 
retaliation. Alternatively, if the United States had insured Taiwan against the 
risks of reclaiming, or declaring independence from, the Mainland, it would have 
imposed itself in such a way as to act as a “tripwire”; any military retaliation from 
the Mainland would have directly involved U.S. forces, thereby justifying U.S. 
retaliation in self-defense. On the other hand, if the United States were to insure
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mainland China, Washington would have only had to declare a policy of 
nonintervention: that Communist Chinese military actions against Taiwan were 
not a threat to U.S. interests, and that the United States would not intervene, so 
long as Communist Chinese forces did not target U.S. forces.
Hypothesis Two: Alignment
A state’s alignment options refer to its external relations with other states 
as sources of military or diplomatic support. As a critical condition, however, 
these alternative alliances must be of such significant stature as to make a 
difference in the balance of power. Having a plethora of weak, insignificant 
states on one’s side does not qualify as alignment options in this context.
An aggressor state that has many alignment options will have more 
latitude in its decisions toward another state, regardless of the interests of the 
pivot, because it would not be dependent upon the pivot for continued support of 
its own needs. An aggressor state that has few alignment options, however, will 
be greatly constrained in its actions toward other states, since it will be inherently 
more dependent on the pivot. With no alternative direction to turn, therefore, an 
aggressor that is without alignment options can be pressured by a pivot to follow 
its direction more readily than can an aggressor with options. This second 
hypothesis presents the following argument:
H2: Pivotal deterrence was more likely to succeed when China’s and Taiwan’s
alignment options were scarce. Conversely, pivotal deterrence was more 
likely to fail when China’s and Taiwan’s alignment options were abundant.
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This is a factor of the original pivotal deterrence model, and also is a 
significant aspect for pivotal deterrence because it demonstrates a correlation 
between the aggressors’ acceptance of the pivot’s desire for peace and their 
access to alternative resources. If this hypothesis holds true, it could suggest an 
important condition for recognizing when one might expect pivotal deterrence to 
be effective in specific situations and relationships. In contrast to the first 
variable, moral hazard, which is highly subjective, identifying indicators for 
alignment is more objective because factors such as diplomatic recognition and 
military aid are, generally speaking, quantifiable matters of record.
Hypothesis Three: Interests
When a pivotal state maintains a preponderance of power in a security 
relationship, taking action to protect vital interests is practically a foregone 
conclusion. Whether that same state will take action to protect secondary 
interests, however, is less certain. In this situation, therefore, a level of 
uncertainty as to the pivot’s level of interest may force aggressor states to 
question whether threatening the pivot’s interests will cause it to intervene or to 
stand aside. In other words, aggressors will be more certain of intervention 
involving vital interests than secondary ones. In opposition to the original pivotal 
deterrence model, this third hypothesis presents the following argument:
H3: With the United States as a preponderant-power pivot, holistic pivotal
deterrence was more likely to succeed when interests in the Strait were 
secondary. Conversely, holistic pivotal deterrence was less likely to
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succeed when interests were vital (i.e., secondary interests invited 
ambiguity; vital interests invited clarity and insured action).
While this element contradicts the original pivotal deterrence model, it 
demonstrates how interests and policies are correlated. Evidence supporting this 
hypothesis would imply situations when pivotal deterrence should or should not 
be effective in relation to the pivot’s interests. For the purposes of this research, 
vital interests are defined as those that Crawford describes as involving an 
actor’s “self preservation, political independence, and, by extension, ‘defense of 
strategically vital areas’”; secondary interests may involve “maintaining trade 
routes, the safety of your allies, and even national ‘prestige,’”13 but their 
compromise probably would not have a significant effect on one’s security, 
economy, or power.
Hypothesis Four: Benefits
States generally act aggressively when they seek to take something from 
their rival, whether that “something” is political, economic, territorial, or otherwise. 
When a pivotal state can offer some benefit that the aggressor values more than 
that which it covets from its rival (this may be physical, economic, ideological, 
social, or political), the aggressor may be deterred from acting on its lesser 
interests if doing so will result in losing the benefit from the pivot. The fourth 
hypothesis presents the following argument:
13. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 31.
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H4: Holistic pivotal deterrence was likely to succeed when China and Taiwan
each wanted to get or keep what benefits the United States could give 
or take away more than what they wanted to take from their rival. 
Conversely, holistic pivotal deterrence was likely to fail when China and 
Taiwan coveted something of their rival’s more than what they would get 
or keep from the United States.
This fourth element is not included in the original pivotal deterrence model, 
but it demonstrates how “sticks and carrots” can be used to manipulate the 
behavior of aggressor states in a pivotal deterrence security relationship while 
also maintaining the requisite ambiguity for its success. This is also the element 
that goes beyond traditional elements of power to give this model the 
characteristics of “holistic pivotal deterrence.”
To illustrate this factor, consider the following: If Taiwan wanted to declare 
independence from the Mainland, but such action would cause the United States 
to withdraw its military aid or flatly refuse to provide military protection, then 
Taipei would have to weigh its chances of success without the United States 
against the probability of needing U.S. benefits. Likewise, for example, if China 
wanted to reclaim Taiwan by force—assuming such action would not result in 
direct U.S. military intervention— Beijing would have to consider those 
repercussions, such as trade sanctions, the United States might impose upon it 
as a result; restrictions upon basic trade or upon transfers of technology could 
have a significant effect upon mainland China’s development.
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The Complimentary Nature of Holistic Pivotal Deterrent Factors
In any security relationship, multiple factors usually are in play 
simultaneously. Many view military power as a key indicator of a nation’s 
strength; but while a large, well-equipped and well-trained military can be a 
reflection of a state’s power, so can other, less tangible factors. Economic 
strength can provide a level of independence from other states, for example, 
while a crumbling social structure can throw a powerful nation into turmoil. And a 
wide network of diplomatic relationships can provide a country with a variety of 
alliance options, whereas isolation can leave it with few or none. Crawford notes 
that “an important qualification” in all of this is that the aggressors “are ‘risk 
averse’”; demonstrating at least a “thin” sense of rationality.14
These factors all play significant roles in determining a state’s level of 
power and security, but each factor is dynamic and subject to wide fluctuations. 
Over time, one or more of these factors often change, leaving the state to 
reassess and adjust its position as necessary to compensate for any gains or 
losses. Just as gains may embolden a state to assume a more aggressive 
position, losses may force it to seek alternative sources of military, political, 
social, or economic influence or support. This research addresses all of these 
factors in the Taiwan Strait throughout the crisis junctures under consideration. 
This approach will help to explain how and why various elements of pivotal 
deterrence apply differently at various junctures.
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UNDERSTANDING THE HOLISTIC PIVOTAL DETERRENCE MODEL
Before testing or applying this model to a specific case, one should take 
care to ensure that the situation appropriately matches the model’s requirements, 
and should also recognize the difficulty in maintaining the ambiguity necessary 
for the model to be effective. If the four preconditions—of preponderant power, 
status quo goals, revisionist adversaries, and the pivot being perceived as the 
lesser threat in the relationship—are shown to exist prior to the model being 
applied, then one can expect the success of holistic pivotal deterrence to be 
directly correlated to the strength of each of the independent variables espoused 
in the hypotheses.
The model does not require that all of the independent variables apply 
equally in relation to each other; one may be stronger than, and make up for 
weaknesses in, another. As the model considers the totality of the situation, so 
too does the deterrent effect consider the overall application of the variables. It is 
important to keep in mind that even if the trilateral deterrent relationship is 
applicable to this model, every actor will possess different qualities that will apply 
less or more directly to each variable. It is the responsibility of those assessing 
the relationship or developing the security strategy to understand these inherent 
nuances.
It is also important to understand that it is not necessary for all of the 
variables to apply to both aggressors, or for them to apply to both aggressors 
equally; particularly if only one of them is pushing toward taking action. And as
14. Ibid., 22.
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illustrated in the three separate scenarios from Chapter II, the deterrent 
requirements may be different for each aggressor. Of the two aggressors, for 
example, the benefits variable is more likely to be effective against the aggressor 
that is more dependent upon the pivot, and the insurance variable is more likely 
to be applied to the aggressor closer to the pivot. This is not a flaw of the model, 
but a simple truth; each actor can be expected to have different needs, and to 
respond differently to the same leverage.
The ambiguity involved in maintaining the deterrent cannot be taken for 
granted. If the pivot is not ambiguous enough, the aggressors may think they 
understand the pivot’s intentions. But if the pivot it too ambiguous, the 
aggressors may not consider the pivot’s threats to intervene as credible. Where 
the reality of the situation is likely to force the pivot away from the appropriate 
level of ambiguity, the pivot should identify its ultimate interests in advance and 
develop a contingency plan in the event deterrence fails and the aggressors 
move to disrupt the status quo.
Finally, one should understand that the pivot does not necessarily threaten 
to shift its support from one aggressor to the other; it is not a case of simply 
“changing sides.” If the pivot ambiguously offers to protect the aggressor closer 
(more closely allied) to the pivot to deter the other aggressor, but threatens not to 
support the closer aggressor if it attempts to disrupt the status quo, the pivot 
does not automatically align itself with the more hostile aggressor to deter the 
closer aggressor; the threat of withdrawing its protection from the closer 
aggressor is enough of a deterrent.
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TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
By applying these four hypotheses—based upon insurance, alignment, 
interests, and benefits—to the four crisis junctures in the Taiwan Strait, this 
research examines whether holistic pivotal deterrence can effectively maintain 
relative peace and stability in the region. It also illustrates the integral role of 
ambiguity in the model. While many researchers use more traditional 
approaches, such as extended deterrence, to explain events such as those 
discussed in this research, understanding security policies, such as those in the 
Taiwan Strait, is a complex matter that can benefit from alternative approaches. 
This research posits that the crises in the Strait could be more clearly understood 
if viewed through the lens of holistic pivotal deterrence; demonstrating how 
uncertainty, more so than clarity, can convince aggressive states that seeking 
conflict is neither their best option nor in their best interests.
As noted in the previous chapter, this research seeks to expand the range 
of perspectives and viewpoints for academics, policymakers, and others to better 
understand these phenomena by applying the holistic pivotal deterrence model to 
the assertions presented herein. It is through this lens which one may view the 
dynamics of the regional security relationship in a new way. The research also 
seeks to illustrate situations in which pivotal deterrence can be an effective 
model for recognizing, understanding, and applying options when faced with the 
prospect of, or the potential for, third-party intervention based on an ambiguous 
strategy.
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SUMMARY
As described above, this research applies holistic pivotal deterrence to 
four empirically testable, although somewhat subjective, hypotheses: First, when 
U.S. power insured China or Taiwan against the risks of acting aggressively, they 
were more likely to do so. Second, strategic ambiguity worked most effectively 
when China or Taiwan had few or no alignment options other than the United 
States. Third, an ambiguous security policy was more likely to be successful 
when the interests being protected were not vital. And fourth, China and Taiwan 
were likely to avoid war when each wanted what they were able to get from the 
United States more than what they wanted to take from each other. These 
hypotheses will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
Pivotal deterrence seeks to explain how an ambiguous third-party security 
policy can maintain peace and stability in a region of potential or limited conflict 
while simultaneously maintaining policies that are potentially contradictory. 
Building on this concept, this research applies the holistic pivotal deterrence 
model to the Taiwan Strait crises in order to illustrate how well it explains the 
absence of conflict escalation in the region in the second half of the 20th 
century.15
The United States employed its strength as a superpower to influence 
events in parts of the world other than the Strait throughout the first half of the
15. This paper presents an analytic argument on the merits of pivotal deterrence 
as discussed herein, and should be considered only one of many approaches to 
understanding security in the Strait in the context of this research.
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20th century,16 but employed it quite differently during the Strait crises than it did 
during WWI, WWII, or the Korean War. Rather than clearly committing its 
military to direct combat in the Strait, the U.S. combined its military capabilities 
with the power of uncertainty to deter those actions that it determined posed the 
greatest threats to stability in the region.
This chapter provides a general overview of the trilateral relationship as it 
applies to the research, but later chapters will go into more detail on the specifics 
of each juncture. It introduced the methodology and explained the key factors of 
the research, and included an introduction to pivotal deterrence and its 
fundamental qualities. It also presented the four hypotheses of the dissertation 
that are applied to key junctures under study in the United States-China-Taiwan 
relationship. Throughout these junctures of crisis in the trilateral relationship, the 
longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity that is the cornerstone of this model 
had indicated unqualified support to neither the government in Taipei nor in 
Beijing; even as the United States projected its military power into the region.
A topic of frequent debate revolves around the factors that prevented both 
Taiwan and China from engaging in major conflict across the Strait, despite the 
desires of both parties to change the status quo. This research investigates, and 
seeks to support, the argument that ambiguity was a critical element that 
prevented either aggressor from knowing with any certainty just how far the
16. While some analysts focus primarily on military power as a reflection of a 
state’s strength, this research considers all factors of power, including diplomatic, social, 
military, and economic.
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United States would allow either to push—or under what circumstances the 
United States would become militarily involved—and thus prevented the 
escalation of force. Ambiguity is largely credited with allowing the United States 
to maintain some degree of control over the political-military forces of both the 
PRC and ROC, and with maintaining the relative peace across the Strait. 
Whereas China and Taiwan have both acted aggressively toward each other and 
sought to alter the status quo, strategic ambiguity appears to have played a 
significant role in maintaining stability in the region for over 50 years.
The next chapter presents the theoretical framework for pivotal 
deterrence: its fundamental qualities, how it compares to other approaches to 
deterrence, military capabilities, three scenarios for pivotal deterrence, key 
assumptions for the research, and the parameters for the overall assessment. 
This assists the reader in developing the context for further discussion of the 
holistic pivotal deterrence model.




This chapter provides an overview of the mainstream theories and 
explanations for the absence of war between the PRC and ROC. It highlights 
some relevant schools of thought and factors in international relations conflict 
theories in order to provide an understanding of how they explain power, state 
behavior, and security. These include general and extended deterrence, 
compellence, rationality, game theory, credibility, capability, and absolute and 
relative gains. This chapter illustrates these theoretical concepts to provide a 
framework for explaining the subsequent research findings.
This chapter presents some fundamental aspects of deterrence and 
describes how it applies to the situation in the Strait, and presents some 
alternative approaches to deterrence and discusses the role of two major 
elements— rationality and credibility— in maintaining an effective deterrent 
position. It discusses the role of military capabilities and the role of absolute and 
relative gains as they apply to military power, and also presents the elements of, 
and arguments for, pivotal deterrence as compared to other forms of extended 
deterrence. It seeks to explain how ambiguity can be more effective than clarity 
in maintaining an effective deterrent position and posits that defining deterrence 
is fundamental to presenting the different approaches, and it also holds that 
defining the key aspects of pivotal deterrence is necessary to understanding the 
relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, and that comparing
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extended and pivotal deterrence is useful for further clarifying the fundamental 
aspects.
Another purpose of this chapter is to further describe what the research 
ultimately seeks to explain: how pivotal deterrence can help clarify what is 
already generally understood about security in the Strait and how it relates to 
other crises. One objective of this research is to show that while realism and 
balance of power remain relevant, regimes and perceptions also are relevant in 
applying pivotal deterrence in the Strait.
In setting the theoretical framework for testing the hypotheses, this 
chapter addresses several issues. It begins by discussing the generally 
accepted definition of deterrence and identifying its strengths and weaknesses.
It then addresses differences in alternative approaches to deterrence and 
explains how deterrence is addressed in the scope of this research. Next, it 
illustrates how this model is applied to the case studies of the Taiwan Strait, the 
assumptions that guide the analysis, and the parameters within which the results 
are considered and presented.
DETERRENCE AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT
In discussing the relationship between China, Taiwan, and the United 
States, one must consider how deterrence generally affects security relations 
between actors. This section presents various approaches to deterrence, since 
recognizing alternative concepts is important for understanding the trilateral 
security relationship and how deterrence relates to international security studies.
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A subsequent review of the pivotal deterrence model will highlight the roles, 
strengths, and weaknesses of extended and dual deterrence in relation to 
maintaining security in the Strait.
The concept of deterrence is widely understood as a key element of 
security studies. It is certainly applicable to the Strait and is often credited for 
maintaining peace between potentially hostile actors such as China and Taiwan. 
Patrick Morgan states that, when one actor threatens another, “deterrence is the 
threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by 
someone else.”1 Following this concept, the vast amount of literature on 
deterrence presents a variety of differing approaches for understanding the 
crises in the Strait. While the term “deterrence” within the realm of international 
relations usually refers to situations between rival states, it does not necessarily 
preclude other defined units from falling within the definition. Deterrence may 
involve an ally, a protectorate, or a friendly neutral actor. But whatever the unit, 
one may reasonably argue that the threat of military action or other force remains 
a central element.
As this chapter describes in greater detail below, Morgan places 
deterrence into two categories: general and immediate. As states more 
frequently find themselves between crises than within them, one may note that 
general deterrence is the more common, but arguably more difficult, of the two 
categories to qualify.
1. Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications, 1983), 30.
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General deterrence applies to situations where the use of force is not 
imminent, but where opponents maintain the potential to employ force at some 
future time—e.g., during periods of relative normalcy. It can be described as a 
relationship among two or more states wherein “leaders in at least one would 
consider resorting to force” to alter the status quo, and wherein “the other side, 
precisely because it believes the opponent would be willing to consider resorting 
to force, maintains forces of its own and offers warnings to respond in kind to 
attempts to use force contrary to its interests.”2 But largely because this 
describes a situation where force has not yet been employed by either side, it is 
difficult to identify precisely when general deterrence has succeeded. In the 
absence of proof in the form of the deterred’s own admission of effect, as Huth 
and Russett argue, there often is little evidence to show whether an actor was 
actually deterred from attacking, or never intended to attack in the first place.3
By contrast, immediate deterrence applies where the use of force by (A) is 
imminent and the threat of retaliation by (B) must be presented in very short 
order—e.g., crisis situations when general deterrence has failed.4 It is employed 
when general deterrence has failed; after “the challenger couples a demand for 
change in the status quo with the threat or initiation of military action.”5 Lebow
2. Ibid., 42-43.
3. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 
1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 497; and Richard Lebow and Janice 
Stein, “When Does Deterrence Succeed, and How do We Know?” Occasional Paper no. 
8 (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990).
4. Morgan, Deterrence, 30-31.
5. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: 
Testing Three Competing Models," American Political Science Review 87, no. 1 (March 
1993): 62.
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and Stein posit, however, that this is merely a short-term strategy intended to 
discourage an imminent attack or challenge of a specific commitment.6
Deterrence is not always utilized on an actor’s own behalf, however. At its 
core, the security situation in the Taiwan Strait is a version of extended 
deterrence, wherein a state’s deterrent posture protects a third party from the 
threat of force by another actor—i.e., where a defender (D) prevents an attacker 
(A) from attacking a third party protege (P), as evidenced in America’s protection 
of West Germany against the Soviet Union. Huth and Russett warn, however, 
that maintaining this balance can be a more precarious and demanding task than 
that of deterring a frontal attack on oneself.7 Samuel Wu extends the description: 
If (D) initiates a counterthreat in response to (A’s) signal of hostile intentions 
toward (P) (i.e., if general deterrence has failed) in concert with (P’s) resistance, 
then this is considered extended immediate deterrence.8 Extended deterrence 
generally establishes clear boundaries that, if (A) crosses, will cause (D) to 
become involved to protect (P).
To be clear, however, Morgan makes the point that deterrence should not 
“be confused with the use of threats to prevent or paralyze opposition or to 
interfere with one’s aggressive objectives, for this promises attack and not 
retaliation”;9 it is too late at this point. The difference is that deterrence passively
6. Richard Lebow and Janice Stein, “Deterrence and the Cold War,” Political 
Science Quarterly 110, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 161.
7. Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?” 496.
8. Samuel Wu, “To Attack or Not to Attack: A Theory and Empirical Assessment 
of Extended Immediate Deterrence,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 3 
(September 1990): 532.
9. Morgan, Deterrence, 32.
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suggests the threat of retaliation if aggression occurs; not afterward. Conversely, 
compellence or coercion is actively using the threat of force to make an actor 
take or cease an action, as discussed in greater detail below.10 This is 
sometimes improperly used to describe deterrence, but is a very different 
concept.
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS OF DETERRENCE
Deterrence may be generally described as a psychological power that 
prevents one actor from doing something that another actor does not want it to 
do. This concept is found in many aspects of society throughout history: Legal 
systems may use the threat of fines, incarceration, or capital punishment to deter 
citizens from committing crimes; families often instill a sense of obligation and 
respect to deter children from acting out against their parents; and states often 
project military strength in an attempt to deter other states from taking hostile 
actions against them.
All of these examples, however, are fallible in that they do not effectively 
deter everyone in all circumstances, and in that the deterring actor frequently 
must resort to alternative measures after deterrence has failed—whether sending 
a criminal to prison, a child to his or her room, or troops to a foreign country to 
confront an aggressor. There is no 100-percent reliable method to determine 
whether an attempted deterrent will be effective in a given situation.
10. For the purposes of this research, the terms “compellence” and “coercion” 
are used interchangeably.
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Compellence and Deterrence
Before delving too far into deterrence, this section will further discuss the 
related, but distinctly different, strategy in dealing with interstate conflict: 
compellence. Whereas deterrence is designed to prevent an actor from taking a 
specific action, compellence is designed to convince an actor to give up 
something it has already started, obtained, or achieved. Many deterrence 
theorists maintain that, as Schelling states, with “other things being equal, 
compellence is ... more difficult to implement in practice” in comparison to 
deterrence.11 This is because, as Richard Lebow and Janice Stein explain, 
“compellence requires the target to act in ways that are highly visible and, 
therefore, more likely to involve major costs that affect important domestic 
constituencies and foreign allies.”12 This is in contrast to deterrence, which 
requires that a potential attacker merely refrain from taking a specific action, 
which is often an “invisible concession.”
In the latter case, an actor can deny that the action was even going to be 
taken in the first place, whereas the former creates the potential problem of 
having to “save face” among peers. The political difference between deterrence 
and compellence can be dramatic. As Walter Petersen argues, efforts to change
11. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1966), 42.
12. Richard Lebow and Janice Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent 
Variable,” World Politics 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 351.
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the status quo are more likely to result in war than are efforts to deter one’s 
opponent from doing so.13
Not all deterrence theorists treat compellence as conceptually distinct from 
deterrence, however. Even Lebow and Stein contend that the two strategies are 
often practiced jointly and in ways that effectively blur the distinctions between 
them. They argue that “deterrence may be used to reinforce compellence, and 
compellence to deter.”14 While recognizing the potential value of compellence as 
a deterrence multiplier, this research considers the distinction significant and 
maintains that they are fundamentally different. For example, Ross posits that 
the 1995-96 confrontation in the Strait combined Chinese coercion and U.S. 
deterrence, stating that “China used coercive diplomacy to threaten costs until 
the United States and Taiwan changed their policies. The United States used 
deterrence diplomacy to communicate to both Chinese and regional leaders the 
credibility of its strategic commitments. Washington used force not to defend its 
Taiwan policy, but to defend its strategic reputation by influencing perceptions of 
U.S. resolve.”15
Supporting this perspective, Scobell presents an argument that both 
coercion and deterrence can serve as diplomatic tools; identifying the 1995-96 
crisis as a case of coercive diplomacy and calling it “the result of a civil-military
13. Walter Petersen, “Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of 
Conventional Wisdom," International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 3 (September 1986): 279.
14. Lebow and Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” 352.
15. Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, 
Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Autumn 2000): 88.
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consensus.”16 He posits that the PRC military exercises, which involved firing 
missiles toward Taiwan, “were clearly defined, circumscribed in terms of location, 
duration, and scope. This was explicitly communicated several days in advance 
to Taipei and Washington.... By contrast, preparations for the exercises of March 
1996 were undertaken many months before, and advance warnings were 
communicated that more saber rattling could be expected.... Still, Chinese 
leaders were certainly concerned about the U.S. response.”17 And Garver 
argues that “in the PI_A’s view, its actions were not seen as very dangerous or 
risky, especially to gauge from the muted U.S. response until early 1996.”18 
Based on these observations, this author contends that compellence and 
deterrence can be effective whether employed individually or in combination.
CHINA, TAIWAN, AND RATIONAL CHOICE
Rational choice can be considered a way of thinking that reflects the way 
humans make decisions, based upon observation and experiment, and 
consisting of “a mental model of the future and predicted outcomes for alternative 
choices.19 Communist and Nationalist China each assumed aggressive positions 
during the various crises in the Strait, but whether they fully considered the 
consequences of their actions is an important point of debate. If either side were
16. Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 
1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 
228.
17. Ibid., 237-37.
18. John Garver, Face off: China, the United States and Taiwan's 
Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 85-86.
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to deter the other, the decision-makers must have maintained some idea of how 
the other might react to any given action. One popular approach to explaining 
how deterrence functions among and between states takes the position of 
viewing states’ leaders as being capable of making rational decisions. George 
Downs describes two versions of this approach, which he terms “rational 
deterrence”: a “weak” version that simply views the outcome of choices as a 
cost/benefit function; and a “strong” version that also considers the shape of 
utility functions, the cost of war, the probability of winning, the effects of 
misperceptions, and numerous other factors. But while the weak version is 
sometimes criticized for being “thin,” Downs notes, the strong version is said to 
encompass too many factors to make it practical in times of crisis.20 While both 
versions appear useful in their own right, each places different demands upon 
researching the topic. And whether weak or strong, rational deterrence will 
ultimately require an actor to predict the potential responses to any decision.
Some critics of deterrence theory rest their case against it on the 
inadequacy of the rational actor model, arguing that people often do not make 
rational decisions. Zagare suggests, however, that since there is a critical 
difference between the rational actor model and the assumption of rational 
choice, which is sometimes taken to be synonymous with it, many of the
19. Kenneth Watman and Dan Wilkening, U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), 17-18.
20. Some inherent ambiguities include determining when deterrence succeeds, 
the appropriate time frame to study, defining what counts as conflict, and other variables.
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criticisms are beside the point.21 Huth and Russett simply use the term “rational” 
in the context of an actor having the ability to order preferences and to make 
decisions according to that ordering, and one’s perceptions regarding the 
likelihood of various outcomes, stating “A rational decision-maker may be risk- 
averse, or risk acceptant. The assumption of rationality does not require that 
perceptions be accurate, or that a given decision-maker’s preferences be the 
same as other people’s ... only that he choose the option with the greatest 
expected utility at the time.”22 This concept is also the premise of what some 
term the “expected-utility” model.
Assessing whether Chinese Communist and Nationalist decision-makers 
were rational during these crises requires one to consider the question of what 
makes an actor rational or irrational. Verba describes a rational actor as 
someone who bases any response to an event upon a “cool and clearheaded 
ends-means calculation,” using the best information available and chooses ... 
that alternative most likely to maximize his goals.”23 As Zagare suggests, making 
such a decision requires each actor to assess the potential preferences of other 
relevant actors and their likely responses to his own tactical choices; that is, to 
his own concessions or threats.24 Sigal notes that a rational policy model 
approach characteristically tends to attribute aggressiveness to one side in a
21. Frank Zagare, “Rationality and Deterrence,” World Politics 42, no. 2 (January 
1990): 238.
22. Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?” 499.
23. Sidney Verba, “Assumptions of Rationality and Non-rationality in Models of 
the International System,” World Politics 14, no. 1 (October 1961): 95.
24. Zagare, “Rationality and Deterrence,” 239.
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conflict. And while Washington and Taipei may have viewed Beijing as acting 
aggressively, Beijing may have viewed Taipei and Washington as the true 
aggressors.25
Luce and Raiffa also provide a very clear and direct definition of a rational 
actor as “one who, when confronted with ‘two alternatives which give rise to 
outcomes ... will choose the one which yields the more preferred outcome.’”26 
For an actor to be rational in the instrumentalist sense described here, Zagare 
argues that one must have both connected (i.e., he must prefer a to b, b to a, or 
be indifferent) and transitive (i.e., if he prefers a to b, and b to c, then he will also 
prefer a to c) preferences over the set of available outcomes. Otherwise, his 
preferences are logically incoherent and are best analyzed outside a rational 
choice framework.27
Costs and Benefits
The role of expectations is a notably critical ingredient in rational 
deterrence, which Nalebuff posits “is based on the application of cost-benefit 
analysis to conflict initiation.” He argues that “the costs of conflict are compared 
with the benefits of cooperation; if all parties prefer cooperation, then the status 
quo will prevail and a potential conflict is avoided. Even at that level of
25. Leon V. Sigal, “The ‘Rational Policy’ Model and the Formosa Straits Crises,” 
International Studies Quarterly 14, no. 2 (June 1970): 152-53.
26. Duncan R. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and 
Critical Survey (New York: Wiley, 1957), 50.
27. Zagare, “Rationality and Deterrence,” 240-41.
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generality, [however,] the theory is incomplete.”28 Because there is a dearth of 
reliable, accurate information about the CPP coming from mainland China 
throughout most of the 20th century, making accurate assessments probably 
would have been very difficult, if not impossible.
Nalebuff also states that “maximizing behavior is an essential element of 
rationality. It imposes cost-benefit analysis as the basis for deciding whether or 
not to intervene.”29 He assumes, then, that an actor will make the most beneficial 
choice among various options. Harmony in anarchy exists when not only every 
state is rational, but when every state assumes that every other state is rational 
too. Moreover, as Waltz affirms, “to allow ... for the irrational acts of others can 
lead to no determinate solution but to attempt to act on a rational calculation 
without making such an allowance can lead to [one’s own] undoing.”30
It is also important to think of states such as China and Taiwan in this 
context as units acting in response to the gravitational force of nationalism. In 
modern times, Waltz argues, feelings of nationalism are fed by the combination 
of loyalty to the nation state and the antagonisms that occur in the international 
system. Therefore, individuals tend to participate in war because they are 
members of states. Rational decision-making within a democratic state 
bureaucracy, Freedman posits, requires a position of considerable political power 
to balance a large degree of irrational influences, such as lobbyists or special
28. Barry Nalebuff, “Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World,” World Politics 
43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313.
29. Ibid., 321.
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interests. Facilitating rational decisions requires a degree of organization “so that 
those at the top are aware of key decisions that have to be made and have the 
information with which to make them.”31 While this may not be as relevant in 
non-democratic states or non-state groups, the implication stands that rationality 
is not a foregone conclusion, and must not be assumed.
But rationality, however important in decision making, does have its limits; 
it is not always fully based on perceptions. As Langlois argues, using the 
analogy of a chess player who can only rationally calculate the complexity of his 
opponent’s upcoming moves to a certain degree, one must make decisions 
based solely on the amount of information one is able to cognitively process at a 
given moment. In chess, there are simply far too many complex calculations for 
most people to consider all of them simultaneously. For a game-theoretical 
model to assume full forward knowledge of an actor’s thoughts—to assume 
“unbounded rationality— it must therefore present a fundamental and severe 
distortion of reality.32 To present this another way, there are limits to how far 
ahead any actor can rationally determine what an adversary might do in any 
given situation; there are just too many variables and unknowns to warrant 
confidence in such situations.
30. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1959), 169.
31. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd ed. (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 231.
32. Jean-Pierre P. Langlios, “Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability,” American 
Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 811.
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Game Theory and Deterrence
One approach to understanding rational decision-making between China 
and Taiwan is expressed in strategic games such as “prisoner’s dilemma,” 
wherein the best course of action for each player depends on what the other 
player(s) do. Snyder describes the game of prisoner’s dilemma as “a paradigm 
... in which the reward for unilateral noncooperation exceeds both the benefit 
from mutual cooperation and the cost of mutual benefit.”33 This concept is based 
on the premise that two prisoners, who are separated and cannot communicate 
with each other by any means, each are given the option of either defecting (D) 
by confessing to the crime, or cooperating (C) by remaining silent; with each 
option presenting a different punishment. If both remain silent (CC), then they 
will both serve a 1-year sentence in prison for a lesser offense. If they both 
confess (DD), then they will both receive a 5-year sentence. But if one 
confesses while the other remains silent (CD or DC), the one who confesses will 
receive a 3-month sentence, while the one who remains silent will receive a 10- 
year sentence.
Since the prisoners in the above scenario cannot communicate with each 
other, each actor must choose the option with the best chance of success. 
Because there is no way for one to know that the other will remain silent, both 
prisoners are likely to confess, each earning the 5-year sentence. The point here 
is that, had they been able to communicate, they could have both agreed to
33. Glen Snyder, ‘“Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’ in International Politics,” 
International Studies Quarterly 15, no. 1 (March 1971): 68.
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remain silent and received the shorter sentence. As Freedman notes, “working 
within the rules, there is no way out of the prisoner’s dilemma.”34 Here, “rational” 
decisions result in sub-optimal outcomes.
Game-theoretical approaches are often criticized for presuming the 
rationality of the players and for ignoring factors such as mental instability, poor 
judgment, political pressures, or other extenuating factors. The gap between 
reality and theory brings a great deal of skepticism to the validity of game theory. 
But charges of unrealistic assumptions have been countered by theorists such as 
Schelling, who argued that “the assumption of rational behavior was not 
necessarily close to the truth, but it was productive for the development of new 
and relevant concepts.”35 This raises an important point: even though a theory 
may not reflect reality, it can still hold inherent value as an alternative to 
contemporary thought.
The Credibility of China’s, Taiwan’s, and America’s Power
In the Strait, as well as other areas of crisis, credibility is a fundamental 
element of deterrence because, as Danilovic states, a potential attacker “must be 
convinced that the deterrer can and will execute its threats if the attack occurs.”36 
And Morgan defines credibility as “looking like you have the will and capability to
34. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 187.
35. Thomas Schelling, quoted in Ibid., 184.
36. Vesna Danilovic, “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (June 2001): 343.
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carry out your threats.”37 One may argue that if Mao did not believe U.S. military 
forces would intervene against a military strike against Taiwan, he would have 
ordered such attacks at several junctures. Zagare and Kilgour expound on its 
importance, stating that the “credibility of a threat to punish an aggressor is 
frequently taken to mean that the threat is believed, and is left at that. Typically, 
the next analytical step is to explore the underlying determinants of such 
beliefs.”38 In this approach, they argue, the principal source of uncertainty lies in 
a general lack of information about the preferences of one’s opponent.
While Huth notes that “a potential attacker... may find it difficult to 
estimate what military capabilities of a defender can be extended to the defense 
of an ally located hundreds, if not thousands, of miles away,”39 this ambiguity can 
also play to the defender’s advantage. By considering how one may take 
advantage of uncertain credibility of threats in such instances, one is better able 
to understand the role of threats in contributing to, or detracting from, the 
robustness of deterrence. Within much of the strategic literature, credibility has 
frequently been considered to be synonymous with believability. Conversely, 
Zagare and Kilgour argue, threats that are not believed are not credible— as was 
the situation with the Eisenhower administration’s threat to inflict nuclear
37. Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 101.
38. Frank Zagare and Mark Kilgour, “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” 
American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 2 (May 1991): 305.
39. Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1988), 4.
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devastation on the Soviet Union for relatively minor transgressions of the status 
quo,40 or U.S. nuclear threats in the Strait.
The credibility of threats has been closely linked with their perceived levels 
of rationality, which, as Schelling argues, creates a deterrence paradox: for actor 
(A) to threaten actor (B) if (B) misbehaves, it is irrelevant how much actor (A) 
would also be hurt in the process—provided that actor (B) believes the threat.41 
Lebow points out that the advent of the nuclear age has, in some ways, damaged 
the credibility of the threat to go to war because most people came to recognize 
that such threats are inherently irrational42 This connection between credibility 
and rationality can be found in many areas, including both the strategic and 
game-theoretic literature, where “the credibility of threats is generally taken to be 
synonymous with subgame perfectness of Nash equilibria.”43
Credibility is not always easy to establish, however, even for powerful 
states such as Communist China, because factors that extend beyond the 
obvious may make using force less likely in some situations. Tunander 
describes a credibility paradox in that it must be “possible to wage war at varying 
but clearly defined levels,” yet at the same time, those levels must be “sufficiently 
indeterminate and hazy for the escalation process to have a deterrent effect, that
40. Zagare and Kilgour, “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” 306.
41. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1966), 36.
42. Richard Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 15.
43. Zagare and Kilgour, “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” 306-7.
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is, to exclude the possibility of such a war.”44 This may create an inherently 
dangerous situation, however, because miscalculations can ultimately lead to a 
game-theoretic “Chicken" situation, described below, wherein states may 
ultimately choose a bad option in order to “save face.”
Whereas prisoner’s dilemma depicts a situation in which neither party 
wants conflict, yet neither trusts the other, Chicken depicts a situation where “one 
party willfully creates a conflict by challenging the other and threatening to 
destroy an already enjoyed common interest if it does not get its way in the 
conflict.”45 Chicken is, at its core, a test of will. A common example involves two 
actors who are driving toward each other at high speed and who each have the 
option of swerving (S) or not swerving (N). If both swerve (SS), then nothing is 
lost, but nothing is gained, either—the results of neither actor swerving (NN), 
however, are catastrophic. Holding out for as long as possible before swerving 
will force each player to assess the rationality of the other; the one who swerves 
first is the “chicken,” and will lose face, while the other player will gain prestige.
Chicken also differs from prisoner’s dilemma in that the credibility of one’s 
opponent is partially dependent on one’s own valuation of the stakes at risk and 
one’s own assessment of the costs of mutual defection. As Freedman illustrates, 
each player can manipulate the perceptions of the other as to his own degree of 
rationality or to the limits of his options: he could pretend to be drunk or
44. Ola Tunander, “The Logic of Deterrence” Journal of Peace Research 26, no. 
4 (November 1989): 355.
45. Snyder, ‘“Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken’,” 68. Also see Herman Kahn, 
Thinking About the Unthinkable (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1962), 45.
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extremely angry; he could throw his steering wheel out the window or appear to 
dismantle his own brakes; or take some other action to convince his opponent he 
had no choice but to go straight ahead 46 By tricking his opponent into thinking 
he might not swerve (N), he “ups the ante” of a mutual defection (NN), thereby 
increasing the possibility of his opponent swerving first. In such a situation, one 
would not want to be faced with a truly irrational opponent whose threats would 
appear highly credible, for such a situation would prove impossible to 
manipulate—especially in the context of the Strait.
MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE STRAIT
Military power is a substantial element of a state’s deterrent posture. After 
1949, both Communist and Nationalist China relied on ever-growing levels of 
military force with which to balance the other, with the Nationalists relying on U.S. 
forces as a proxy and with Communist China relying on the Soviet Union for 
military supplies.47 Without this power, therefore, the threat of force may be 
negated along with the ability to persuade.
Kartsen, Howell, and Allen emphasize the role of power in a state’s ability 
to achieve its goals within the international system, arguing that both direct and 
indirect threats of the potential use of force are inherent features of international 
systems populated by states with substantial military capabilities. In an indirect
46. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 188.
47. While recognizing the role of nuclear weapons, this section focuses on 
conventional military capabilities because, for the purposes of this dissertation, the 
fundamental principles of deterrence remain the same in their absence.
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threat environment, they posit, the basis for obtaining a diplomatic objective is 
not to achieve the actual defeat of an opposing military force, but rather to 
communicate the proposed or potential damage that one state’s armed forces 
could inflict on another actor. They argue that “an effective military system gives 
a nation the constant potential to formulate precise direct threats or actually 
employ violence [that] remains indirect or unspecified.48
The effect of military capabilities on deterrence has been widely 
recognized within the realm of international security. Betts further qualifies these 
observations, noting that whether a state’s “given capabilities deter, tempt, or 
provoke attack is highly dependent” on not only physical, but also “political 
factors—especially the nature of a potential attacker’s motives and beliefs.”49 He 
also notes that in ambiguous situations, the greater the level of power one has 
available to reinforce deterrence, the more effectively it can be employed; by 
possessing the capability to inflict “awesome punishment,” the risks are 
significantly magnified for the attacker. While not exclusive to nuclear powers, he 
argues, this deterrent is often widely considered in this context. Without nuclear 
weapons, however, he states that “extremely high confidence in conventional 
options, rather than uncertainty, would be necessary to provide the same degree 
of deterrence.”50
48. Peter Karsten, Peter D. Howell, and Artis Francis Allen, Military Threats: A 
Systematic Historical Analysis of the Determinants of Success (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1984), 3.
49. Richard K. Betts, “Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and 
Policy Confidence,” World Politics 37, no 2 (January 1985): 154.
50. Ibid.
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Afheldt and Sonntag offer support for the deterrent effect of nuclear 
weapons, stating that “stable equilibrium on the level of strategic nuclear arms is 
the principle upon which military maintenance of peace through deterrence is 
based.”51 While this dissertation recognizes such weapons’ historical role in 
security, it does not place such emphasis on the nuclear factor. Looking back at 
the crises in the Strait gives reason to doubt the credibility of America’s nuclear 
deterrent, but American resolve at the time of the crises most likely appeared 
more credible that it does in hindsight.
The quality and quantity of conventional military technology an actor 
possesses can play a crucial role in one’s deterrent strategy, but some 
technologies are more capable than others of supporting an effective threat. 
Hermann notes that the various characteristics of weapons systems have long 
had an impact on the decision-making processes by which policymakers decide 
on their use or nonuse. As an example, he noted that “the shift from liquid fuel 
rockets, which may take hours to prepare, to solid fuel rockets, which are ready 
for almost immediate launch, may force a different set of decision requirements 
on policy makers.”52 Likewise, other advances in military technology not yet 
conceived of might, one day, present similar problems.
Deterrence assumes that adversaries are most likely to resort to force or 
military threats when they perceive the military balance to be in their favor and
51. Horst Afheldt and Phillip Sonntag, “Stability and Deterrence through Strategic 
Nuclear Arms,” Journal of Peace Research 10, no. 3 (1973): 245.
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when they question the defender’s resolve.53 For all their potential, however, 
military capabilities do not provide a deterrent in-and-of themselves without the 
potential to commit them to use. As George and Smoke argue, “the 
requirements for implementing deterrence are much less a matter of acquiring, 
proving possession of, or using raw military capabilities than a matter of 
demonstrating concern, motivation, and commitment.”54 Thus, it is not the 
possession of, for example, nuclear weapons, but rather the potential for the 
actor in possession of such weapons to utilize them in a given situation. As the 
cliche goes, “guns don’t kill people; people kill people.”
Capabilities factor into a number of elements of a state’s deterrent power. 
A strong military can be an effective psychological force in getting other states to 
comply with one’s wishes, and can also support a state’s credibility. But without 
adequate military capabilities, deterrence will fall short unless replaced by a 
significant degree of influence in other areas, such as economic or political 
power. But few states probably possess these alternative elements in sufficient 
levels to forego a strong military. And when considering military capabilities, the 
degree to which a state will consider another actor to be a threat will depend 
largely upon whether it views that actor in absolute or relative terms. The state 
that focuses on relative gains will be more likely to perceive a threat than will
52. Charles F. Hermann, “Trends Toward Crisis Instability: Increasing the Danger 
of Nuclear War,” quoted in Cimbala, Stephen, ed., Challenges to Deterrence:
Resources, Technology, and Policy (New York: Praeger, 1987), 70.
53. Lebow and Stein, “Deterrence and the Cold War,” 161.
54. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign 
Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 52. Also see Huth and Russett, 
“What Makes Deterrence Work,” 502.
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those that focus on absolute gains. This can be a significant factor in 
understanding a state's security perspectives and concerns.
Shambaugh illustrates the role of military capabilities in the Strait, stating 
“Taiwan knows no threat to its national security except for that from China, and 
thus there exists a direct relationship between Taipei’s cross-Strait and external 
policies and its defensive security.”55 As such, military capabilities cannot be 
discounted, but should be viewed in perspective along with other factors.
Whether these capabilities are viewed independently or in relation to an 
adversaries’ can make a significant difference on one’s perspective.
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE GAINS IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES
As described above, a state’s military capabilities—as well as those of its 
adversaries—can have a profound effect on its own security perspective and 
may involve very different perceptions, depending upon how one views its own 
position in the international system. As Mearsheimer posits, a state that focuses 
on absolute gains is primarily concerned about its own benefit and cares little 
about how much other states gain or lose; but a state that focuses on relative 
gains will be more concerned that they “do better, or at least no worse, than the 
other side.”56 And conventional deterrence can consider capabilities in three
55. David Shambaugh, “Exploring the Complexities of Contemporary Taiwan,” 
The China Quarterly, no. 148 (December 1996): 1051.
56. John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 
International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-95): 12-13.
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ways: numerical forces, the nature of weaponry, or how forces are employed to 
achieve the desired objective.57
Snidal points out that whenever states care primarily about winning rather 
than doing well, international politics will operate in an arena of relative gains.
He notes, however, that “no sophisticated view” sees states as seeking only 
relative or absolute gains; rather, the pursuit of relative gains can be viewed as 
“bargaining chips” in a short-term strategy of inducing other states to cooperate 
in seeking long-term absolute gains.58 The issue is important to security studies 
because, as Greico, Powell, and Snidal argue, in an anarchical international 
system, “states cannot be certain how [other] states that are friendly in the 
present will choose to act in the future.”59
Likewise, they contend that when considering the rationality of war, what 
seems rational at one moment may not appear so at another time, and that even 
if states conclude that the costs of war outweigh the benefits, they cannot be 
sure that other states share the same “cost-benefit analysis of the efficacy of 
force.” Even if all actors currently reject the efficacy of force, they argue, one 
cannot be certain that future circumstances will not shift some state’s 
perspectives to accept the cost-benefit ratio of force in the future: Because the 
consequences of adopting the wrong position could have disastrous
57. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983), 203.
58. Duncan Snidal, “International Cooperation among Relative Gains 
Maximizers,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 4 (December 1991): 388.
59. Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal, "The Relative Gains 
Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 
(September 1993): 733-34.
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consequences, “states are likely to approach these matters as extremely risk- 
averse actors.”60
A state’s strategic environment can have a direct impact on the degree of 
its concern for relative gains. This relationship means that the concern for 
relative gains is part of the outcome, not part of the explanation; an effect, rather 
than a cause. As Powell notes, the causes for both cooperation and concern for 
relative gains are therefore underlying features of the states’ strategic 
environment that jointly induce a concern for relative gains and thereby make 
cooperation difficult.61 Similarly, he argues, future costs for a present lack of 
cooperation can also be a factor in determining whether a state will choose 
relative or absolute gains, and this “shadow of the future” may be large enough 
that immediate gains may be curtailed by the potential for future repercussions. 
Considering this shadow, the cost-benefit analysis may even cause nationalistic 
or egotistic states to cooperate with one another.62
The differences between absolute and relative gains illustrate the various 
perspectives states may possess regarding their own or their adversary’s military 
capabilities, and may highlight the effects they may have on the stability of a 
region. Expressed in this way, one may more easily understand how such 
capabilities can create increased tensions between actual or potential 
adversaries; regardless of whether such tensions are intentional or accidental.
60. Ibid.
61. Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist- 
Neoliberal Debate,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 337.
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Shambaugh argues that the total balance of forces and order-of-battle 
between the PLA and Taiwan’s armed forces may not be a very useful measure 
of Taiwan’s security. This is due to Taiwan’s qualitative superiority in weapons 
systems and the general readiness of its troops, as well as the fact that, short of 
an all-out attack, the PLA is generally not thought to possess sufficient capability 
to subdue Taiwan quickly. The possibility of American intervention in any given 
scenario must also be taken seriously, however, particularly if the United States 
were to determine that a PRC attack on Taiwan was unprovoked.63
CRITICISMS OF TRADITIONAL DETERRENCE
While many approaches to deterrence theory exist, this research supports 
Williams’ and Hawkins’ argument that “no formalized theory of general 
deterrence is universally accepted as complete and definitive.”64 Deterrence 
theory must not be considered the ultimate factor in formulating a security 
strategy. Rather, as George and Smoke argue, it should be “regarded as, at 
best, an aid to devising deterrence strategies.” In their view, the most relevant 
and responsible role for deterrence in policy-making is its diagnostic function, 
rather than its prescriptive power. That is to say, “its assistance to [policymakers 
is most useful] in assessing the configuration of a situation in which some kind of
62. Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations 
Theory,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (December, 1991): 1306.
63. David Shambaugh, “Taiwan’s Security: Maintaining Deterrence amid Political 
Accountability,” The China Quarterly, no. 148 (December 1996): 1303-04.
64. Kirk Williams and Richard Hawkins, “Perceptual Research on General 
Deterrence: A Critical Review,” Law & Society Review 20, no. 4 (1986): 546.
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challenge to deterrence may occur.”65 They emphasize that deterrence theory 
perse  does not provide sufficient criteria to indicate when a deterrence policy 
should be applied in foreign policy. Viewed within the broader context of foreign 
policy, they argue, deterrence theory is best understood as a contingent policy 
theory: “Deterrence strategy, in other words, must be viewed as only one of a 
number of different instruments of foreign policy.”66 And according to Buzan, 
even experts from NATO posit that deterrence has to be constantly adapted to 
new political and technological needs, and that one “should not be satisfied 
forever with a system of deterrence that is too heavily dependent on the residual 
possibility of catastrophic destruction.”67
A major criticism of deterrence focuses on the problem of establishing 
indicators of the intention to attack. Lebow and Stein argue that, without an actor 
clearly stating such intentions, a defender must rely on its interpretation of 
“multiple streams of evidence interpreted in context.”68 They argue that the 
movement or redeployment of military forces, for example, may be a principal 
indicator of the intention to attack, but such deployments can be for a wide range 
of other purposes as well. Hence, a problem with testing deterrence theory lies 
in operationalizing the central theoretical concepts of “challenger” and “defender,”
65. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, “Deterrence and Foreign Policy,” 
World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 180.
66. Ibid., 181.
67. Barry Buzan, ed., The International Politics of Deterrence (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987), 191.
68. Lebow and Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” 342-47.
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which also depends on a presumption of the participants’ intentions. Such 
designations may ultimately reveal themselves to be incorrect, however.
This section illustrated that deterrence encompasses many factors that 
may apply differently at various points in time. In any situation where adversaries 
have less than perfect information about one another, miscalculations as to the 
planned success of any particular approach are probably unavoidable. But the 
general concepts behind deterrence continue to work for the majority of strategic, 
operational, and tactical decisions that policymakers face on a recurring basis. 
One can argue, therefore, that despite its flaws, deterrence is likely to continue 
maintaining its imperfect applicability in an imperfect world.
FOUNDATIONS OF PIVOTAL DETERRENCE: ORIGINAL AND HOLISTIC
Based upon many of the concepts described above, this research uses an 
approach that is distinct from, but modeled on, pivotal deterrence as presented 
by Crawford. Pivotal deterrence describes a situation where a defender (D) 
simultaneously deters two aggressors (A1) and (A2) from attacking each other, 
but also dissuades either from provoking an attack by the other. The primary 
factor in Crawford’s model is military power and its effect on other actors, such as 
states. While some may initially categorize this situation as “dual extended 
deterrence,” Crawford’s model incorporates some specific, unique attributes that 
alternative descriptions do not adequately address. These are described in 
greater detail below.
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Pivotal vs. Dual Extended Deterrence
Before continuing with this section, it is important to differentiate between 
extended and pivotal deterrence. Pivotal deterrence is distinct from the 
conventional theory of “extended deterrence,” which is often used to explain 
third-party security relationships. Recognizing that many aspects of the two 
approaches tend to overlap, however, this research identifies extended 
deterrence as employing clearly defined boundaries and consequences. As 
noted in the previous chapter, one of pivotal deterrence’s key factors and 
fundamental principles is that it emphasizes the role of ambiguity; a critical 
element in maintaining stability and understanding the explanatory value of its 
application to U.S. security policy. This research presents these conditions 
described above with the understanding that alternative academic and policy 
perspectives may ultimately disagree with their implications, and that these 
conditions may present theoretical limitations in other venues outside the Strait.
In contrast to many mainstream theories of deterrence, pivotal deterrence 
embraces ambiguity in influencing the decision-making process of aggressor 
states. It must assure adversaries that they can safely disarm, and must also 
sufficiently deter them from attacking each other. Similar to other approaches, 
pivotal deterrence is used in both the general and immediate contexts.69 As 
mentioned above, general deterrence refers to long-term maintenance of a 
deterrent posture, whereas immediate deterrence is implemented to address an 
emerging threat.
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While extended deterrence typically involves a more traditional role of 
“balancer” wherein the third party uses threats to keep aggressors in check, 
pivotal deterrence is somewhat different, in that its design is such that the pivot’s 
proclivity for support or threat can be more readily shifted toward, withheld, or 
diverted to another. In this sense, the pivot’s balancing options remain 
somewhat open to question throughout the deterrent process.
Huth and Russett posit that, in immediate extended deterrence (either 
through explicit verbal threats and counterthreats or by the overt movement or 
alerting of military forces, by both the potential attacker and the state assuming 
the role of defender), “the long-term balance of forces and the defender’s 
possession of nuclear weapons make little difference.”70 The defender is more 
likely to fight when the short-term balance of forces favors it, when it is bound to 
the third party by alliance ties or geographic proximity, and when it has followed a 
firm-but-flexible bargaining strategy during the crisis.71 They argue, for example, 
that “the power of nuclear weapons is so disproportionate that a normative 
restraint has come to apply, especially if the defender possesses immediate or 
short-term military superiority.”72
Because a plethora of articles, books, and papers on mainstream 
deterrence theories have been widely researched, discussed, and published, 
literary resources are abundant. But since pivotal deterrence itself is a relatively
69. For a full description of pivotal deterrence, see Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence.
70. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” 
International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 30.
71. Ibid., 29.
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new approach, few people other than Crawford have written about it.73 Probably 
the closest approach to pivotal deterrence is “dual deterrence,” which also 
supports a somewhat ambiguous approach to U.S. policy in the Strait against two 
adversaries, but does not explicitly identify the same key features: the moral 
hazard, alignment options, interests, and benefits—all of which are discussed in 
greater detail further below. Jervis asserts that “the nub of this ‘dual deterrence’ 
is that ‘complex, conditional threats and promises’ are much harder ‘to make 
credible’ than the typically one-sided threats of extended deterrence.”74 
Additionally, because the China-Taiwan issue is one of the predominant 
contemporary security relationships utilizing such an approach, the region is a 
prime subject for its application.
In mainstream extended deterrence models, a defender tries to create 
widespread certainty about its future behavior; thereby surrendering freedom of 
action, staking its reputation on public threats and promises, and closely 
coordinating war plans with allies. Conversely, in pivotal deterrence, the pivot is 
better off maintaining some uncertainty about its future behavior. Crawford notes 
that “maintaining freedom of action and keeping leverage over both sides is the 
goal; avoiding public commitments—and when they are necessary, making them 
as ambiguous and vague as possible— is the key objective. This basic difference
72. Ibid., 35.
73. This was the topic of Crawford’s doctoral dissertation at Columbia University 
in 2001.
74. Robert Jervis, “What Do We Want to Deter and How do We Do It?" quoted in 
L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr, Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. 
Military Strategy (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 122-124.
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between the two carries implications for the timing, clarity, and publicity of 
commitments.”75
Extended deterrence generally is most effective when a defender makes 
early commitments to a protege (the protectee), because waiting too long may 
result in the aggressor state becoming politically committed to the exact action 
that was meant to be deterred. Even worse, if a crisis has already broken out, 
the defender’s deterrent threat may be even more destabilizing than if it were 
made beforehand. And by committing early, the defender can coordinate war 
plans with the protege before the crisis erupts, significantly improving their 
chances of success and also sending a strong signal to the aggressor. A pivotal 
deterrence approach, in contrast, does quite the opposite. It avoids making firm 
commitments to either side, but if it must, it will try to delay making that 
commitment as long as possible.
Naturally, as Crawford points out, since getting involved in any third-party 
conflict can be politically costly, avoiding commitment is often a desirable 
approach. But getting involved can also translate into additional leverage over 
the involved states by “playing hard to get.”76 Under the strategy of dual 
deterrence, as Yung-Ming Yang notes, “Washington always tries to remind both 
Taiwan and China that peace is the key U.S. interest in the Strait and the region.” 
Under this condition, he posits, “Taiwan cannot assume that the [United States] 
“will defend it under any and all circumstances, nor can China assume that the
75. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 10.
76. Ibid., 10-11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
[United States] will not be involved should [China] decide to attack Taiwan.”77 
This holds true for pivotal deterrence, as well. And finally, by avoiding 
commitments in the early stages of a crisis, the pivot may be better positioned to 
negotiate effectively with the aggressor that it would be facing during a conflict.
During the 1958 crisis, for example, President Eisenhower refused to 
quickly specify how U.S. forces would be used to prevent Communist China from 
taking the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, where the Nationalist army had 
positioned many of its troops, stating “you simply cannot make military decisions 
until the event reaches you.”78 While this statement is inconsistent with the 
decisive signaling logic of extended deterrence, it seems to make perfect sense 
for the model of pivotal deterrence. This is because many now understand that 
Eisenhower sought to control the Nationalists’ ambitions while at the same time 
attempting to negotiate with the Communists for a compromise.
Criticisms of Pivotal Deterrence
Because, as previously noted, little has been written specifically about pivotal 
deterrence models, this author discussed some of its potential criticisms with the 
model’s founder, Timothy Crawford.79 One of the strongest criticisms Crawford 
received, not unlike many other aspects of deterrence theory, is based on the
77. Phillip Yung-Ming Yang, “Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: U.S. Strategies Towards 
China and Taiwan,” (Paper presented at the Peace Forum International Conference, The 
Westin Taipei, Taiwan, 23 May 2004), 15.
78. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The President’s News Conference of August 27th, 
1958,” 27 August 1958, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11188&st 
=&st1= (accessed 18 December 2004).
79. Timothy Crawford, telephone conversation with author, 28 December 2004.
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subjective interpretations and perceptions assumed for its application; e.g., 
whether interests are vital or secondary may depend on the context in which they 
are discussed. Such assumptions are inherently troublesome, yet remain 
essential to making theories such as pivotal deterrence useful. This criticism can 
be somewhat mitigated through studies that help to provide clarity as to what 
constitutes “vital, extremely important, important, and secondary interests,” such 
as the Commission on America’s National Interest’s report from July 2000.80
The strategic concept of pivotal and dual deterrence maintains its share of 
critics and skeptics who generally criticize its ambiguous aspects. One argument 
Zhu Liqun presents is that the U.S. dual deterrence policy merits doubt and “is 
also to a certain extent dangerous: if it is ineffective, it will trigger a great risk.”81 
Similarly, Pan Zohngqi argues that the lack of clarity may lead to a zero-sum 
security dilemma where China views even defensive gains by Taiwan as a threat, 
and where dual deterrence invariably leads to an arms race across the Strait.82
The argument for clarity is not without its supporters, many of whom argue 
that maintaining ambiguity is dangerous and irresponsible. Shulsky posits that, 
despite its advantages, ambiguity seems to be a poor long-term policy for
80. The Commission on America’s National Interests, “America’s National 
Interests,” July 2000, http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs 
/nationalinterests.pdf (accessed 4 January 2005).
81. Zhu Liqun, quoted in “China Roundup: Beijing’s ‘Tense’ Relations with 
Taiwan and Hong Kong,” 2 June 2004, U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2004/wwwh40602.htm (accessed 
17 January 2005).
82. Pan Zhongqi, “The Dilemma of Deterrence: U.S. Strategic Ambiguity Policy 
and its Implications for the Taiwan Strait,” Research paper, The Henry L. Stimpson 
Center (April 2004): 18, 21.
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deterring Chinese use of force against Taiwan.83 And Nye argues that the United 
States should abandon ambiguity and clarify its policy on Taiwan, stating that “if 
Washington leaves these ambiguities in place ... it may court disaster,”84 citing 
the growing uncertainty that came with Taiwan’s growing democracy. While one 
can never be certain how such a calculated gamble may turn out, history 
suggests that ambiguity can play an important role in foreign policy.
Another drawback to a policy of ambiguity, as Nathan notes, is that 
policymakers themselves may become confused as to where they should draw 
the line in stating their official positions or in how to approach sensitive issues.85 
In adjusting its level of threat to either aggressor, Nathan argues, the deterring 
state risks “opening up room for adventurist actions by the other.”86 With this in 
mind, Washington must ensure that neither aggressor misunderstands nor 
misperceives its real intentions. Also arguing against ambiguity, Bush states that 
one aggressor must present a credible threat to deter another aggressor, but not 
to the point of appearing fundamentally hostile. While at the same time, it must 
take care not to lead the other aggressor to feel abandoned.87
Further arguing against the foundations of pivotal deterrence, Pan 
Zhongqi states that by attempting to maintain the status quo across the Strait,
83. Abram N. Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior (Santa 
Barbara: RAND, 2000), 48.
84. Joseph Nye, "A Taiwan Deal," Washington Post, 8 March 1998, C7.
85. Andrew Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy,” The 
Washington Quarterly 23, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 98.
86. Ibid., 102.
87. Richard Bush, “The Ordeal of Dual Deterrence: The United States Between 
Taiwan and China,” (Paper presented at a conference on the military balance and
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strategic ambiguity becomes dangerous, self-contradicting, and “incompatible 
with its stated policy goals.”88 Similarly, Benson argues that such a policy risks 
increased nationalism by China and/or Taiwan, and that, because Taiwan relies 
on the United States for the majority of its arms, the growing military imbalance 
will gradually reduce the costs of Chinese aggression.89 But while these 
concerns should not be taken lightly, one could mitigate their effects through 
careful analysis of all available factors prior to applying deliberate ambiguity in 
any approach to security policy.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This research adopts several key assumptions about the actors in the 
security relationship. The first is that other outside actors that are not part of the 
aggressors’ alignment options would not inject themselves into the relationship. 
That is to say that in no instances would another actor unilaterally get involved 
solely as a counterbalance to the pivot without directly supporting one aggressor 
or the other. Second, where benefits are involved, as in (H4), the aggressor must 
be assumed to be at least somewhat rational and pragmatic in its 
decisionmaking.
decision making across the Taiwan Strait, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University, 
United Kingdom, 27-28 February 2004), 7.
88. Pan Zhongqi, “The Dilemma of Deterrence,” 37.
89. Brett V. Benson and Emerson M.S. Niou, “Comprehending Strategic 
Ambiguity: U.S. Security Commitment to Taiwan,” (Working paper, Duke University, 12 
November 2001), http://www.duke.edu/~niou/teaching/strategic%20ambiguity.pdf 
(accessed 9 November 2006).
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Additionally, the analysis only considers what is known about the 
perceptions and capabilities of the actors at the time. That is to say that, for 
example, the research only considers the known capabilities of the PRC 
amphibious forces, regardless of whether it may have had greater or lesser 
capabilities than was known at the time. The majority of this research uses 
generally accepted beliefs about China and Taiwan in these respects as the 
basis of analysis.
Unfortunately, since much remains unknown about China and Taiwan 
during the periods under study, primary documents are relatively limited. 
Therefore, secondary documents served as a major source of data for the 
research. This analysis of pivotal deterrence in the Strait is based on the data as 
it is presented in the sources, but recognizes its inherent weaknesses, such as 
biases and translation flaws. It therefore also considers general assessments on 
other factors—such as personalities, military capabilities, public statements, and 
overt and surreptitious activities— in the overall analysis.
SUMMARY
This chapter presented the theoretical framework for the dissertation, 
which is based, and builds, upon Crawford’s model of pivotal deterrence. By 
comparing the new model to traditional deterrence approaches and to Crawford’s 
model, this chapter illustrated the unique qualities of holistic pivotal deterrence 
while it maintained that there are similarities to many more traditional 
approaches. It illustrated three specific scenarios in which a pivotal deterrence
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model could affect two aggressor states, and identified the key assumptions and 
limitations for the research; recognizing that no model is without flaws.
Holistic pivotal deterrence, while an imperfect model for approaching the 
issue of deterrence, nevertheless remains a valuable perspective for those who 
must weigh their options in making decisions regarding third-party interventions.
It provides a much-needed argument and perspective for promoting ambiguity in 
security policies. As the area of security studies requires a broad understanding 
of the various approaches to any particular problem, pivotal deterrence models 
help broaden one’s selection of “tools in the toolbox.”
The history of the trilateral relationship in the Taiwan Strait specifically 
embodies many of the prerequisite conditions for pivotal deterrence, and the 
following chapters in this dissertation address and test these conditions against 
the holistic pivotal deterrence model. In doing so, this research qualifies the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter II, to provide its own contribution to deterrence 
theory, upon which others may continue similar research.
The next chapter reviews the literature on the United States-China-Taiwan 
relationship and the development of strategic relations in the region— primarily 
from 1949 through the mid-1990s. It covers the origins of the controversy over 
Taiwan’s status and the shift in power; as well as the diplomatic, economic, 
military, and social developments that helped shape trilateral relations over the 
years. This presents the reader with an understanding of the complex dynamics 
at work, and will concludes with an assessment of what this research adds to the 
existing literature.




Whereas the previous chapter discussed the deterrence literature in the 
context of developing and supporting the research methodology, this chapter 
discusses the development and adaptation of the trilateral relationship between 
the United States, China, and Taiwan. It provides a review of the literature 
explaining the basis for U.S. security policy in the region: how it is perceived in 
the context of international security, discussing developments in the relationship 
throughout the second half of the 20th century, illustrating the shifting U.S. 
strategic relations in the Strait, and examining the military balance. Finally, it 
addresses gaps in the relevant China-Taiwan-United States literature, and 
explains the contribution this research makes to the study and understanding of 
pivotal deterrence as it applies to the Strait and elsewhere.
THE UNITED STATES-CHINA-TAIWAN LITERATURE
In reviewing the literature directly discussing relations between the United 
States, China, and Taiwan, it quickly becomes evident that there are many 
positions on, and factors in, the various aspects of the trilateral relationship. 
These include domestic political factors, military capabilities, and the lack of 
cooperation or coordination between various levels of government. These 
factors are discussed in more detail below.
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The Legal Basis for Claims to Taiwan
Any argument for or against the legitimate right to Chinese sovereignty 
must start with an understanding of the historical background. Bush notes that 
President Roosevelt— largely based upon the charms and persuasion of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s wife, Madame Chiang, who conveyed her husband’s desires in an 
early 1943 trip to Washington— “came to his conclusion on the island’s fate,” and 
together with Churchill and Stalin, agreed that the ROC should have control of 
Formosa.1 But Arora writes that, after the CPP overthrew the KMT, Mao Zedong 
declared victory and enacted “the organic law, popularly known as the Organic 
Programme, of the New Republic,” which “dealt with the foreign policy of the new 
Government.”2 Within the span of about one year, Beijing “had received de jure  
recognition from several states,” including the Soviet Union, thereby establishing 
its position in the international community.3 While this was considered a 
legitimate action and basis for the Communist’s sovereignty over China, the 
United States did not immediately agree.
Japan surrendered sovereignty over Taiwan, the Pescadores, and 
arguably the Diaoyu Islands as a condition of the 1951 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, but Charney and Prescott note that China was not a party to the treaty, 
and also point out that the treaty “did not specifically identify the entity that was to
1. Bush, At Cross Purposes, 37-38.
2. R.S. Arora, Ambassadors Exchanged after Thirty Years: Sino-American 
Relations 1940-1979 (New Delhi: The Institute for the Study of International Relations, 
1980), 10.
3. Ibid., 11.
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inherit Taiwan.” They argue that none of the post-World War II treaties explicitly
ceded sovereignty to any specific state or government,4 but that
by 1952, the PRC’s governmental authority over historical China certainly 
existed de facto, if not yet de jure  [italics added]. This authority derived 
from the military victory and effective territorial control by the PRC, as well 
as its continuous existence subsequently, its recognition as the 
government to which the Chinese seat at the United Nations is accredited, 
and its recognition by the vast majority of states. Today a non-state entity 
may hold territory in opposition to the state with sovereignty over that 
territory, and the population of a territory may have rights of self- 
determination that deny the sovereign state the unqualified authority to 
control that territory and its population. Clearly, Taiwan is independent of 
China, having achieved economic and governmental autonomy despite 
Beijing’s efforts to the contrary. Traditionally, only states could have 
sovereignty over territory or rights under international law. This state- 
centered approach, however, has eroded. Specifically, the use of the 
word “peoples” in describing those entities entitled to the right of self- 
determination has proved to be a notable challenge to the traditional state- 
centered framework.5
The proper domain of international law concerns “the relationships between 
states and not domestic affairs within states, such as the relationship of a state to 
its nationals. In this light, even when the international community recognizes a 
right of self-determination, it does not appear to support a general right to 
secession.6
Nations generally consist of a population that identifies itself as sharing an 
identity. Lee-Jay Cho notes that mainland China’s population by the early 1980s 
numbered over 1 billion—“almost double the 1949 figure of 542 million”—
4. Jonathan I. Charney and J.R.V. Prescott, “Resolving Cross-Strait Relations 
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suggesting that the Mainlanders probably had a clear idea of who they were.7 
Charney and Prescott argue that the issue of whether the population of Taiwan 
constitutes a “people” that may claim a right of self-determination is not only 
undefined, but may be irrelevant because newcomers to the island make up only 
15 percent of the population, and that the roots of the island of the remaining 85 
percent had been established before 1985 8 This does not necessarily account 
for the generations of Taiwanese who have no direct link to the Mainland, 
however.
POLITICAL FACTORS AND PERSPECTIVES
Much of the relevant literature highlights the vast differences between 
Chinese and American perspectives on international relations and foreign policy. 
Vogel, for example, notes that the Chinese are less responsive to democratic 
processes and are more concerned with coherent long-range strategies than are 
Americans, and therefore tend to believe that other countries’ policies also have 
a similar cohesiveness—suggesting that the Chinese do not seem to understand 
the influence of public opinion on U.S. governmental policy.9
Clough posits that immediately following WWII, “Americans viewed 
Taiwan as a small, distant island ... that would as a matter of course be taken
7. Lee-Jay Cho, “Population Dynamics and Policy in the People’s Republic of 
China,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 476 (November 
1984), 112.
8. Charney and Prescott, “Resolving Cross-Strait Relations,” 473.
9. Ezra Vogel, ed., Living with China: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: Norton W.W. &Co., Inc., 1997), 170.
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from Japan and returned to China,” and held no real interest in it.10 Similarly, 
Jacobs argues that “before 1945, the Chinese Communists did not devote much 
attention to Taiwan.”11 But by 1949, Huebner notes, China had created a 
persistent propaganda theme purporting that the United States’ interest in 
Taiwan was only to secure it as a sphere of influence in the region, regardless of 
the outcome on the Mainland.12 He also notes that—both before and after the 
start of the Korean War—the CPP’s proclaimed goal of liberating Taiwan was 
unequivocal, but was more a declaration of principle that did not signal rash 
military action. “Even before the United States intervened in the Taiwan [Strait] 
the new [CPP] regime most probably saw the actual extension of its rule to 
Taiwan as being a relatively long-range objective.”13
Chiang and He Di note that Mao Zedong lost to ROC forces on Quemoy in 
1949, but wanted to reclaim face by taking the Dachens. Mao deliberately 
restrained his local commanders, however, ordering them to avoid military 
clashes with, and strictly instructing them not to provoke, U.S. military forces and 
to guard against starting even accidental conflicts.14 “Please note,” Mao stated, 
“only after verifying that there are no U.S. ships or planes present can we launch
10. Ralph N. Clough, “U.S. Policy Toward Evolving Taiwan-Mainland China 
Relations,” chap. 5 in J.W. Wheeler, ed., Chinese Divide: Evolving Relations Between 
Taiwan and Mainland China (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1996), 103.
11. J. Bruce Jacobs, “Political Opposition and Taiwan’s Political Future,” The 
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 6 (July 1981): 22.
12. Jon W. Huebner, “The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, 
no. 10 (June 1987): 259.
13. Ibid., 274.
14. Gordon Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War in the U.S.-China 
Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?” 
The American Historical Review 98, no. 5 (December 1993): 1512.
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the attack on the Dachens. Otherwise, do not initiate any military action.”15 
These statements reflect various complex elements of the political and military 
processes that China, Taiwan, and the United States faced on several 
occurrences.
While President Truman’s decision to send the Seventh Fleet into the 
Strait probably prevented a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Tu Weiming asserts, it 
“perpetuated the confrontation between the two sides of the Strait.”16 Although 
the United States initially adopted a hands-off policy toward Taiwan after the 
KMT resettled in Taipei in 1949, King-yuh Chang argues, it was the only country 
to which Taiwan could turn for assistance.17
The First Crisis
Western perceptions of the 1954-55 crisis are based almost exclusively on 
U.S. documentary material and Western public sources, according to Chang and 
He Di, who argue that the West has only been able to infer the Chinese side of 
the story from Chinese-published materials and observed behavior, and has 
perceived China as a threat to regional stability; whereas the standard Chinese 
public account of events in the 1950s has characterized United States-China 
policy in the Strait as one of inflexible hostility, aggressiveness, and
15. Mao Zedong, “Remarks on the Timing of the Attack on the Dachen Islands,” 
21 August 1954, Jianguo Yilai, 1954\ 533, quoted in Chang and He Di, “The Absence of 
War,” 1512.
16. Tu Weiming, “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in 
Contemporary Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, no. 148 (December 1996): 1122.
17. King-yuh Chang, “Partnership in Transition: A Review of Recent Taipei- 
Washington Relations,” Asian Survey 21, no. 6 (June 1981): 603.
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warmongering.18 They also argue that Beijing’s orders in 1954 to shell Quemoy 
was a specific and limited response to what Mao perceived as an increase in 
U.S. and Nationalist military provocations in the area, and that China intended 
only to defend the Strait against the West’s attempt to divide it via a mutual 
defense treaty, which would play a role similar to that of Korea.19
Flemming attributes the 1954-55 crisis to three factors: (1) the 
“unleashing” of Chiang on 1 February 1953, (2) American determination to hold 
Formosa as a part of its far Pacific defense Chain, and (3) rising Chinese 
power.20 He notes that, around March 1955, the United States was finding itself 
standing largely alone in its support for the Nationalists. Australia and Canada 
would not support a war over Quemoy and Matsu, Japan would not allow U.S. 
forces to use Japanese bases to attack China, and our European allies had long 
disavowed the idea of a war over the offshore islands; leaving only the 
Philippines and Thailand as possible allies.21 He also notes that around this 
same time, Admiral Carney, Chief of Staff for the Navy, had advocated crushing 
Communist China in order to end its expansionist tendencies, but that the 
American public soon came to understand the war party’s “teach Asia a lesson” 
campaign, and warned the Eisenhower administration against carrying a divided 
nation into an unjust war based on Quemoy and Matsu.22
18. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War,” 1501.
19. Ibid., 1507-08.
20. D.F. Flemming, “Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait,” The 
Western Political Quarterly 9, no. 3 (September 1956): 535.
21. Ibid., 540.
22. Ibid., 543.
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Xiaobing Li, Xiaobo Hu, and Yang Zhong highlight the effects of domestic 
politics in U.S. foreign policy, noting that candidates’ efforts to garner votes have 
contributed to the making of a “cyclical pattern” of United States-China relations. 
They argue that while U.S. politicians often adopt the popular position during an 
election—frequently amounting to China-bashing—these politicians quickly return 
to their long-term and strategic interests once in office, emphasizing U.S. national 
interests and facing China’s growing role in Asia.23 They also note, however, that 
the same pattern also holds true for politicians in Taiwan. And as Christensen 
further discusses, domestic politics often play a role in China, as well.
Concerned about economic relations with Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, 
he argues that an attack against Taiwan would seriously jeopardize China’s 
economy. As such, China’s goals of economic growth and nationalism are often 
at odds with each other.24
While material elements of power are often misunderstood as motives that 
drive policymakers, Gries and Christensen argue that policymakers often 
overlook Chinese emotions as they “evolve in dynamic relationship with 
American actions.”25 Pointing out that America’s interest in supporting Taiwan is 
fundamentally linked to the Wilsonian notion of the right to self-determination, 
they argue that China’s position—that Taiwan is an internal affair and none of
23. Xiaobing Li, Xiaobo Hu, and Yang Zhong, eds., Interpreting U.S.-China- 
Taiwan Relations: China in the Post-Cold War Era (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1998), 54-61.
24. Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a 
Taiwan Conflict,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4. (Autumn 2002): 12.
25. Peter Gries and Thomas Christensen, “Power and Resolve in U.S. China 
Policy,” International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 165-157.
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America’s business—should come as no surprise in matters such as this;
Chinese sovereignty as a whole is at stake. This description illustrates the 
problem that arises from the typical U.S. belief that American values are 
universal and have international appeal.
According to Chang and He Di, Mao did not consider the shelling of 
Quemoy on 3 September 1954 as the beginning of the crisis. To Communist 
China, this was simply a continuation of tensions that had existed between the 
PLA and the KMT since 1949, and it was not until U.S. warships entered the 
Strait that some high-level Communist officials recognized the situation as a 
confrontation involving Western interests.26 But through the lens of the Korean 
War, they posit, the Eisenhower administration viewed this as a failure of 
deterrence—especially since the Seventh Fleet had twice deployed to the Strait 
during the summer of 1954, quoting Dulles’ statement that China would not dare 
“challenge [the United States] in any major or sustained way and provoke further 
our sea and air power along their coast.”27
Sigal notes that the period prior to the 1954-55 Formosa crisis had not 
been free of U.S. threats to China’s survival. While no clear signal of the United 
State’s intentions was perceptible, he argues, neither was any U.S. effort to curb 
Chiang; that Washington might allow itself to become “embroiled” in a renewal of
26. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War,” 1502-1504.
27. John Foster Dulles, quoted in Ibid., 1505.
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the civil war was not unimaginable. And if this were true, then any Nationalist 
move to counterattack would constitute a grave threat to Beijing.28
Gurtov notes the negative effect of the Formosa Resolution on Nationalist 
aggression, in that after the legislation was forced through Congress in January 
1955, Chiang began a substantial buildup of military forces on Quemoy and 
Matsu, where nearly one-third of his ground troops were already deployed at the 
time the crisis started.29 Washington did nothing to stop this buildup until the 
crisis had already begun, thereby blurring the lines between acquiescence and 
approval and supporting the perception in Beijing that the United States had not, 
in fact, “re-leashed” Chiang.30 Gurtov argues that, with the completion of the 
Nationalist military buildup on the offshore islands, Chiang had artificially 
manufactured a strong link between the defense of the islands and the protection 
of Taiwan; if China responded by attacking the islands, U.S. forces would have to 
either defend them—and probably take the fight into the Mainland— or let them 
fall, and risk losing Taiwan. Ultimately, rather than attempting to reverse the 
Nationalist buildup, Washington had again condoned it, thereby falling even 
deeper into Taipei’s web of dependence.31
The linkage between the United States and Taiwan, however, might not 
have been as definitive as they appeared. As Chang and He Di posit, Zhou Enlai 
stated at the Bandung Conference in April 1955 that “China distinguished the
28. Sigal, “The ‘Rational Policy’ Model,” 127.
29. Melvin Gurtov, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign 
Policy in Chinese Motives,” Modern China 2, no. 1 (January 1976), p 67-68.
30. Ibid., 61-62.
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conflict between the Mainland and Taiwan from that between China and the 
United States. Taiwan was an internal question and [was] linked to the Chinese 
civil w ar... but the tension between China and the United States was an 
international matter, which China was willing to discuss with Washington.”32 This 
suggests that Beijing might have held a different perception of the trilateral 
relationship than did Washington and Taipei.
The Second Crisis
Sigal notes that Khrushchev in 1958 advised the Eisenhower 
administration that the Soviet Union would defend China against an attack on its 
Mainland—equating an attack on the PRC with an attack on the U.S.S.R.—and 
that the Soviets would do everything to defend peace; but Khrushchev did not 
specifically address the Nationalists on Taiwan or infer Soviet backing for a 
Communist Chinese assault against Formosa, thereby supporting a level of 
ambiguity in its own China policy.33 And Kwan Ha Yim notes that the 
administration rejected Khrushchev’s communication, quoting a White House 
statement that “it is tragic that Soviet military despotism should support the use of 
force to achieve expansionist ends.”34 A strain clearly was weighing upon the 
regional relationships.
31. Ibid., 71.
32. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War,” 1520-21.
33. Sigal, “The ‘Rational Policy’ Model,” 137.
34. Kwan Ha Yim, China and the U.S. 1955-63 (New York: Facts on File, Inc, 
1973), 99.
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Clubb attributes this second crisis to a 3,000-word memorandum that the 
U.S. State Department released on 9 August 1958, which publicly barred any 
change in United States-China policy and denounced any idea of a two-state 
solution. Communist China resumed its shelling of Quemoy from 25 August until 
2 September—while consistently demanding the Nationalists’ surrender. The 
United States responded again by sending the Seventh Fleet to the Strait, and 
the crisis was effectively over by October 1958. U.S. forces avoided direct 
engagement of the Communist forces during this crisis, and mainly helped with 
logistical support in protecting supplies being sent to the ROC forces on the 
offshore islands, through logistical support and supplies, leaving the Nationalists 
to defend the airspace against the PLAAF themselves.
Although the conflict demonstrated that the Nationalists’ air power was a 
formidable match for the PRC’s MIG fighters, Clubb argues, it also showed that, 
although the Nationalists worked well with American forces, they would have 
been unable to supply their offshore garrisons without U.S. support backing them 
up.35 He also suggests that the Communists deliberately kept the United States 
involved in the Strait by reducing the shelling of Quemoy; continuing 
ceremoniously only on odd days, starting on 3 November 1958.
In doing this, Clubb argues, the PRC effectively denied compliance with 
the original American dictum that “before there could be disengagement from the
35. O. Edmund Clubb, “Sino-American Relations and the Future of Formosa,” 
Political Science Quarterly 80, no. 1 (March 1965): 6-7.
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offshore islands, there would have to be an effective cease-fire in the Strait.”36 
He observes that while the legal issue of establishing “one China, one Taiwan” 
concept could work in theory, actually creating “two Chinas” has always been a 
non-starter in practice; when strategists linked Quemoy, Matsu, and the 
Pescadores to American Formosa policy in the joint American-Formosan 
communique of 1958, they established a serious roadblock to any two-state 
solution.37
Melvin Gurtov suggests that the 1958 crisis was neither manufactured nor 
stimulated by domestic concerns, but that Mao ordered the bombardment of the 
offshore islands in 1958 only because of American actions in Taiwan, elsewhere 
in Asia, and in the Middle East; that Mao actually sought international 
quiescence, and that he did not want a crisis in the Strait.38 He notes that 
American “Matador” nuclear-capable missiles were deployed to Taiwan and that 
unarmed missiles were test-fired on 2 May 1958, with the assertion that they 
would be “used in retaliation for a Chinese Communist attack in the Strait area”—  
though it was not clear whether the nuclear warheads were physically in Taiwan 
or in Okinawa, Japan—and 8-inch atomic-capable howitzers were reportedly also 
moved to Taiwan, though the locations of these warheads were also unknown.39
Gurtov further asserts that China’s first priority in 1958 was to “deflect a 
growing threat to [its] security at a time of rapid domestic change and military
36. Ibid., 8.
37. Ibid., 17-18.
38. Gurtov, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited,” 50.
39. Ibid., 74.
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weakness,” and that Mao’s series of limited attacks on the offshore islands was 
his way of “bringing the Americans to their senses about their ally on Taiwan.”40 
He states that the 1958 crisis made Mao well-aware of Soviet unreliability as well 
as U.S. strength and aggressiveness: it “had the twin effects of clarifying the 
nature of both the number one enemy and the number one friend,” it showed that 
China could conduct crisis diplomacy independently of the U.S.S.R., it taught 
Mao that “China would have to be as self-reliant internationally as it was seeking 
to become economically and militarily,” and it helped shorten the timetable of 
Sino-Soviet cooperation— resulting in the withdrawal of all Soviet assistance by 
I960.41
The 1960s
Gordon states that the relationship between Taipei and Washington took a 
downward turn between 1954 and 1962, and that diplomatic negotiations 
revealed serious disagreements between the two, including the objectives and 
interpretation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. These differences resulted in 
Taipei and Washington growing “farther apart from and distrustful of one 
another.” He notes that by the end of July 1961, “the Nationalists concluded that 
... action must soon be taken to return to the Mainland.... In an effort to improve
40. Ibid., 88.
41. Ibid., 89.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
111
the Nationalists’ military posture, Chiang ordered all armed-forces units to 
prepare for combat readiness and to await further orders.”42
While the United States did not support these actions, reports of 
Nationalist Chinese military preparations and Taipei’s “public statements in 
January 1962 led to U.S. concern that the Nationalists assumed the United 
States would concur in offensive military operations on the Mainland. To avoid 
any misunderstanding, [U.S.] Ambassador Drumright in [Taipei] was instructed to 
... remind [the Nationalist leaders] that agreement by the United States was 
required for military operations on the Mainland”;43 unilateral ROC action was not 
an option.
Sigal notes that by 1962 the Communist buildup of “men and planes” had 
far exceeded that of the 1958 mobilization and was approaching a level that 
could be used to attack Quemoy and Matsu. He also notes, however, that 
because it did not include the sea-going junks required for a landing, such 
buildup may have been merely defensive preparations for a potential Nationalist 
attack, which is exactly how the Kennedy administration decided to handle the 
situation—assuring the Chinese that Washington would not support the use of 
force in the Strait.44 By this time, Gordon argues, the Nationalists had rattled 
their sabers to the point that China had massed troops and military equipment on 
the Mainland and alerted the country for an invasion from Taiwan. To reassure
42. Leonard H.D. Gordon, “United States Opposition to Use of Force in the 
Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962,” The Journal of American History 72, no. 3 (December 1985): 
637, 655.
43. Ibid., 657.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
112
China, “their ambassador in Warsaw was informed on June 26 that the United 
States would not support ‘any Nationalist attempt to invade the Mainland.’”45 
Taipei finally realized it would not obtain support from Washington, and backed 
off its military preparations.
Up until 1964, Kallgren notes, the KMT upheld two fundamental 
assertions: that they were the legitimate government of China, and that they 
would inevitably reclaim the Mainland. They measured their success on world 
acceptance of their representational claims, she argues, based upon “the number 
of nation-states [that accorded] them recognition and [were] prepared to support 
their position in the United Nations.”46 Eventually, however, Taipei most likely 
came to realize that these assertions were becoming increasingly difficult to 
defend, and that China was becoming a major player in the international arena.
Finally abandoning the dream of reclaiming the Mainland, Kallgren notes, 
the KMT’s continued guerrilla campaigns against the Mainland were probably 
conducted “more for their psychological value rather than [their] military 
significance,” and that these operations would achieve little more than “to foment 
unrest and sabotage.’’47 Gurtov further describes the situation, arguing that the 
KMT was previously “guided in its international relations by the overpowering 
goal of reconquering the Mainland.” But that by 1966 “Chiang was moved to
44. Sigal, “The ‘Rational Policy’ Model,” 146.
45. Gordon, “United States Opposition to Use of Force,” 657-58.
46. Joyce K. Kallgren, “Nationalist China: Problems of a Modernizing Taiwan,” 
Asian Survey 5, no. 1 (January 1965): 12.
47. Joyce K. Kallgren, “Vietnam and Politics in Taiwan,” Asian Survey 6, no. 1 
(January 1966): 29.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
remark that unless the Communists were unseated by 1968, only the U.S. would 
be in a position to effect the recovery because of Peking’s anticipated nuclear 
delivery capability.”48
Gurtov describes a changing geopolitical-military landscape in 1967, 
wherein Chiang recognized that political means were quickly becoming the main 
avenue toward reclaiming the Mainland. And although military force remained a 
constant necessity for survival, it was “no longer necessary for the ROC to 
launch a lightning strike against the Mainland in as much as Mao’s extremist 
measures to save his regime are bound to produce similar effects, and at less 
cost”;49 Chiang felt that Mao’s Cultural Revolution, discussed in Chapter VI, 
improved Taiwan’s image abroad and “enhanced Taipei’s claim to represent the 
only legitimate China.”50
Clubb argues that “the very justification for the Nationalists’ rule on 
Formosa [was] their ‘expectation’ to return to power on the Mainland; if the dream 
[failed], the raison d ’etre of the Nationalist government... also [would have 
passed.]” He also argues that the lower ranks of the Nationalist army by 1965, 
however— 15 years after leaving the Mainland—were “predominantly made up of 
Formosans who [had] no urge to ‘return to the Mainland’ because they didn’t 
come from there; and the Nationalist overlordship [had] not been accepted as 
legitimate and final by the Formosans, who [had] never given their mandate to
48. Melvin Gurtov, “Taiwan in 1966: Political Rigidity, Economic Growth,” Asian 
Survey 7, no. 1 (January 1967): 40.
49. Melvin Gurtov, “Taiwan: Looking to the Mainland,” Asian Survey 8, no. 1 
(January 1968): 16.
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the Kuomintang.”51 He states that in 1964, China began to lean toward the 
“intermediate zone” of Asia, Latin America, Europe, Canada, and Australia, and 
he argued in 1965 that China’s success could rely on a change in its attitude; 
namely by adopting the manners of those states with which it sought improved 
relations. He asserted that “where it was unable to get Moscow to adopt its 
behavior patterns, it will hardly be successful with Japan, Canada—or, be it 
acknowledged ... France. In the field of foreign trade, business considerations 
will govern. Regardless of its revolutionary pronounciamentos, China will be able 
to buy and sell if it acts in a manner acceptable to the respectable bourgeois 
bankers and traders of the world.”52
Policy Changes in the 1970s
Vogel identifies three factors critical to the transformation of U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan after 1970: First, in 1972, the Nixon administration established 
official contact with Beijing, resulting in the Shanghai Communique and ultimately 
opening liaison offices in each other’s capitals in 1973; second, in December 
1978, under pressure from Beijing, President Carter severed diplomatic ties and 
terminated America’s defense treaty with Taiwan; and third, in 1982, the Reagan 
administration came to an agreement with Beijing regarding arms sales to 
Taiwan. These factors, Vogel argues, have been continually adjusted to 
maintain peace and stability in the region, allowing Taiwan to become a wealthy,
50. Gurtov, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited,” 17.
51. Clubb, “Sino-American Relations and the Future of Formosa,” 10-11.
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free, democratic, and secure populace. He identifies other issues as responsible 
for these advancements, including U.S. military protection, economic aid, 
openness of U.S. markets, and “green card” status for the Taiwanese people.53
As political parties in Taiwan and the PRC move away from the status 
quo, Petersen argues, there is a real danger that conflict across the Strait lies not 
far ahead. He writes that domestic pressures in Taiwan may force it to challenge 
the status quo by either directly declaring independence or by forcing Beijing to 
react to an increase in support of such a move. Such a drive for independence is 
likely to create an equally strong drive in China for reunification.54 Further 
complicating the issue, he posits, is the fact that as Taiwan’s faltering economy 
continues to cause it to lose ground in the cross-Strait arms race, it will become 
increasingly dependent on the United States for military support and arms 
sales.55 He supports the argument that America will soon be forced to abandon 
its policy of strategic ambiguity, but that taking a firm position will not be easy, 
and that ignoring Taiwan’s reach for democracy would undermine America’s 
basic foreign policy goals stated in the Bush administration’s 2002 National 
Security Strategy of “actively [working] to bring the hope of democracy ... to every 
corner of the free world.”56
52. Ibid., 18-19.
53. Vogel, Living with China, 173.
54. Andrew Peterson, “Dangerous Games across the Taiwan Strait,” The 
Washington Quarterly 27, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 27.
55. Ibid., 36.
56. Executive Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002): 1-2.
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King-yuh Chang criticizes the Carter administration’s haste to shift 
recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, arguing that the situation gave China 
no reason to make substantial concessions to the West. Although Taipei was 
justifiably angry about the move, it nevertheless “was prepared to cope with the 
unfavorable situation and to rebuild Taipei-Washington relations.”57 And “while 
the decision was a serious blow to Taiwan,” Jacobs argues, “it was hardly 
unexpected, and [Taipei] had been seeking to expand relations wherever it 
could.”58 King-yuh Chang does note, however, that the Carter administration 
introduced the Taiwan Omnibus Bill, which helped to supplement United States- 
Taiwan relations. This concentrated almost exclusively on creating a private, 
non-profit corporation—the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)—to “maintain 
commercial, cultural, and other relations with the people on Taiwan without 
official government representation and without diplomatic relations.”59 The bill 
was not as forceful in its position as it might have been, however, since the 
administration “failed to insist on the PRC’s renunciation of the use of force 
against Taiwan.”60
Chong-Pin Lin argues that as Taiwan’s military posture shifted from 
offensive to defensive, it was forced to shift its military capabilities as well, stating 
“When Taipei’s strategic orientation shifted from ‘retaking the Mainland’ to 
defending Taiwan ... the imbalance between its oversized army and under­
57. King-yuh Chang, “Partnership in Transition,” 606.
58. J. Bruce Jacobs. “Taiwan 1978: Economic Successes, International 
Uncertainties,” Asian Survey 19, no. 1 (January 1979): 28.
59. King-yuh Chang, “Partnership in Transition,” 607.
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equipped air and naval forces became obvious. In [the] early 1980s, the 
government almost simultaneously began reducing its troops and upgrading its 
arsenal. In addition, Taipei diversified its arms suppliers to more than 20 
countries by 1991 in order to reduce its dependence on the United States.”61 
But military forces alone to not reflect military strength. While China had 
numerically superior forces “in a straightforward ‘bean-counting’ sense,” there 
was “no clear-cut answer from the grand strategic perspective.”62
While Taipei adjusted its military posture, it also had to adjust its political 
posture. Jacobs argued in 1974 that Taiwan used quasi-official associations as 
an effective alternative to official diplomatic relations.63 But even with these 
efforts, Scobell posits, it was not until after the deaths of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 
and of Mao Zedong in 1976 that an improvement in relations across the Strait 
was possible; Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor, “demonstrated renewed energy 
and determination to recover Taiwan combined with a healthy dose of 
pragmatism. Whereas Mao had focused on ‘liberation’ by military force, Deng 
stressed peaceful unification.”64 This helped to clear the way for a period of 
stability in the region.
Furthermore, Shao-Liang Liu notes that Taiwan suffered a series of 
diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s, such as China’s improved international
60. Ibid., 614.
61. Chong-Pin Lin, “The Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 146 (June 1996): 579.
62. Ibid., 592.
63. J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1973: Consolidation of the Succession,” Asian 
Survey 14, no. 1 (January 1974): 26.
64. Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers,” 230.
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standing, Beijing’s replacing of Taipei at the United Nations in 1971 and United 
States’ severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1979. But the decade was not 
completely negative for Taiwan, because “while diplomatic ties took a downward 
turn, economic development brought about a strong middle class, a less 
authoritarian government, [and] wider political participation and higher social 
mobility.”65
China and Taiwan in the 1980s and 90s
Biddick argues that while China and Taiwan remained primarily focused 
on competing against each other for diplomatic recognition throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, China came to view the region “in a larger geostrategic context as an 
area of contention of major powers, including the Soviet Union.” But while 
diplomatic competition was a divisive element for regional deliberations, “over the 
longer term, PRC interests [transcended] the immediate concern with the Taiwan 
question.... Beijing has positioned itself to gain long-term political influence as a 
benign and sympathetic friend of the island states.”66
Ambassador Shen, the ROC’s last ambassador to the United States, 
notes that when President Reagan took office, the Taiwanese people— both 
governmental and private—were relieved by Reagan’s friendly position toward 
Taiwan. Shen notes that Reagan on several occasions during his campaign
65. Lawrence Shao-Liang Liu, “Judicial Review and Emerging Constitutionalism: 
The Uneasy Case for the Republic of China on Taiwan,” The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 39, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 510.
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“faulted Jimmy Carter for the way he established diplomatic relations with”
Beijing, and that there was a quick improvement in contacts between the United 
States and Taiwan 67 This may have been little consolation, however, in light of 
President Carter’s earlier surprise announcement to essentially abandon the 
ROC by shifting diplomatic recognition to the Mainland and to abolish the 1954 
MDT.
Bernstein and Munro posit that China in the early 1990s considered the 
United States a “hegemonist”; a term China reserved from the 1960s to the 
1980s “exclusively for the Soviet Union.”68 Despite the PRC’s setbacks, Biddick 
argues, its involvement in the region was not wholly incompatible with Western 
interests, but China’s growing role in the region “should serve as a reminder that 
the predominance of Western interests in the South Pacific [could] no longer be 
taken for granted.”69
Some regional experts find that deeper U.S. engagement with China is 
likely to raise domestic tensions and threaten the country’s fragile unity. 
Oskenberg and Economy state that China is skeptical of joining Western 
enterprises—suspecting hidden motives of the outside world to subvert the 
Chinese political system through peaceful evolution, to hinder the country’s 
economic growth, or to lock it into a subordinate solution. Stating that an already
66. Thomas Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and 
Taiwan,” Asian Survey 29, no. 8 (August 1989): 801, 811, 814.
67. James C.H. Shen, The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out its Ally 
(Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1983), 279.
68. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict With China (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1998), 22.
69. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry,” 815.
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tense situation could turn even worse, their study identifies warning signals that 
could precede such a change, including increased Chinese military expenditures, 
increased missile and nuclear testing and proliferation, and increased 
government control of communications.
They also argue that the United States cannot successfully impose the 
conditions of China’s involvement in world affairs unilaterally. Rather, it should 
consult widely with its Asian and European partners to secure as much support 
as possible toward China, recognizing that adjustment is necessary to secure 
China’s commitment to international cooperation.70 And Tan, Chan, and Jillson 
describe how Taiwan—growing from an economic backwater in the early 
1950s—created an economic miracle that made it into one of the world's export 
powerhouses in the face of growing Chinese power and threats of force to reunify 
the island with the Mainland; Taiwan was in a precarious position as it asserted 
its role in the region and the world. They argue, however, that these unique 
circumstances provided it with dilemmas, as well as opportunities.71
Dennis Hickey argues that U.S. security policy toward Taiwan has been 
steered primarily by Cold War calculations and by how the United States has 
sought to respond creatively to the constraints on military support to Taipei; 
imposed upon it by the normalization of relations with mainland China. He 
further argues that—with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the
70. Michael Oskenberg and Elizabeth Economy, Shaping U.S.-China Relations:
A Long-Term Strategy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 46.
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Cold War—the time had arrived for adjustments in the United States-Taiwan 
relationship in the early 1990s, but that these modifications should not include a 
change in American security policy, which should continue to serve U.S. interests 
in the post-Cold War environment.72 Lassiter supports this argument, positing 
that the end of the Cold War “produced systemic changes that made 
developments on Taiwan appear more in harmony with international change than 
did developments on the Mainland."73 And Goucang Huan notes that by the 
early 1990s, China had become “a mixed economy with a relatively weak central 
government and strong local authorities,” which led to an active private economic 
sector that could exert growing influence on China’s foreign policy.74
Hickey also examines the security arrangements between the United 
States and Nationalist China from 1942 until 1992, noting that the KMT has 
traditionally depended heavily upon U.S. military support, and arguing that the 
relationship needs to remain based on Cold War considerations—at least until 
such time as the People's Republic of China renounces the use of force to regain 
control over Taiwan.75 Harris also argues for such maintenance, noting that 
“China would have preferred to maintain the status quo that had existed” in the
71. Alexander Tan, Steve Chan, and Calvin Jillson, eds., Taiwan's National 
Security: Dilemmas and Opportunities (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001),
68.
72. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold 
War to Beyond Containment (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group Incorporated, 
1993), 109.
73. Martin Lassiter, U.S. Interests in the New Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993): 203.
74. Guocang Huan, “China’s Foreign Economic Relations,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 519, China’s Foreign Relations 
(January 1992): 186.
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early 1990s, and that so long as Taiwan did not attempt to declare 
independence, no foreign powers interfered, and there was “no internal chaos 
within Taiwan,” that China had reluctantly “accepted the continuity in both [United 
States-Taiwan] and Taiwan-China relations.”76
STRATEGIC RELATIONS THROUGHOUT THE YEARS
Noting the importance of developing an effective international relations 
strategy, Ross states that when two states share “general interests toward a 
common adversary as well as conflictual particular interests, as is the case in 
U.S.-China relations, each side must decide on a bargaining strategy concerning 
the conflictual issues. This strategy is, for the most part, a function of each 
state’s position in the triangular pattern of relations.”77 Whiting provides an 
example of how a strategic balance can drive decisionmaking, positing that 
“When the calculation of political cost from passivity outweighed the economic 
and military costs of taking action, Beijing moved against the United States in 
Korea.... Preemption and seizure of the initiative resulted in limited victory ... 
while risk management avoided escalation by the opponent.”78
Sigal’s account of Washington’s relations with Chiang Kai-shek in early 
1955 reflects a potentially confusing series of exchanges: as three U.S. aircraft
75. Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties, 112.
76. Stewart Harris, “The Taiwan Crisis: Some Basic Realities,” The China 
Journal, no. 36 (July 1996): 129-30.
77. Robert Ross, “International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: U.S.-China 
Relations since 1972,” World Politics 38, no. 2 (January 1986), 259.
78. Allen S. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan,” International 
Security 26, no. 2 (Autumn 2001): 131.
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carriers were en route to the Strait from Manila Bay, Eisenhower blocked efforts 
to extend coverage to the offshore islands beyond Formosa and the Pescadores. 
Chiang asserted on 1 March 1955 that he was readying a counterattack on the 
PLA and that he expected Washington to support him short of providing ground 
forces. Eisenhower expressed his position against such efforts, however, 
arguing that the United States would not support Nationalist aggression toward 
the Mainland.79 Sigal also argues that China’s actions followed a discernable 
pattern throughout the 1954-55, 58, and 62 crises; one of “probing Nationalist 
and U.S. intentions, followed by preemptive moves and reprisal against 
Nationalist-held islands”— inferring that China’s primary aim throughout these 
crises was, in fact, deterring any possible Nationalist invasion.80
Gurtov writes that the situation in the Taiwan Strait helped establish the 
external environment in Sino-Soviet relations, leading to decisions that helped to 
define Communist China’s objectives. Beijing was displeased with a series of 
events in the Soviet Union in 1956— Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, the 
Soviet response to uprisings in Poland and Hungary, the Soviet reconciliation 
with Yugoslavia, and the mild Soviet reaction to the Suez crisis—as well as with 
Moscow’s openness to a relaxation of tension with the United States in 1957.81 
And while China still needed and sought Soviet support in 1958, it realized that it 
could not rely on Moscow to promote either the revolution at home or its interests 
abroad. Through its military support, the Soviet Union appeared to maintain a
79. Sigal, “The ‘Rational Policy’ Model,” 131.
80. Ibid., 149.
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degree of paternal control over China, which most likely resulted in Mao’s 
determination that “the PRC would take the long road to military self-sufficiency,” 
including developing its own nuclear weapons.82
Despite being a formidable power in Asia, the PRC did not necessarily 
have a great number of options for building strong alliances, according to 
Hoobler and Hoobler. They portray China’s relationship with the Soviet Union in 
the 1950s as an uncomfortable coalition; even from 1954 to 1956, Communist 
China was making overtures toward normalization with the United States, with 
Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization policies creating obvious signs of a rift in Sino- 
Soviet relations by 1957.83 They argue that Soviet support for Communist China 
during the 1958 crisis was far less than Mao expected from China’s Communist 
brother. In 1959, the Soviets rejected Chinese requests for an atomic bomb; 
remained neutral in China’s border dispute with India; and Khrushchev visited the 
United States, which further strained the relationship and led to the public 
acknowledgement of a Sino-Soviet dispute.84 And even if the Soviet Union was 
not prepared to support PLA actions in the Strait at the time, as Hsieh posits, it 
most likely cautioned China to undertake any operations carefully and to adjust 
any military force based on the type and degree of U.S. military response that 
Beijing could expect.85
81. Gurtov, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited,” 61-62.
82. Ibid., 64-65.
83. Dorothy Hoobler and Thomas Hoobler, U.S.-China Relations Since World 
War II (New York: Franklin Watts, 1981), 48-51.
84. Ibid.
85. Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China’s Strategy in the Nuclear Era 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
Clubb notes that France’s January 1964 recognition of Communist China, 
the April 1964 appointment and exchange of French and Chinese ambassadors, 
and China’s October 1964 nuclear explosion had substantially altered China’s 
world power position.86 He states that during discussions in Geneva following 
the Bandung Conference, the United States and China both essentially 
demanded each other’s surrender—the United States demanded that Peking 
renounce the use of force in the Strait, and China insisted that the United States 
withdraw its military forces from the Strait— but in the end, little was resolved.87
Sigal states that Beijing might have perceived American policymakers—  
especially Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Assistant Secretary of State 
Walter Robertson—as being tied into the Nationalist strategy; Dulles in March 
1952 advocated “unleashing Chiang,”88 and Eisenhower confirmed in his 1953 
State of the Union address that that the Seventh Fleet would no longer be 
employed to shield Communist China, stating “Permit me to make crystal clear 
this order implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no 
obligation to protect a nation fighting against us in Korea.”89
Sigal also posits that the Nationalists’ taking control of the offshore islands 
was an offensive tactic, as it symbolized Chiang’s rejection of a “two Chinas” 
solution in the region. And Chiang probably viewed surrender of the islands as 
undermining a credible line of defense; the PRC’s attempt to compel him to leave
86. Clubb, “Sino-American Relations and the Future of Formosa,” 1.
87. Ibid., 5.
88. Sigal, “The ‘Rational Policy’ Model," 124.
89. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.”
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one island, and then another, in the face of continued “salami-slicing tactics.”90 
And while Eisenhower wanted to confuse the Communists by keeping them 
guessing as to whether the United States would actually get involved in a conflict 
over Quemoy and Matsu, according to Chang and He Di, he encouraged China’s 
assault on Yijiangshan Island; this “taxed China’s amphibious capabilities to the 
limit and required the largest combined force operation to date in Chinese 
Communist history,” thereby emphasizing Beijing’s inability to conduct an 
effective amphibious operation against Taiwan.91
Taiwan’s military transformation continued through the end of the century. 
Copper notes that the U.S. moratorium on sales of weapons to Taiwan “was lifted 
at the beginning of 1980, but the cancellation of the [U.S.-ROC Mutual] Defense 
Treaty also went into effect at the same time. In January 1980, the Carter 
administration announced plans to sell Taiwan USD $291.7 million worth of 
“defensive” weapons, including 280 surface-air missiles, 14 shipboard gun 
mounts, and 1,000 antitank missiles.92 But while the U.S. State Department also 
refused Taiwan’s request for high-performance aircraft, such as the F-4, F-16, 
and F-18, the Bush administration did agree in 1992 to sell 150 F-16 fighters to 
Taiwan;93 a move that Chen Qimao views as a “serious violation of the 1982
90. Sigal, “The ‘Rational Policy’ Model,” 127.
91. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War,” 1510-12.
92. John F. Copper, “Taiwan in 1980: Entering a New Decade,” Asian Survey 21, 
no. 1 (January 1981): 57.
93. Arms Control Association, “U.S. Conventional Arms Sales to Taiwan,” June 
2004, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/taiwanarms.asp (accessed 7 January 
2006).
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communique,” and which he argues “deteriorated PRC-U.S. relations” and 
threatened to “cause tension between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.”94
Copper notes that Taipei was successful in obtaining two submarines from 
Holland in 1981, but was unable to obtain advanced aircraft, which Taiwan 
argued it needed to compete against Chinese MIG-19 and MIG-21 aircraft. 
“American opponents of the sale replied that China’s smaller defense budget and 
the fact that Beijing has withdrawn military forces from areas close to Taiwan to 
transfer them to the Sino-Vietnamese border made such sales unnecessary.”95 
Adding to the insult, the United States in January 1986 announced the sale of 
USD $500 million in radar navigation equipment to China so it could upgrade 50 
of its F-8 jet fighters. To soften the blow, however, General Dynamics 
Corporation was permitted to help Taiwan design and build its own jet fighter 
plane, including an indigenous avionics system.96
MILITARY MODERNIZATION IN THE STRAIT IN THE 1990S
Edmonds and Tsai discuss the military balance in the trilateral relationship 
and the prospects for air power in the future security of the Strait during the 
1990s, positing that Taiwan invested considerable resources in thoroughly re­
equipping its airforce with modern U.S. and French air defense equipment and
94. Chen Qimao, “New Approaches in China’s Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold 
War Era,” Asian Survey 33, no. 3 (March 1993), 248.
95. John F. Copper, “Taiwan in 1981: In a Holding Pattern,” Asian Survey 22, no.
1 (January 1982): 51.
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strike aircraft armed with modern air-to-air missiles, thereby ultimately denying 
China air superiority in any conflict in the short- to medium-term. They state that 
these weapons were supplemented with indigenously designed and developed 
combat aircraft and air defense missiles, and that air power would remain a 
crucial influence on the overall balance that— in the longer term, as China's 
efforts to upgrade its own air force's capabilities—would begin to undermine 
Taiwan's current advantages, and could serve as a critical warning for 
policymakers in determining future arms sales to Taiwan.97
Garver explores the origins and “triangular dynamics” of the 1996 crisis, 
which he states resulted in the biggest show of American naval force in East Asia 
since the Vietnam War. He notes a Chinese journal that highlighted the 
weaknesses in Taiwan’s defense strategy, which was heavily concentrated on 
ground forces and was insufficient in air and naval forces. Based on these 
deficiencies, it stated, the PLA would focus on controlling the air and sea in 
coordinating an attack against the island; this is what the 1995-96 missile tests 
and amphibious exercises were intended to demonstrate.98 In addition to the DF- 
31 missiles used in these exercises, China had employed SU-27 fighter aircraft, 
guided missile destroyers, attack submarines, electronic reconnaissance aircraft, 
amphibious craft, helicopters, paratroopers, and minesweepers.99 While China’s
96. John F. Copper, “Taiwan in 1986: Back on Top Again,” Asian Survey 27, no.
1 (January 1987): 87.
97. Martin Edmonds and Michael Tsai, eds., Taiwan's Security and Air Power: 
Taiwan's Defense Against the Air Threat from Mainland China (Philadelphia: Taylor & 
Francis, Inc., 2003), 98.
98. Garver, Face off, 100.
99. Ibid., 97-105.
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military forces might not have been capable of conducting an actual, successful, 
coordinated, large-scale amphibious assault on Taiwan, it certainly made a 
significant show of its military force.
Despite this display of power, however, the long-term regional security 
balance in the Taiwan Strait does not rely upon battalion-to-battalion, bomber-to- 
bomber, or ship-to-ship quantitative comparisons, nor necessarily upon 
comparative military capabilities from the most recent conflict. The United States 
and Taiwan have always maintained a lead in these areas relative to China—with 
the probable exception of manpower. Christensen posits that Chinese leaders 
have more recently begun to recognize the potential for closing the gap without 
having to match either side’s military power. Rather, he asserts that China has 
been examining the possibility of a “counterrevolution in military affairs” through 
asymmetric warfare, which would allow them to skip levels of technological 
development and to defeat superior powers by focusing on exploiting their 
reliance on high technology.100
A technological advantage can be important, but not all technology is 
equal. For all their hype, for example, nuclear weapons may not legitimately play 
a key role in the regional security strategy; either for China or for the United 
States. In fact, as Ross argues, asymmetric capabilities have enabled 
Washington to de-link extended deterrence from a reliance on such weapons.
He notes that some Chinese military specialists have even argued that superior
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asymmetric capabilities, such as information warfare, may be superior to nuclear 
capabilities.101 Until achieving such superiority, however, Ross states that 
China’s emphasis on conventional capabilities in deterring local war means that, 
for now, the US-China conventional deterrence relationship remains the factor 
that will determine whether China will use force against Taiwan to achieve 
reunification.102
While asymmetric superiority may remain one of China’s hopes for the 
future, Ross also notes that one advantage China may believe it currently has on 
its side is the perception-based “Somalia analogy,” which posits that hegemonic 
powers fear, above all, personnel casualties.103 Similarly, Jia Qingguo argues 
that “while Beijing takes note of the American public’s unwillingness to accept 
any sacrifice of lives in foreign interventions, Beijing never underestimates 
Washington’s ability to intervene or to justify such intervention.”104 And Watman 
and Wilkening posit that “regional powers seek quick, decisive military results, 
not long wars of attrition”; they want to avoid long, drawn-out conflicts.105 Neither 
China nor Taiwan, however, could have likely achieved this on their own.
The Somalia analogy mentioned above reflects the 1993 debacle when 
American troops fled Somalia after local rebels dragged the corpses of American
100. Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s 
Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 
2001): 8-9, 21-23.
101. Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation 
Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 27, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 64.
102. Ibid., 61-62.
103. Ibid., 18-20.
104. Jia Qingguo, “Reflections on the Recent Tension in the Taiwan Strait,” The
China Journal, no. 36 (July 1996): 94.
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servicemen through the streets. This analogy, however, may no longer hold true 
since the continuation of Operation Iraqi Freedom amid insurgents’ suicide 
bombings, the public burning of American contractors hung from a bridge, 
multiple beheadings of Western civilian aid workers, widespread anti-war 
sentiment among the American people, and over 3,000 fatalities among 
American military personnel as of early 2007 and many tens of thousands more 
casualties. Although the American people have grown tired of it, the U.S. 
Government appeared largely determined to “stay the course.” As Snyder notes, 
“in any particular crisis, part of the payoff for firmness is in the encouragement of 
expectations of one’s future firmness.”106 In this realm, the war in Iraq probably 
has revitalized perceptions of Washington’s resolve and credibility in the eyes of 
many opponents of the United States. During the 1996 crisis in the Strait, 
however, this analogy probably would have still applied.
Jia Qingguo argues that a U.S. policy of engagement with China 
eventually won out because implementing an effective containment policy would 
have been extremely costly and counter-productive. It would have turned China 
into an “instant enemy,” and would not necessarily have received support from 
the international community because a heavy-handed approach might have 
appeared excessive, and because American businesses could have missed an
105. Watman and Wilkening, U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies, 67.
106. Snyder, ‘“Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Chicken,’” 99.
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opportunity to “tap into the vast China market; a dream they have shared for the 
past century but have not yet had a chance to turn into reality.”107
Although much hope remains for future efforts in the Strait, Tsang argues 
that growing economic ties between Taiwan and the Mainland have not 
significantly reduced tensions and the threat of force between Taiwan and the 
Mainland. War or peace across the Strait, he posits, will determine whether 
stability, good order, and prosperity can be maintained in East Asia. And while 
the key to pre-empting war rests primarily in the hands of policymakers in Beijing 
and Taipei, Washington can still significantly influence their policies. While 
nobody openly prefers war to peace, Tsang argues, China insists on retaining its 
right to use force to achieve reunification and has embarked upon a major 
military build-up.108
Does strategic thinking on the question of deterrence vary between Sino- 
American cultures? Should practitioners assume a common understanding of 
deterrence, regardless of national and cultural differences? Shu Guang Zhang 
takes on these questions by exploring Sino-American confrontations between 
1949 and 1958. By drawing on recently declassified American documents and 
previously inaccessible Chinese Communist Party records, he illustrates the vast 
differences between the Chinese and American assessments of each other's 
intentions, interests, threats, strengths, and policies during this period. He 
suggests that, because of such misperceptions, American and Chinese
107. Jia Qingguo, “Reflections on the Recent Tension,” 96.
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counterthreats to perceived threats—a principal feature of a deterrent 
relationship—did not work as intended, and that the literature on deterrence, at 
least as of 1993, provided no clear manner for approaching such a divergence of 
understanding or such a unique balance of mutual deterrence.109
In the end, Chang and He Di posit, Mao determined by February 1955 that 
the United States would not go to war over the offshore islands; but because 
Eisenhower’s military plans were so ambiguous, Mao could not understand the 
extent of Washington’s commitment. Mao feared showing any signs of 
weakness in the face of U.S. military pressure, but in the absence of a fully 
credible U.S. threat, Beijing did not assess the military costs of conducting 
operations as outweighing the political costs of giving into U.S. deterrence.110 
Further explaining the security situation, Ross argues that America’s success in 
the Strait relies on the belief within China’s leadership that American military 
capabilities can be used effectively in a cross-Strait conflict, and also that China 
will suffer more costs from conflict than it will gain through reunification; that it 
values other interests more than reunification.111 Whether this holds true is 
largely dependent upon perceptions of rationality and credibility, as were 
addressed in Chapter III.
108. Steve Tsang, ed., Peace and Security across the Taiwan Strait (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 89.
109. Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American 
Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 133.
110. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War,” 1515-17.
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Although military technology has improved the efficiency and capabilities 
of most modem military equipment, technology is only a tool; how it is used 
largely determines its effectiveness, and this is often a reflection of a military’s 
organizational structure. Additionally, as Ping Deng notes, the economic 
standing of a nation can have a significant effect on military power, because 
“military might is significantly dependent on economic might.”112 And 
Shambaugh states that the organizational structure of the PLA at the turn of the 
21st century was “essentially that of the Soviet model imported in the 1950s,” 
consisting of a “Central Military Commission, general departments— notably, with 
Communist Party dominance and a political commissar system— military regions 
and districts, and configuration of services.”113
Shambaugh argues that ground forces have always been the “heart and 
soul of the PLA,” to which the PLAAF has always been secondary. He also 
notes that mainland China maintains a very large paramilitary force, which 
consists of the People’s Armed Police, the People’s Militia, and the PLA Reserve 
Corps.114 While these comprise a significant element of its military, however, 
none of this is to say that China is limited to land operations: their air force, while 
not the primary element of China’s military, probably remains a powerful and 
capable force that policymakers should not disregard when considering China’s 
military strength.
112. Ping Deng, Taiwan’s Restriction of Investment in China in the 1990s: A 
Relative Gains Approach,” Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (November-December 2000): 960.
113. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and 
Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 109.
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Military capabilities can often be quantified, at least in general terms, but 
leadership is more ambiguous and can have a more immediate impact on a 
state’s military posturing; irrespective of its capabilities. Scobell differentiates 
between a belligerent leader who “has crossed a threshold in a particular 
instance and is eager for battle”; a bellicose leader “who is predisposed to war;” 
and a hawkish leader “who is predisposed to saber-rattling, brinkmanship, and 
threats of war to achieve policy goals— i.e., coercive diplomacy”—which he 
contends was the case in the 1995-96 crisis.115 He further describes the myths 
that influence contemporary perceptions of China as a belligerent power, 
including one myth of a “defensive-minded pacifist ancient culture,” and another 
myth that assumes “a military completely subordinate to, or totally in 
synchronization with, a civilian elite.”116
Scobell argues that territorial disputes—particularly those pertaining to 
Taiwan—are quite important to Beijing, and that in many cases it was the 
paramount leader who was the driving factor in the decision to use force. He 
also argues that soldiers generally are “more cautious and conservative than 
statesmen on domestic and foreign employments; however, this is less true on 
issues of emotional nationalism.”117 This may suggest that the PRC and ROC 
militaries in the 1950s and 1960s might have been more willing to engage in a 
Taiwan conflict—when Taiwan was a more personal issue—than in the 1990s,
114. Ibid., 154, 158, 170.
115. Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and 
the Long March (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003), 171.
116. Ibid., 192.
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when most Communist Chinese military members had no personal ties to the 
island. Scobell’s perception of Chinese civil-military culture presents an 
interesting lens through which to view the way China’s military and policymakers 
might perceive its interests in the Strait.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
This dissertation presents a relatively common issue—the Taiwan Straits 
Crises—and presents it in a way so that the reader can view the events through 
a lens that he or she might not have considered previously. Rather than simply 
applying a traditional deterrence model or assuming that geopolitics drove the 
actors to take one action over another, this research helps to explain the role that 
the deliberate application of ambiguity played in the trilateral relationship. It also 
provides the reader with some additional context into how the factors espoused 
in the model might be applied to other trilateral security situations.
Because pivotal deterrence is a relatively new approach to deterrence, 
there is very little literature specifically addressing it—particularly as to whether 
or how it applied to U.S. security policy in the Taiwan Strait. Also, previous 
studies that broadly employed extended deterrence have often neglected the 
Strait because, Taiwan and China being technically and legally one state, the 
crises between them have been generally categorized as “civil” conflicts; or 
because the conflicts were not protracted to a degree to warrant classification as 
“war.” This author, however, posits that China and Taiwan qualify as separate
117. Ibid., 195-196.
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actors due to the unique situation in the Strait, and also that holistic pivotal 
deterrence presents an effective approach to explaining the security relationship 
throughout the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55, 1958, 1962, and 1995-96; as 
well as during the relationship shift in the 1970s.
The most similar approach to pivotal deterrence—extended dual 
deterrence—does not sufficiently address the factors presented in this research. 
By applying the holistic pivotal deterrence model presented herein to the four key 
crises in the Taiwan Strait, this dissertation provides additional data points for 
understanding and assessing pivotal deterrence and, more specifically, the effect 
of ambiguity in international security policy. Although this research focuses 
heavily upon political, military, economic, and social developments in the Strait, it 
is not, on the whole, about United States-China-Taiwan foreign policy; it is more 
succinctly about U.S. security policy, which may be understood as a more 
specific subset of foreign policy, and the triangular relationship in the Strait 
through the lens of holistic pivotal deterrence. This research contributes to the 
literature by building upon Crawford’s pivotal deterrence model and using it to 
explain stability in the Taiwan Strait. As a result, this research builds upon the 
existing deterrence literature and applies it to a regional context, thereby 
identifying the elements of holistic pivotal deterrence, illustrating how a strategic 
playing field can change over time, and demonstrating how these changes 
affected the application of a pivotal deterrence model.
This model was developed to address the complexities of the ambiguous 
trilateral relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan in a way that
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other aspects of deterrence theory fail to encompass. While this research 
presents a largely explanatory— rather than predictive—outcome, its lessons may 
help readers understand the complexities of utilizing deterrence and ambiguity to 
maintain security, which can be useful for scholars and professionals in both the 
theoretical and policymaking fields of international studies to identify potential 
opportunities for applying the model in future situations.
SUMMARY
This literature review has demonstrated that U.S. relations across the 
Taiwan Strait since 1949 have been tenuous throughout many periods of crisis, 
but that U.S. involvement has remained an essential element in sustaining the 
relative peace and stability between Taiwan and mainland China. America’s 
strategic approach throughout this period involved maintaining a degree of 
flexibility and ambiguity that has allowed it to manage relations with both China 
and Taiwan in a way that could not have been accomplished if it had taken a 
clear position with one side or the other. America’s policy toward the region has 
permitted growth and development that hopefully, over time, will continue to bring 
China and Taiwan closer to a peaceful reconciliation of their differences. This 
chapter touched upon some elements of deterrence, which is a complex and 
fundamental element of U.S. foreign policy in the Strait, and which warrants 
further exploration.
While this literature review addressed military, political, diplomatic, and 
economic factors in the Strait, the next chapter will discuss the specific events
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that drove the trilateral relationship throughout the second half of the 20th 
century. It will include the background treaties, documents, and other 
agreements upon which U.S. relations in the Strait are founded, and will show 
how the multiple factors maintained security within the region’s dynamic security 
structure.
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CHAPTER V
FACTORS AFFECTING SECURITY IN THE STRAIT: 1945-63
The previous chapter presented a review of the literature discussing the 
trilateral security relationship and the framework in which it operates. Building 
upon these concepts, this chapter discusses the shifting political, military, 
economic, and diplomatic factors that helped to define the roles and positions of 
China, Taiwan, and the United States in that relationship since the late 1940s 
and that set the stage for the next five decades of tension in the region.
This chapter also presents the context for understanding how the United 
States developed and managed its regional security policy from 1945 to 1963. It 
provides a basic picture of the regional geopolitical events leading up to the 
period under study and provides important context for the remainder of the 
dissertation. It is intended to help the reader understand why China’s more 
recent history has been so turbulent, as well as why U.S. policy has remained so 
ambiguous throughout the years.
POWER AND CONTROL
This chapter focuses on the empirical data available on the three primary 
actors throughout the relationship—China, Taiwan, and the United States—  
including information about public statements, arms sales, military mobilizations, 
propaganda, external relationships, treaties, aggression, and capabilities; as well 
as perspectives from regional experts, former government officials, transcripts of
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diplomatic meetings, and other relevant sources. These are presented to 
demonstrate how they support pivotal and holistic pivotal deterrence.
This chapter presents the background on the actual developments that 
created, shaped, and directed the security situation in the Strait. This information 
will illustrate to the reader how and why pivotal deterrence applied to the events 
in the region. This is also where the information comes together to create the 
linkages that exist between the United States, China, and Taiwan, and how they 
function together in a political climate.
Political, military, and diplomatic factors are important in explaining how 
and why conflict did not escalate to its full potential in the Strait during the four 
crises, but the balance of economic power also plays an important role. Since 
one’s economic position may reflect independence or reliance upon other states, 
it is worth noting to some extent. Taiwan’s surpluses in 1945 could be attributed 
to “technological discipline and a high degree of social and economic 
organization,” and provided a great potential advantage.1 The shifting of power 
from the Nationalists to the Communists at the end of the decade, however, did 
not come with a smooth economic transition.
Economic Factors
Taiwan’s economy under Japanese rule was developed to serve the 
economic needs of Japan and the military needs of the Japanese base
1. George Kerr, “Some Chinese Problems in Taiwan,” Far Eastern Survey 14, no. 
20 (October 1945): 284.
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established on Taiwan; not to benefit the Taiwanese.2 But by mid-February 
1947, “the economic crisis in China threatened a general breakdown of China’s 
economic structure.... The 6,500,000 Formosans found themselves in February 
1947 infinitely worse off than they had been under the Japanese for half a 
century.”3 And by late 1948, due to China’s spiraling inflation, “prices have 
become astronomical and their rise so rapid that the government [have] been 
unable to print sufficient money to meet day-by-day needs”;4 the KMT was 
quickly losing control.
With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Clark notes, the United 
States extended a security umbrella—which was critical to Taipei’s existence—  
guaranteeing the survival of the Republic of China. With this, Chiang’s 
reconstituted KMT government made a momentous decision to promote rapid 
development.5 While Taiwan maintained “the reputation of being a capitalist or 
free-market showplace, its rapid growth has been closely associated with several 
major structural transformations of the economy that were the result of explicit 
state policy and guidance,” including radical land reform of the early 1950s and
2. A.J. Grajdanzev, “Formosa (Taiwan) Under Japanese Rule,” Pacific Affairs 15, 
no. 3 (September 1942): 323.
3. George Kerr, “Formosa’s Return to China,” Far Eastern Survey 16, no. 18 
(October 1947): 208.
4. United States Department of State, “The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to 
Secretary Marshall,” 10 August 1948 (Doc 161: Annex), United States Relations with 
China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-99 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1949): 885.
5. Cal Clark, “The Taiwan Exception: Implications for Contending Political 
Economy,” International Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (September 1987): 333-335.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
an import-substitution industrialization policy that established strong protectionist 
controls.6
Omestad notes that “Taiwan’s de facto independent existence was sealed 
early on by U.S. military protection. The Communists unified the Mainland, and 
the government on Taiwan busied itself with economic growth.”7 And Ying-mao 
Kau notes that the 1958 crisis “forced the KMT to face squarely the difficult reality 
of long-term survival on Taiwan versus the short-term dream of retaking the 
Mainland. Hence, the concept of ‘economic development’ began to carry 
increasing weight and moved to the center of the KMT’s political game plan.”8
Taipei has long recognized the importance of technological progress for its 
industrial development, according to Arnold. He argues that economic growth in 
the 1950s and 60s “was spurred primarily by labor-intensive industries and the 
export of processed goods: very little scientific research and development was 
actually carried out except in the field of agriculture where improved varieties of 
crops and animals were successfully developed.”9 Taiwan was determined to 
grow its economy in the 1970s and to improve its indigenous capabilities in 
science and technology in order to improve its security and develop its defense 
industry, as well as to provide “an important motivational basis for developmental
6. Ibid., 334.
7. Thomas Omestad, “Dateline Taiwan: A Dynasty Ends,” Foreign Policy, no. 71 
(Summer 1988): 179.
8. Michael Ying-mao Kau, “The Power Structure in Taiwan’s Political Economy,” 
Asian Survey 36, no. 3 (March 1996): 290.
9. Walter Arnold, “Science and Technology Development in Taiwan and South 
Korea,” Asian Survey 28, no. 4 (April 1998): 444.
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bureaucrats to hasten the institutionalization of science and technology research 
and development plans.”10 These were ambitious, but important, goals.
Chang emphasizes Taipei’s history of dependence on Washington, 
noting that the United States provided approximately USD $3.7 billion in 
economic and military aid to Taiwan between 1949 and the early 1960s, of which 
about $1.4 billion went directly into the Taiwanese economy.11 The annual 
amount of military aid decreased from $351.2 million in 1952 to $84.4 million in 
1962, and the total amount of assistance also decreased from $442.6 million in 
1955 to $160.4 million in 1962, but the United States remained Taiwan’s largest 
economic trading partner in the early 1960s, followed by Japan.12 Overall, the 
tensions in the Strait did not appear to have a negative impact on Taiwan’s 
economy. In fact, as Plummer notes, Taiwan’s economic progress “was the most 
impressive of all the emerging countries of Asia” in the 1960s.13 Moreover, Ho 
argues, 1951-84 was actually an unprecedented period of successful economic 
development for Taiwan, although he does note that its development “is 
sometimes attributed to the United States aid it received from about 1951 
through the mid-1960s.”14
Highlighting the relevance of economic power, Werner posits that “the 
legitimacy of a political system reflects many ingredients, but the most significant
10. Ibid., 444-45.
11. David W. Chang, “U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan,” Asian Survey 
5, no. 3 (March 1965): 152-54.
12. Ibid., 155-58.
13. Mark Plummer, “Taiwan: The ‘New Look’ in Government,” Asian Survey 9, 
no. 1 (January 1969): 20.
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may be hope, and a sense of economic progression ... [that] continued economic 
prosperity is the key to Taiwan’s future since it is the underpinning of political 
legitimacy. This linkage is therefore the hinge of domestic stability.”15 These 
factors illustrate the importance of Taiwan’s economic development, which 
helped it to establish itself as an economic power in the region.
While the United States clearly possessed a great deal of economic 
control over Taiwan, China could generally count on the Soviet Union for support 
and trade throughout the 1950s. Economic decline and famine on the Mainland 
toward the end of the decade created some shifts in Chinese dependence, but 
not to any great extent. The CIA assessed that, as of late 1962, Western grain 
shipments to mainland China made a significant economic contribution to the 
strength of the Communist regime, and was perhaps the only true economic 
lever against the regime that the West possessed at the time.16 With few viable 
options in this regard, one might expect that economic pressure would play a 
large role in U.S. security policy toward China; this was not the case, however.
Kaim posited in 1949 that, when the PRC came to power, “the 
Communists [realized] they [could not] carry out their reform plans without foreign 
cooperation and without imports,” and that “such imports [could] be purchased in
14. Samuel P.S. Ho, “Economics, Economic Bureaucracy, and Taiwan’s 
Economic Development,” Pacific Affairs 60, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 226, 232.
15. Roy A. Werner, “Taiwan’s Trade Flows: The Underpinning of Political 
Legitimacy?” Asian Survey 25, no. 11 (November 1985): 1105-07.
16. United States Department of State, “Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning 
Council,” 30 November 1962, (Doc. 157: Paper), Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gov/www 
.about_state/history/frusXXII/151to197.html (accessed 15 December 2006).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Russia and eastern Europe only in very small quantities.”17 But Boone notes that 
while the PRC was “calling on the business community to continue their normal 
functions and promising them protection” following the takeover of mainland 
China, they “were not slow to put into effect their plans for the elimination of 
Western interests from the Mainland.”18 And in 1953, Hughes notes, the PRC 
instituted its first “Five Year Plan,” which emphasized capital industry’s 
responsibility to double the Mainland’s industrial output in the PRC’s “attempt to 
compress the modernization of China’s backward economy” into an expedited 
timeframe.19
TAIWAN’S EARLY YEARS: DESIGNING LEGITIMACY
Until the 17th century, the population of Taiwan was almost exclusively 
composed of non-Chinese aboriginal groups whose origins may be traced to 
Southeast Asia.20 But when Japan annexed Taiwan in 1895, it faced the issue of 
determining how it could get the most out of China, especially territory, without 
provoking the West into intervening, l-te Chen notes that “the annexation of 
Taiwan ... satisfied [Japan’s] public hunger for Chinese territory, at least
17. J.R. Kaim, “Trade Prospects in China,” Far Eastern Survey 18, no. 11 (1 
June 1949): 124.
18. A. Boone, “The Foreign Trade of China,” The China Quarterly, no. 11 (July- 
September 1962): 177
19. T.J. Hughes, “China’s Economy—Retrospect and Prospect,” International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 46, no. 1 (January 1970): 65.
20. Ronald G. Knapp, “Chinese Frontier Settlement in Taiwan,” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 66, no. 1 (March 1976): 43.
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temporarily, and gave Japan the coveted status of a colonial power.”21 This 
lasted 50 years and resulted in artificially created social tensions on Taiwan.
Following the end of WWII in 1945, Japan was forced to relinquish control 
of its annexed territories. The initial issue regarding the legitimate ownership of 
Taiwan following WWII is rooted in the Cairo Declaration of 27 November 1943, 
in which the United States, the United Kingdom, and China declared their intent 
that "all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Formosa 
and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."22 Hsiao and 
Sullivan note that after 1943, the CPP treated Taiwan a priori as an integral part 
of Chinese territory and thus denied any potential political sovereignty to the 
Taiwanese people.23
The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 further defined the terms for 
Japanese surrender and stated that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be 
carried out,”24 but it did not explicitly mention Taiwan or the other offshore 
islands. And Japan’s surrender did not resolve Taiwan’s problems. As Yu-Shan 
Wu notes, “the KMT state and Taiwan society were alien to each other when they
21. Edward l-te Chen, “Japan’s Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Ito-Mutsu 
Diplomacy, 1894-95,” The Journal of Asian Studies 37, no. 1 (November 1977): 72.
22. United States, Taiwan, and Great Britain. “Declaration of the Three Powers— 
Great Britain, the United States and China Regarding Japan,” 27 November 1943, 
National Diet Library, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c03.html (accessed 30 May 
2006).
23. Frank S.T. Hsiao and Lawrence Sullivan, “The Chinese Communist Party and 
the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943,” Pacific Affairs 52, no. 3 (Autumn 1979): 465.
24. United States, China, and Great Britain. “Proclamation Defining Terms for 
Japanese Surrender,” 26 July 1945, National Diet Library, http://www.ndl.go.jp 
/constitution/e/etc/c06.html (accessed 30 May 2006).
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first met in 1945 after fifty years of Japanese colonization of the island.”25 They 
had become so isolated from each other, he posits, that they no longer identified 
with one another; they had become different peoples.
TENSIONS BUILDING IN THE STRAIT: 1949-54
After the PRC’s rise to power in 1949 and the resurgence of the KMT in 
Taipei, it was still unclear whether the Cairo Declaration’s specification that the 
territories were to be restored to the “Republic of China” discredited the PRC’s 
claims of ownership. While not specifically covered in the Potsdam Declaration, 
however, some argue that after the territories reverted back to the ROC, these 
islands became an integral part of China that subsequently saw a shift in power 
to the PRC. Conversely, others may argue the opposite; that since the Cairo 
Declaration specifies that the territories belonged to the ROC, and not the PRC, 
that Taipei has a legitimate claim to their ownership. This question seems to 
balance on whether one considers the government in Taipei as legitimate or as 
existing in name only. Although Washington and others have recognized the 
PRC as the official Government of China, some continue to recognize Taipei.
When the KMT reestablished itself on Taiwan, Clough notes, it immediately 
transformed the island “into the seat of a national government, still recognized by 
most of the world at that time as the legitimate Government of China.”26 Clubb
25. Yu-Shan Wu, “Marketization of Politics: The Taiwan Experience,” Asian 
Survey 29, no. 4 (April 1989): 382.
26. Ralph N. Clough, “The Enduring Influence of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan Today," The China Quarterly, no. 148 (December 1996): 1055.
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argues that the civil war in China in the late 1940s was not, at the time, a priority 
for the United States, which was going to wait for the situation to run itself down a 
bit before developing a new policy for the region27 Washington’s position toward 
Communist China at the outset appeared more ambivalent than confrontational.
U.S. diplomats discussed giving diplomatic recognition to the Communist 
regime in 1949, but were put off by its arrogant mood.28 The U.S. Ambassador in 
China at the time considered any move toward recognition of the PRC unwise, 
noting that “Chinese have long successfully employed through weakness [a] 
policy of playing one foreign power against another.”29 Washington recognized 
the reality of continuing to conduct business with the Mainland, but recognized 
the need to proceed carefully, as any de facto relations could be construed as, 
and eventually become, de jure  recognition of the Communist regime.30
While Communist China at the time sought diplomatic relations with the 
United States, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Great Britain,31
27. O. Edmund Clubb, “Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 
1950-1955,” Political Science Quarterly 74, no. 4 (December 1959): 517.
28. United States Department of State, “The Ambassador in China (Stewart) to 
the Secretary of State,” 29 April 1949, (893.01/4-2949: Telegram), Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1978): 12.
29. United States Department of State, “The Ambassador in China (Stewart) to 
the Secretary of State,” 3 May 1949, (711.93/5-349: Telegram), Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1949, Vol. 9, China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1978): 14-15.
30. United States Department of State, “The Ambassador in China (Stewart) to 
the Secretary of State,” 27 May 1949, (893.01/5-2749: Telegram), Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1978): 30.
31. United States Department of State, “The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) 
to the Secretary of State,” 2 October 1949 (793.00/10-249: Telegram), Foreign Relations
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Washington considered early U.S. recognition of the regime “highly unlikely.”32 
Nevertheless, Mao Zedong declared Beijing’s intent to establish diplomatic 
relations with “any foreign government prepared [to] observe principles [of] 
equality, mutual interest, [and] mutual respect [of] territorial integrity [and] 
sovereignty.”33 U.S. diplomats had reason to believe in 1949 that China’s 
Communist leaders truly desired “American recognition and regularization [of] 
relations for both political and economic reasons,” and felt that any Communist 
concessions “would be rooted in political and economic exigencies.”34 
To maintain regional stability between China and Taiwan, President 
Truman ordered the United States Navy’s Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Strait 
on 27 June 1950. Justifying this action, he stated
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism 
has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations 
and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the 
Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international 
peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by 
Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area
of the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1978): 93.
32. United States Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the 
Consul General at Tientsin (Smyth),” 30 September 1949 (893.01/9-2349: Telegram), 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, China (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1978): 93.
33. United States Department of State, “The Ambassador in the Soviet Union 
(Kirk) to the Secretary of State,” 2 October 1949 (893.01/10-249: Telegram), Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, China (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1978): 94.
34. United States Department of State, “The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) 
to the Secretary of State,” 11 October 1949 (893.01/10-1149: Telegram), Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 9, China (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1978): 121-22.
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and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions 
in that area.35
While sending the U.S. Navy into the Strait to prevent any attack on 
Formosa, Truman called upon Taipei to “cease all air and sea operations against 
the Mainland,” declaring “the [Seventh] Fleet will see that this is done.” He also 
stated that “the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the 
restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or 
consideration by the United Nations.”36 Not specifically supporting the ROK, the 
United States was somewhat ambivalent about the China-Taiwan issue at the 
time.
Washington’s ambivalence changed toward the end of 1950. As Wolk 
illustrates, the Korean War brought a series of successes and failures for the 
United States in the region. At the height of U.S. success during the war,
General MacArthur landed at Inchon on South Korea’s western coast and 
subsequently drove the North Koreans north, back across the 38th Parallel and 
continued pushing northward— not recognizing the perceived threat that his 
actions presented to China as U.S. and ROK military forces approached the 
Yalu River. MacArthur decided to push ahead on 24 November 1950, but late on 
25 November, “more than 200,000 Chinese troops attacked [U.S. forces], driving 
through the South Korean Army's II Corps and pulverizing the right flank of the
35. Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea,” 27 
June 1950, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu 
/ws/index.php?pid=13538&st=&st1= (accessed 2 December 2005).
36. Ibid.
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Eighth Army. In an instant, the war had been transformed.”37 As Chinese forces 
drove U.S. troops back to the 38th Parallel, the PLA’s actions reinforced 
Eisenhower’s stated belief that the Communist Chinese, along with the 
Communist North Koreans and Soviets, were a threat to democracy, a threat to 
peace, and a threat to the security of the United States.
President Eisenhower in February 1953 described America’s role in the 
Strait as one of “playing both sides against the middle” in order to prevent both 
China and Taiwan from taking aggressive action against the other. “In June 
1950, following the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea,” he stated, the 
Seventh Fleet “was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to 
ensure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the 
Chinese Communist Mainland. This meant, in effect, that the United States Navy 
was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China.”38 He later 
stated that “any invasion ... would have to run over the [Seventh] Fleet.’’39 In 
essence, the United States had publicly and officially become a pivotal influence 
between the two Chinese powers.
Chiang Kai-shek reclaimed his presidential powers in March 1950 from 
Taipei, where he announced his five-year plan to reclaim control of mainland 
China; making preparations in 1951, conducting a counter-attack in 1952, and
37. Herman S. Wolk, “Truman’s War,” Air Force Magazine Online 83, no. 11 
(November 2000), http://www.afa.org /magazine/Nov2000/1100korea.asp (accessed 30 
November 2005).
38. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.”
39. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The President’s News Conference of August 17th, 
1954.” 17 August 1954. The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency 
.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9987&st=&st1= (accessed 16 December 2006).
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“mopping up” from 1953-1955.40 This plan was not well-received in Washington, 
which certainly recognized the trouble that any such operations would entail.
The PRC’s performance in the Korean War helps to illustrate the basis for U.S. 
concerns.
Ambiguity in Taiwan’s legal status seems to have complicated matters in 
the Strait. Whereas the Cairo Declaration of 1943 clearly stated that Taiwan 
should be restored to China, this was superseded by the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty of 1952 with Japan, which did not specify who would be the beneficiary of 
these islands. Trong Chai notes that the Cairo Declaration was never ratified, 
however, and was not a legal document.41 Until the San Francisco Treaty, he 
argues, Taiwan and the Pescadores still technically belonged to Japan. At that 
time, “the KMT’s occupation became effective ... [and its] title to Taiwan was 
derived not from the occupation, which occurred in 1945, but from the treaty.”42 
Mendel notes, however, that neither China nor Taiwan was invited to the 1951 
San Francisco Peace Conference because of disagreement over whether to 
invite the new Peking Communist regime or Taipei’s Nationalists. To avoid any 
consternation on the point of to whom Taiwan rightfully belonged, the 1951 treaty 
simply conveyed Japan’s renunciation of “all right, title, and claim to Formosa 
and the Pescadores” without specifying any beneficiary.”43
40. Clubb, “Formosa and the Offshore Islands,” 517.
41. Trong Chai, “The Future of Taiwan,” Asian Survey 26, no. 12 (December 
1986): 1314.
42. Ibid., 1315.
43. Douglas H. Mendel, “Japanese Policy and Views Toward Formosa,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 28, no. 3 (May 1969): 514.
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The reorganization of the KMT in the early 1950s illustrates several things, 
according to Dickson: the evolution was episodic, not gradual; and it was partial, 
not complete, because it did not become an entirely different political party; and 
the organizational form it chose was consistent with its own past, but also proved 
successful with the environment it wished to control.44
1954-55: THE FIRST TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS
Shortly after the Korean War Armistice, which was signed in 1953, China 
and Taiwan came into conflict over several small islands— including Quemoy and 
Matsu— located off the shore of the Mainland that were claimed by both sides of 
the Formosa Strait. After Nationalist military forces moved to occupy the islands, 
China began an artillery bombardment of the islands, thereby drawing the United 
States military into the conflict.
The Seventh Fleet had been operating in the region for years. But in his 
State of the Union Message to the Congress on 2 February 1953, President 
Eisenhower stated that “since the ‘Red Chinese’ had intervened in the Korean 
War, he felt no longer any need to ‘protect’ them from an invasion by the 
Nationalist Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek.”45 The next day, newspapers 
throughout America announced that Eisenhower was ready to “unleash Chiang” 
on Communist China.
44. Bruce J. Dickson, “The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the 
Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950-52,” The China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993): 83.
45. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union.”
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Stalin’s death in March 1953 may have changed Eisenhower’s perspective 
on the China situation. With Moscow facing new leadership, Beijing might have 
been in a weaker position to use it for leverage against the West. The 
bombardment stopped as a result, but only temporarily.
Despite Washington’s ties to Chiang, the United States Congress began 
to change its attitude during the early stages of the 1954-55 crisis, arguing that 
Communist China should not be ignored, and that formal recognition of Beijing 
was inevitable.46 Any empathetic sentiments toward the CPP, however, were 
quickly reversed. Shortly after his inauguration, President Eisenhower lifted the 
naval blockade of Taiwan that had previously prevented Chiang from deploying 
his Nationalist forces against the Mainland. Beijing, probably fearing that an 
unconstrained Taiwan would begin preparing for an attack on the Mainland, 
began shelling the islands of Quemoy and Matsu on 3 September 1954.
America most likely perceived this bombardment as a Communist attempt to take 
control of the offshore islands and a step toward invading Taiwan; furthering 
Beijing’s hopes of becoming a reunified, regional hegemon in the Asian-Pacific 
region.
The outbreak of this crisis seems to have caught the Eisenhower 
administration offguard, although Communist Chinese forces had been raiding 
several Nationalist-held offshore islands since the spring. President Eisenhower 
felt that the United States was “morally bound” to take necessary action to
46. Jian Yang, Congress and U.S. China Policy: 1989-1999 (Hauppauge: Nova 
Science Publishers Inc., 2000), 55.
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defend Taiwan from the Mainland 47 And as a response to these attacks, the 
United States’ Seventh Fleet had been deployed twice to the Strait in a show of 
force, which resulted in the withdrawal of Chinese forces. Thus, up until shortly 
before the outbreak of this crisis, Washington falsely believed that its deterrence 
had been, and would continue to be, effective 48 By sending its naval forces, 
however, the United States became deeply entangled in a delicate balance 
between protecting the Nationalists of Taiwan and controlling their newfound 
sense of security, as well as preventing aggression toward the Chinese 
Mainland. Chiang was more than eager to use the U.S. military as a shield 
behind which he could provoke and attack the Mainland in an attempt to reclaim 
it in the name of the Nationalist party. Taiwan’s aggression against mainland 
China, however, was as contrary to U.S. interests as was a PRC invasion of 
Taiwan.
The presence of the United States Navy, it seems, effectively thwarted a 
Communist attempt to reclaim Taiwan, while it also prevented Chiang from acting 
irresponsibly toward the Mainland. But in what Beijing most likely viewed as yet 
another move against China, the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO)49 on 8 September 1954 to limit aggression in Southeast
47. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “To Walter Bedell Smith,” 7 September 1954 (Doc. 
1050: Teletype), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, http://www 
.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential -papers/first-term/documents /1050.cfm.
(accessed 16 December 2006).
48. Thomas Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1995), 23-25.
49. Created by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), 
which included the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, and the United Kingdom.
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Asia and the Southwest Pacific further angered Mao, who might have worried 
that such an organization would actively seek to destroy Communism and help 
the Nationalists regain control of the Mainland. Tucker posits that Mao strongly 
believed that American policies, in consort with Chiang, were designed to 
encircle and isolate China and also to permanently sever Taiwan from the 
Mainland.50
Briggs notes that United States-China relations in the 1950s may have 
been responsible for the emotional anti-Communism movement, to the severe 
detriment of any “bipartisan approach towards foreign policy.”51 Whereas the 
United States by 1949 was tied to the KMT in Taipei, he argues, “it refused even 
de facto recognition of the new Mainland government and successfully rallied 
enough votes to exclude the People’s Republic from admission to the United 
Nations.” But despite this refusal, he posits, “the Truman administration did not 
totally embrace the Nationalist Government. Military aid was not immediately 
forthcoming despite strong congressional criticism.”52 And Ying-mao Kau notes 
that KMT authoritarianism in the 1950s was often characterized as “predatory 
authoritarianism,” mainly because the party “was so preoccupied with regaining 
control of the Mainland that it treated Taiwan simply as a stepping stone for 
recuperating the strength for its return.”53 While one can argue that this might
50. Tucker, Nancy, ed., China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino- 
American Relations, 1945-1996 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 81.
51. Philip J. Briggs, “Congress and the Cold War: U.S.-China Policy, 1955,” The 
China Quarterly, no. 85 (March 1981): 80.
52. Ibid., 81.
53. Ying-mao Kau, “The Power Structure in Taiwan’s Political Economy,” 290.
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have seemed a better option to the United States than a Communist government, 
it was at best the lesser of two evils.
U.S. Measures to Support Taipei
By most accounts, the United States seemed to view the idea of Taiwan’s 
independence as detrimental to stability in the region, and therefore deliberately 
avoided any implication of supporting such sentiments. But, as Chang and He Di 
note, the United States has maintained its public support for Taiwan’s defense, 
as well as its commitment of political support to upholding stability in the Strait 
since the 1954-55 crisis. As such, the United States signed the MDT on 2 
December 1954, followed by the Formosa Resolution, which Congress enacted 
on 28 January 1955—authorizing the President to employ the U.S. military in the 
area of the Taiwan Strait in times of future hostilities.54
Facing the threat from mainland China, the MDT was designed to maintain 
peace and preserve security in the West Pacific area under a common bond of 
sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist Communist 
aggression that developed during the Korean War. It sought to declare 
Washington’s and Taipei’s sense of unity and common determination to defend 
themselves against external armed attack, pending the development of a more 
comprehensive system of regional security.55
54. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War,” 1501.
55. United States and Taiwan, “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United 
States and the Republic of China,” 2 December 1954, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb 
/avalon/diplomacy/china/chin001.htm (accessed 10 March 2005).
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The MDT completely ignored China’s claim over Taiwan, and Trong Chai 
notes that “most nations have either remained silent on the Taiwan question or 
used such forms as ‘acknowledging,’ ‘taking note of,’ or ‘respecting,’ the Chinese 
position to reject the Chinese demands.”56 Eisenhower submitted the treaty for 
Senate approval in January 1955, declaring its purpose to be “defensive and 
mutual in character, designed to deter any attempt by the Chinese Communist 
regime to bring its aggressive military ambitions to bear against the treaty 
area.”57 However, as Briggs notes, “Article VI referred only obliquely to the 
offshore islands by making the provisions of mutual [defense] applicable to ‘such 
other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.’”58
Trong Chai also notes that the treaty stipulates that the parties are to 
settle “any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not 
endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,”59 thus 
declaring the use of force an illegitimate means to effecting political ends. In 
Article II, the United States and ROK agreed to “separately and jointly by self- 
help and mutual aid ... maintain and develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities,” thus
56. Trong Chai, “The Future of Taiwan,” 1315.
57. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Special Message to the Senate Transmitting Mutual 
Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China.” 6 January 1955. 
The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php7pid 
=10427 accessed 16 December 2006).
58. Briggs, “Congress and the Cold War,” 86.
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establishing a commitment to ensuring the safety of each party. This 
commitment, however, was not limited to military means. In Article III, they also 
agreed to “strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in 
the development of economic progress and social well-being” in order to further 
their individual and collective efforts.60 And Article V established that “an armed 
attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the 
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety,” declaring that it would 
act to meet the common danger, and that “any such armed attack and all 
measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council of the United Nations.”61 These articles provide some of the foundational 
ambiguity under which the trilateral relationship operated.
The treaty defined the protected territories as “the Republic of China, 
Taiwan and the Pescadores, and granted permission to the [United States] to 
station naval, air, and land forces “in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as 
may be required for their defense,”62 thus establishing the right of the U.S. 
military to intervene in the Strait on behalf of Taipei. Some, including Chiang Kai- 
shek, seemed to believe incorrectly that this protection extended to the offshore 
islands of Quemoy and Matsu.63
59. United States and Taiwan, “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United 
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The United States considered China’s shelling of the islands part of a 
directed military campaign, according to Chang and He Di, partially intended to 
“probe the strength of the United States security commitment to Quemoy, if not 
the beginning of an actual effort to seize the island.”64 This perceived aggression 
toward the United States fueled a push toward—and fostered the support in the 
Eisenhower administration and Congress to pass—the Mutual Defense Treaty, 
which essentially gave Eisenhower a “blank check” to use American military 
forces to protect American interests in the Taiwan Strait. Whether Communist 
China was probing the United States or simply carrying out standard military and 
psychological operations against the Nationalists as part of its ongoing civil war, 
its actions brought the United States closer to Chiang Kai-shek, strengthened the 
ties between Washington and Taipei, and set the stage for decades of regional 
tension and conflict.
Secretary of State Dulles had reason to be concerned about instability in 
the region and probably shared Japan’s concerns that Japan itself might be a 
target of unchecked Communist Chinese aggression. The Seventh Fleet, which 
had been in the Strait prior to 3 September 1954, did not deter the shelling of 
Quemoy and Matsu; possibly because its mere presence was not backed by 
apparent intent toward directly engaging with or defending either China or 
Taiwan.
But Dulles’ position on Taiwan probably was influenced more by his 
personal convictions than by national or strategic interests. Mosley posits that
64. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War,” 1501.
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Dulles held Chiang Kai-shek, like South Korean president Syngman Rhee, in 
very high regard based primarily on religious grounds. He was even quoted as 
stating, “No matter what you say about [them, they] are the equivalent of the 
founders of the Church. They are Christian gentlemen who have suffered for 
their faith. They have been steadfast and have upheld the faith in a manner that 
puts them in the category of the leaders of the early Church.”65
Having interviewed Chinese former military personnel who were 
Commanders at the time of the 1954-55 crisis, Chang and He Di present an 
alternative view to that presented by the Eisenhower administration on the 
shelling of Quemoy and Matsu. They note that General Zhang Aiping and Ye Fei 
both stated in their interviews that China had no intention of taking these islands, 
but that because the United States had fully endorsed the Nationalist harassment 
of the Mainland, Mao felt compelled to react against the American efforts to keep 
Taiwan and China divided.66
On 23 July 1954, Wang Bingnan notes, Mao telegrammed Zhou Enlai, 
stating that “in order to break up the collaboration between the United States and 
Chiang and to keep them from joining military and political forces, we must 
announce to our country and the world the slogan of the liberation of Taiwan. It 
was improper of us not to raise the slogan in a timely manner after the cease-fire 
in Korea. If we were to continue dragging our heels now, we would be making a
65. Leonard Mosley, Dulles: a Biography of Elanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles 
and Their Family Network (New York: Dial Press, 1978), 256.
66. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War,” 1508.
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serious political mistake.”67 While one can debate whether this accurately 
reflects reality in Beijing at the time or is simply a constructivist version of history, 
these statements present a strong argument for the power of perceptions. Taken 
so long after the fact, however, this could also be part of a deliberate 
disinformation effort to skew history in favor of Communist China.
The MDT must have been a serious concern to Mao, who witnessed how 
a similar document divided the Korean Peninsula. As Clubb notes, Chou Enlai 
on 8 December 1954 responded for Beijing to the treaty, stating that “the 
liberation of Formosa and annihilation of the Chiang Kai-shek traitorous band is 
entirely within the province of Chinese sovereignty and domestic politics, and no 
foreign country will be permitted to interfere.”68 But in January 1955, President 
Eisenhower declared to Congress that “the United States must remove any doubt 
regarding our willingness to fight, if necessary, to preserve the vital stake of the 
free world in a free Formosa, and to engage in whatever operations may be 
required for that purpose.”69 Despite opposition from many different directions, 
United States policy in the Strait would maintain this steadfast conviction toward 
the Nationalists for the foreseeable future.
On 29 January 1955, in response to President Eisenhower’s assertion that 
Chinese aggression in the Strait was a threat to the peace and to the United
67. Wang Bingnan, Zhongmei Huitan Juinan Huigu (Beijing, 1985), 5-6, quoted in 
Ibid., 1508.
68. Chou Enlai, quoted in Clubb, “Formosa and the Offshore Islands,” 523.
69. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Special Message to the Congress Regarding United 
States Policy for the Defense of Formosa,” 24 January 1955, The American Presidency 
Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php7pid_10355&st=&st= (accessed 
30 November 2005).
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States’ security, Congress passed a joint resolution effectively giving the 
Eisenhower administration “carte blanche” authority to use military force in the 
Strait, and beyond. The international community, however, did not offer the 
Nationalists the same level of support. On 31 January 1955, the United Nations 
Security Council voted to take the issue on as a matter of international security 
and stability. The United States did not enjoy wide support among its 
international partners, including New Zealand, Britain, India, France, and 
Canada; some of which sought a Nationalist withdrawal from at least some of the 
offshore islands in return for broad international guarantees for the security of 
Formosa pending final determination of its status.
The United States, most likely at the insistence of Secretary of State 
Dulles, rejected such proposals, probably intending to hold out for a simple 
cease-fire that would leave Chiang’s forces in place while maintaining the status 
quo. As it happened, however, the matter was deadlocked because Peking 
refused to send a delegation to discuss a cease-fire unless it received the seat 
on the Security Council held by Taipei, and also because of Chiang’s refusal to 
consider either a cease-fire or a withdrawal of Nationalist forces from—and the 
collateral American position on—the offshore islands. This deadlock resulted in 
the UN backing off from the issue until matters had a chance to further run their 
course.70
In the end, Communist China insisted that Formosa was a wholly internal 
matter and that the situation in the Strait was created and maintained by the
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actions of the United States, which—still angry from China’s interference in the 
Korean War—refused to back down in the face of Communist pressure; and the 
Nationalists, still holding out hope that the United States would support a 
counter-attack to reclaim the Mainland, maintained an air of high confidence in its 
eventual victory.
Building upon the 1954 MDT, the Formosa Resolution, signed in January 
1955, authorized the President of the United States “to employ the Armed Forces 
of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing 
and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores.”71 Although the U.S. Congress 
later repealed the Formosa Resolution in October 1974, Bellows argues that the 
repeal did not actually jeopardize the United States’ defense commitments to 
Taiwan because Taipei considers the 1954 MDT to be the cornerstone of the 
security relationship, and because many in China believe that “a period of long 
waiting is preferable to a two-China compromise.”72
President Eisenhower in 1955 expressed his concern about the situation 
in the Strait and about the uncertainty of peace agreements between the CPP 
and the KMT when he stated “There seems to be a great deal of 
misunderstanding about the effect of a ‘cease-fire.’ The Communists with their 
continental bases and power of concentrating when and where they choose have
70. Clubb, “Formosa and the Offshore Islands,” 525-528.
71. United States Congress, “Joint Resolution by the Congress,” 29 January 
1955 (Legislation), 84th Cong., 1st sess., reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1955-1957, Vol. 2, China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986): 
163.
72. Thomas J. Bellows, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of 
Adaptation and Viability.” Asian Survey 16, no. 7 (July 1976): 595-96.
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a tremendous advantage over any small island-based air force. Moreover, as 
long as actual fighting persists anywhere, there is always the danger that some 
hot bullet will hit a powder keg."73
Eisenhower also expressed his concern to Winston Churchill about the 
potential failure of conventional deterrence in the Strait, stating that “the principal 
weakness of this policy is that it offers, of itself, no defense against the losses 
that we incur through the enemy’s political and military nibbling. So long as he 
abstains from doing anything that he believes would provoke the free world to an 
open declaration of major war, he need not fear the ‘deterrent.’”74 This is 
indicative of the “salami-slicing” issue that is inherent to a deterrence policy 
based upon clarity.
Eisenhower emphasized the importance of maintaining a degree of 
distance in supporting Taipei, stating in January 1955 that the United States must 
be sure not to get “hooked into any agreement whereby we would have to join in 
the defense of Quemoy or Matsu just because they were attacked, by a battalion, 
for example.”75 The United States’ European allies may have been concerned 
about the potential escalation in the Strait, but Eisenhower in February 1955
73. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "To Henry Robinson Luce," 24 January 1955 (Doc. 
1265: Personal letter), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, http://www.eisenhower 
memorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1265.cfm (accessed 16 
December 2006).
74. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "To Winston Spencer Churchill," 25 January 1955 
(Doc. 1267: Correspondence), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, http://www 
.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1267.cfm (accessed 
16 December 2006).
75. United States Department of State, “Memorandum of a Conversation, 
Washington, January 30, 1955, 6:30p.m.,” 30 January 1955 (Memorandum), Foreign
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described to General Gruenther (of SACEUR) the complexity of creating an
effective deterrent:
If the solution we adopt should state flatly that we would defend the 
principal islands of the offshore group (Quemoy and the Matsus), we 
would now please the Chinese Nationalists, but we would frighten Europe 
and of course even further infuriate the Chinese Communists.... By 
announcing this as a policy we would be compelled to maintain in the 
area, at great cost, forces that could assure the defense of the islands.... 
This defensive problem could be extremely difficult over the long term, and 
... [many allies] would believe us unreasonable. On the other hand, as we 
consider the problem of defending Formosa, we understand how 
important [it is] to the morale of the Chinese forces on that island. Their 
willingness to fight and keep themselves in a high state of readiness for 
fighting is one of the keys to the solution.76
He further emphasized the importance of an ambiguous policy in describing the 
wording of the Formosa Resolution, to which “the wording, as to areas outside 
Formosa and the Pescadores is vague. In view of what I have just said, you can 
understand why this is so.”77
In March 1955, President Eisenhower responded to a concern among 
members of his Cabinet that the United States would soon “actually be fighting” 
in the Strait, stating that “it is, of course, entirely possible that this is true, 
because the Red Chinese appear to be completely reckless, arrogant, possibly 
over-confident, and completely indifferent as to human losses.” He seems to 
have understood that keeping both the Chinese Communists and Nationalists in
Relations of the United States, 1955-57, Vol 2, China (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1986): 175.
76. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "To Alfred Maximillian Grunther," 1 February 1955 
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line depended upon not providing too great a level of clarity as to the United 
States’ intentions in the Strait and how far it was willing to go to protect Taiwan. 
Eisenhower had, in fact, called “quite unrealistic” proposals to restate the U.S. 
position in the Strait “so clearly and so definitively that the Chinese Communists 
cannot possibly misunderstand” that the U.S. would support Taipei “in their 
resistance to ... attack wherever and by whatever means are most appropriate to 
defend these islands.”78
1958 CRISIS: ROUND TWO
A 1956 National Intelligence Estimate presented the United States 
Intelligence Community’s assessment of mainland China’s capabilities and 
probable courses of action through 1960. While it stated that Communist China 
would “suffer from military weaknesses, particularly air defense deficiencies and 
lack of an adequate indigenous armaments base,” it also assessed that if 
Communist China became convinced that the U.S. “would not assist in defense 
of the [offshore] islands with its own forces, or react in strength elsewhere, they 
probably would attempt to seize them.”79 While this suggests an inherent value 
in signaling intentions, however, U.S. policymakers still needed to constrain 
Chiang’s desires for action on Quemoy and Matsu. Since the 1954-55 crisis,
78. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "To George Magoffin Humphrey," 29 March 1955 
(Doc. 1369: Correspondence), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, http://www 
.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1369.cfm (accessed 
16 December 2006).
79. National Intelligence Estimate, “Chinese Communist Capabilities and 
Probable Courses of Action through 1960,” 5 January 1956, (NIE 13-55), Central 
Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, reprinted in Foreign Relations of the
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Nationalist forces on Quemoy had been continually engaging in raids on the 
Mainland, and Communist China finally reacted on 23 August 1958. Resuming 
the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu from August through October 1958, the 
Mainland used patrol boats to blockade Nationalist resupply efforts of forces on 
the offshore islands, threaten American naval ships, and declare its intent to 
“liberate” Taiwan.
As a protective measure, President Eisenhower again deployed the 
Seventh Fleet to the Strait as escorts to the Nationalist ships that were 
resupplying forces on Quemoy and Matsu, and U.S. naval aircraft helped Chiang 
reestablish control of the region’s airspace following Dulles’ declaration that 
America would take “timely and effective action to defend Taiwan.”80 In addition, 
the United States was reported as having been contemplating nuclear strikes 
against China; targeting Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Nanjing.81 These reports, 
however, remained unsubstantiated.
President Eisenhower on 4 September 1958 stated that events had not 
yet warranted the employment of the U.S. Armed Forces, but that he would not 
“hesitate to make such a finding if he judged that the circumstances made this 
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Joint Resolution,” and that “the 
securing and protecting of Quemoy and Matsu have increasingly become related
United States, 1955-1957, Vol. 3, China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1986): 232-33.
80. Federation of American Scientists, “Second Taiwan Crisis: Quemoy and 
Matsu Islands,” 20 July 1999, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/quemoy_matsu-
2.htm (accessed 10 October 2001).
81. Ibid.
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to the defense of Taiwan.”82 The conflict again came to a conclusion after the 
intervention of the United States Navy, and in a fashion similar to the 1954-55 
crisis; without direct U.S. military intervention against either side.
Leading up to this period of crisis, Sino-Soviet relations had become strained. 
Krushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, the Soviet response to uprisings in Poland 
and Hungary, as well as their reconciliation with Yugoslavia and minimal reaction 
to events in Suez in 1956, and Moscow’s openness to a relaxation of tension with 
the United States in 1957, were all discouraging signs to Mao.83 This period also 
coincided with what is often considered one of China’s greatest economic 
disasters—the “Great Leap Forward” (GLF), which shunned heavy, commercial 
machinery and emphasized communal labor to produce iron and steel in an 
attempt to surpass Great Britain using only the collective will of the Chinese 
people. The overall spirit of the GLF was self-reliance. Unfortunately for the 
Mainland, however, it was practically a total failure, largely resulting in an 
exaggerated, and false, sense of accomplishment, potential, and power.
American support to Taiwan probably encouraged many of the actions 
that led to the 1958 crisis. Though Peking in 1956 and 1957 sought to improve 
relations with the United States, Washington did little to help the efforts, and 
often actively damaged the already weak relationship through actions such as 
staging nuclear-capable Matador missiles on Taiwan—although it is not clear, as
82. John Foster Dulles, “Authorized Statement by the Secretary of State 
Following His Review with the President of the Situation in the Formosa Straits Area,” 4 
September 1958, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
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noted above, whether the nuclear warheads themselves ever were physically 
located on Taiwan. These two years seem to represent a period of significant 
missed opportunities for reducing tensions.
Chiang constantly took advantage of American support by continuing to 
build up Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu, conducting offensive-oriented 
exercises in the Strait, and hosting high-ranking American official visits on the 
offshore islands. By the completion of the military buildup, Chiang had 
manufactured an artificial tie between the defense of the offshore islands and the 
protection of Taiwan, placing the United States in a position wherein, if China 
attacked the islands, America would have to either (1) become militarily involved 
and subsequently forced to carry the conflict into China or (2) let the islands and 
the Nationalist forces on them fall to the PRC, and risk losing Taiwan as well as 
political support at home.
The Eisenhower administration realized that any Chinese attack on the 
offshore islands could not be considered or held to a “limited operation.”84 When 
Taipei and Beijing welded the issue of the offshore islands to Formosa and the 
Pescadores, they interposed a strong roadblock to any shift in American policy; 
effectively closing the door on a “two-Chinas” solution.85 When China resumed 
shelling of the offshore islands in August 1958, none of America’s allies 
supported United States intervention. But Chiang again turned to the United
/ws/index.php?pid=11226&st=&st1= (accessed 28 September 2006).
83. Gurtov, “The Taiwan Strait Revisited,” 49.
84. Ibid., 70.
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States for help, arguing that “at long last the Communists were making their 
move, and the capture of the islands would be the first stage of invading 
Taiwan.”86 It seems that by the 1958 crisis, relations between China and the 
USSR had strained to a point where Mao could no longer rely on the Soviets for 
military support, though Mao was not ready to go it alone and was still somewhat 
dependent upon Soviet support.
The 1950s was a good decade for Taiwan in many respects. As Walker 
notes, from 1949-1958, the Nationalists “made substantial strides in rebuilding 
their government, morale, and symbolic appeal.” And whereas 1951 and 1952 
were “years of reform,” 1953-1957 was a period of adjustment and planning, and 
in “1957 and 1958 the cumulative effect of domestic reforms and United States 
aid brought a burst of flowering in economic and cultural fields.”87 In stark 
contrast to Taiwan’s economic development at the start of the 1960s, China’s 
“Great Leap Forward” of 1958-1962 represented a period of economic 
devastation. For the most part, however, economic conditions in China did not 
have the same impact as they did in Taiwan. Whereas China’s CPP was able to 
manipulate its resources to make up for its problems, the KMT had to work within 
its more limited economic scope to compensate for any losses.
Chang posits that Taiwan’s economic progress would not have been 
possible without massive U.S. military and economic support. “American
85. Clubb, “Sino-American Relations,” 18.
86. Mosley, Dulles, 439.
87. Richard L. Walker, “Taiwan’s Development as Free China,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 321 (January 1959): 122.
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assistance to Taiwan during the five years after 1949 was aimed at economic 
support and rehabilitation to rid the economy of war damage.... From 1956 to
1960, U.S. aid was geared to defense and economic development.”88 But by
1961, Ta Jen Liu notes, U.S. aid shifted to “fostering private enterprise, 
promoting exports, and terminating congressional assistance,” and by mid-1965, 
Taiwan was economically self-sufficient and able to “go it alone.”89
1962 CRISIS: CHIANG’S CHANCE TO TURN THE TIDE
As early as March 1962, Chiang Kai-shek warned that “an invasion of the 
Mainland may come at any time,”90 setting the tone for a new crisis in the Strait. 
The events of 1962-63 were relatively benign in comparison to previous China- 
Taiwan conflicts— largely because it was averted before it was able to escalate to 
military action. It is also very significant, however, because the predominant 
threat to regional stability had shifted from one side of the Strait to the other.
After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, China was in a state of famine, 
chaos, and turmoil. The Chinese economy had all but collapsed, and agricultural 
production had suffered a severe loss.91
88. Chang, “U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan,” 152.
89. Ta Jen Liu, U.S.-China Relations: 1784-1992 (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1997): 279.
90. John F. Kennedy, “The President’s Press Conference of March 29, 1962,” 29 
March 1962, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws 
/index.php?pid=8573&st=mainland&st1= (accessed 22 December 2005).
91. “China: 1949-1972,” CNN Perspectives Presents: Cold War, VHS 
Videocassette, Vol. 5, Chap. 15 (Burbank, CA: Warner Home Video, 1998).
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In its weakened state, China appeared to be in an ideal position for the 
KMT to invade and re-occupy the Mainland. In a conversation with CIA director 
John McCone on 5 June 1962, Chiang stated that his sole purpose since 1949 
had been to reclaim mainland China. Chiang declared “that conditions on the 
Mainland had so deteriorated that operations on a reasonable scale, if properly 
executed, would be supported by the populace and would succeed in 
establishing control of an area which by further efforts on a larger scale would 
expand over all of South China and would ultimately topple the Communist 
regime.” He further asserted that this belief “was shared by all followers on 
Taiwan, giving rise to almost irresistible pressure upon him to act.”92 Chiang 
clearly considered this the opportune time to execute his long-awaited plan to 
return to the Mainland.
Chiang asserted that “under no circumstances would he undertake a 
reckless operation or one which did not offer a reasonable chance of success,” 
nor would he “undertake any formal military operations without consultation and 
concurrence with the United States Government.” He did, however, speak of his 
“dilemma with regard to obtaining United States Government approval for his 
actions, indicating that this area always presented him with an uncertainty and 
therefore foreclosed proper dynamic planning of operations.”93 To this end,
92. United States Department of State, “Telegram from the Central Intelligence 
Agency Station in Saigon to Director of Central Intelligence McCone,” 7 June 1962 (Doc. 
116: Telegram), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; 
Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gOv/www.about_state/history/frusXXII/101 to150.html 
(accessed 15 December 2006).
93. Ibid.
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President Kennedy stated on 27 June 1962 that the 1954 MDT still prohibited
Taiwan from taking action without the agreement of the United States, and
implied that Chiang should not make statements indicating his intention to regain
a foothold on the Mainland.94
A CIA study presented to Chiang in January 1962 concluded that the
Nationalists “had [an] insufficient attack force for sea lift, air cover, supply and
everything that make an invasion of a continent possible,” and that the Mainland
would probably try to drag the United States into it, as well.95 But Chinese
Communists by June that year had started moving troops in what appeared to be
possible offensive posturing for an attack against the offshore islands, although
whether their intentions were offensive or defensive was not clear.96 In either
event, a U.S. State Department memorandum noted “clearcut disadvantages in
making any firm decisions on [U.S] defense of the offshore islands,” noting that
continued ambiguity as to U.S. intentions coupled with a military posture 
capable of interpretation by the Chinese Communists as preparatory to 
defense of the island, while offering [Taiwan] no exploitable assurances, 
combines the advantages of plausible deterrence and preparedness with 
maximum flexibility and maneuverability for the U.S. It avoids a sharp 
worsening of [U.S.-Taiwanese] relations and possibly serious domestic
94. John F. Kennedy, “The President’s Press Conference of June 27th, 1962,” 27 
June 1962, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index 
.php?pid=8735&st=mainland&st1 = (accessed 22 December 2005).
95. United States Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 4 
February 1963 (Doc. 166: Memorandum), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961- 
1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gov/www.about_state/history 
/frusXXII/151to197.html (accessed 15 December 2006).
96. United States Department of State, “Memorandum From the Director of the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk," 18 June 
1962 (Doc. 119: Memorandum), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 
22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gov/www.about_state/history/frusXXII 
/101to150.html (accessed 15 December 2006).
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U.S. repercussions, while keeping the Communist Chinese seriously in 
doubt as to the ultimate risks involved in a grab for the offshore islands.97
In addition to this policy, an unsigned draft statement entitled “Basic National 
Security Policy” from June 1962 called for a “stick and carrot” approach, 
declaring that the United States “should leave ajar possibilities for expanding 
commercial, cultural, and other contacts with Communist China.”98 This 
statement further illustrates the United States’ interest in playing the pivotal role 
against both sides of the Strait during this period.
After Chiang’s preparations for an attack on the Mainland were discovered 
and reported, President Kennedy assured Mao through the Warsaw Talks on 23 
June 1962 that the United States would not support a Nationalist assault on the 
weakened PRC.99 When Chiang expressed concern after receiving word of 
Kennedy’s assurances to Communist China and inquired whether this was 
correct, however, the Embassy in Taiwan responded that it was not correct; that 
what the United States presented to Communist China was simply “a mutual 
renunciation of force.”100 But the Embassy also told Chiang that if the time were
97. United States Department of State, “Memorandum From the Director of the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman),” 21 June 1962 (Doc. 125: Memorandum), Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www 
.state.gov/www.about_state/history/frusXXII/101to150.html (accessed 15 December 
2006).
98. United States Department of State, “Editorial Note,” Undated (Doc. 129: 
Note), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, 
http://www.state.gOv/www.about_state/history/frusXXII/101to150.html (accessed 15 
December 2006).
99. Tucker, China Confidential, 176.
100. United States Department of State, “Telegram From the Embassy in the 
Republic of China to the Department of State,” 4 July 1962, (Doc. 139: Telegram),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
to come when both the U.S. and Taiwanese Governments “mutually decided 
conditions [were] suitable for invasion, that [would] create a new situation.”101 
While this may have been Chiang’s most opportune moment for victory, 
America’s lack of support for Chiang’s aggressive plans again demonstrated that 
it was interested only in maintaining stability in the region.
By January 1963, the CIA had assessed that ideological conflicts between 
Beijing and Moscow had, for all practical purposes, caused a Sino-Soviet split, 
and that most of the world had already considered Communist China and the 
Soviet Union “two separate powers whose interests conflict on almost every 
major issue.”102 A National Intelligence Estimate in May 1963 reaffirmed the 
severity of the split, stating that “Peiping’s dispute with Moscow springs from 
basic issues of incompatible national and party interests, and the Chinese 
Communists show no signs of relenting.”103
If Taiwan had hoped to take advantage of the Mainland’s weakened 
condition, it faced a closing window of opportunity to do so before China
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, 
http://www.state.gOv/www.about_state/history/frusXXII/101 to150.html (accessed 
15 December 2006).
101. United States Department of State, “Telegram From the Embassy in the 
Republic of China to the Department of State,” 5 July 1962 (Doc. 140: Telegram),
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, 
http://www.state.g0v/www.ab0ut_state/hist0ry/frusXXII/l01to150.html (accessed 15 
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102. United States Department of State, “Memorandum by the Deputy Director 
for Intelligence (Cline),” 14 January 1963 (Doc. 163: Memorandum), Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gov/www 
.about_state/history/frusXXII/151to197.html (accessed 15 December 2006).
103. National Intelligence Estimate “Problems and Prospects in Communist 
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recovered from the damage of the Great Leap Forward. Responding to a 
question regarding recent discussions that Chiang might be preparing to invade 
mainland China, President Kennedy in May 1963 reiterated his statement 
regarding the United States’ position from a year earlier—that the 1954 MDT 
prevented Taipei from taking unilateral action, and that Washington did not 
support such action.104
By September 1963, U.S. diplomatic communications from Taiwan 
signified that near-term indicators of plans or preparations from Taiwan for 
military or paramilitary actions were no longer apparent, “except for small team 
probes,” as it had been conducting in the recent past, and that the “atmosphere 
in this respect [was] much more relaxed than in the spring of 1962” or even early 
1963.105 By this time, the KMT’s vision for reclaiming the Mainland by force 
seemed to dwindle. In a discussion with McGeorge Bundy, General Chiang 
Ching-Kuo— Chiang Kai-shek’s son—maintained Taipei’s desire to overthrow the 
Communist regime, but now admitted that “the solution to the problem must be 
more political than military,” including options such as “political warfare,
the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gov/www 
.about_state/history/frusXXII/151to197.html (accessed 15 December 2006).
104. John F. Kennedy, “The President’s Press Conference of May 22nd, 1962,” 
22 May 1962, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws 
/index.php?pid=9233&st=mainland&st1= (accessed 22 December 2005).
105. United States Department of State, “Telegram From the Embassy in the 
Republic of China to the Department of State,” 6 September 1963, (Doc. 184: 
Telegram), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; 
Japan, http://www.state.gOv/www.about_state/history/frusXXII/151to197.html (accessed 
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psychological warfare, diplomatic action and paramilitary operations such as 
maritime raids on the coast and airdrops of military teams.”106
General Chiang admitted to President Kennedy in September 1963 that 
the Nationalist raids on the Mainland “had not seen much success” among these 
operations, which Kennedy also observed were “not very significant”— in fact, it 
appears the raids suffered an average 85-percent fatality rate, with some 
reaching 100-percent—General Chiang maintained that there had been some 
tangible results in that, for example, ten-man units were able to involve 3,000 
Communist troops.107 This was to imply that, while it might not create direct 
military results, this type of response drew from Communist China’s military and 
economic resources and “achieved their purposes: i.e., to cause trouble on the 
Mainland, to raise the morale of the people who hope for liberation, and to upset 
the organization of the army.”108
By this time, the U.S. Ambassador in Taiwan noted that Nationalist 
“preparations for military action against the Mainland” seemed to be “in a 
prolonged quiescent period,”109 and the threat of conflict escalation had
106. United States Department of State, “Draft Minutes,” 10 September 1963 
(Doc. 185: Meeting minutes), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 
22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gov/www.about_state/history/frusXXII 
/151to197.html (accessed 15 December 2006).
107. United States Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 11 
September 1963 (Doc. 186: Meeting), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961- 
1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gov/www.about_state/history 
/frus)0(ll/151to197.html (accessed 15 December 2006).
108. Ibid.
109. United States Department of State, “Letter From the Ambassador to the 
Republic of China (Wright) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs 
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diminished to a point which this research considers the termination of the crisis. 
While the Nationalists probably could not have successfully carried out its plans, 
its determination might have dominated over pragmatism. Throughout this crisis, 
and while maintaining U.S. support for Taiwan, President Kennedy probably felt 
that the United States-China relationship was somewhat irrational, since he 
apparently believed that Communist China was “here to stay,” and not simply a 
passing phase.110 Keeping China out of the United Nations, however, was seen 
by many as an essential factor in containing Communism, further prompting 
Kennedy’s commitment to prevent recognition of Beijing.
Although Kennedy was killed in November 1963, Roger Hilsman, who was 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, delivered a speech the 
following month that Kennedy had previously approved,111 emphasizing the 
United States’ willingness to add flexibility to its policy of firmness toward 
Communist China; arguing that Beijing’s overthrow was unlikely because “police 
states of such a far-reaching nature are notoriously invulnerable to uprisings by 
an inadequately armed populace,” and because Communist China’s leaders 
“have shown a tendency to pull back and become pragmatic in the face of 
serious internal or external resistance.”112
States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gov/www.about 
_state/history/frusXXI 1/151 to197.html (accessed 15 December 2006).
110. William Bueler, U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan (Boulder: 
Colorado Associated University Press, 1971): 43.
111. George Washington University, “Interview with Roger Hilsman,” 8 June 
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This crisis seemed to have little or no effect on either the United States- 
Taiwan, or the United States-China relationship. Taiwan was still America’s card 
to play against China, and was too valuable to reprimand for this potential, yet 
unfulfilled act of aggression toward the Mainland. Even if the United States had 
allowed Chiang to carry out his plans, however, is it not certain that he would 
have been successful, even with China in its weakened state. While it marked 
the apparent end of Taiwan’s goal of reclaiming the Mainland by force, this 
incident also served as yet another example of America’s commitment to 
maintaining stability and peace in the region.
SUMMARY
This chapter illustrated the political, military, economic, and social factors 
that affected power, alliances, and security in the Taiwan Strait up to the early 
1960s. It also discussed the three primary crises in the Strait between 1954 and 
1963 and the United States’ response to each. These crises demonstrated the 
complex dynamics of the trilateral security relationship in the Strait as tensions 
remained high between Taiwan and the Mainland, with the United States 
maintaining a delicate balance of “deliberate ambiguity.” Throughout these 
crises, the United States faced the task of simultaneously shielding Taiwan from 
Communist Chinese hostility while acting as a restraint to preventing Chiang’s 
Nationalists from mounting an aggressive campaign against Mao’s Communists.
(Stevenson),” 19 December 1963 (Doc. 196: Letter), Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, China; Korea; Japan, http://www.state.gov/www.about_state
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
182
The record shows that the ROC clearly depended upon the United States 
for military equipment, training, and support throughout this period. Even with 
modern equipment, the Nationalist forces were inadequate to either defend 
against, or conduct an offensive attack upon, the Communist forces on the 
Mainland. The PRC limited its military operations to the offshore islands, and 
was either unwilling or unable to mount an invasion of Taiwan with the U.S. Navy 
operating in the Strait. While the West had grain shipments as a lever against 
mainland China in the early 1960s, there appear to have been very few “carrots” 
with which to leverage mainland China during the 1954 and 1958 crises; it is 
interesting to note, however, that the empirical data does not seem to indicate 
that the United States attempted to use its economic lever against the Mainland 
in later years.
While the PRC was gaining diplomatic recognition from an increasing 
number of states, the ROC also maintained diplomatic relations with many 
states. Not all allies are equal, however, and few states could replace or equal 
the political, economic, or military influence of the United States upon Taiwan. 
While Communist China continued to receive support from the Soviet Union at 
various levels, it appears their relationship was not as sound as many seemed to 
believe at the time. Ideological and political disagreements between Peiping and 
Moscow resulted in heightened tensions and lowered levels of trust; the Soviets 
maintained an ever-growing distance between itself, the PRC, and the United 
States. In 1963, as Sino-Soviet relations were waning and as France adopted
/history/frusXXII/151 to197.html (accessed 15 December 2006).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
183
diplomatic recognition of the Mainland, Peking adopted a shift in foreign policy, 
proclaiming that it should “lean toward the intermediate zone”; forming a united 
front with any state—other than the United States—that it could have as an ally in 
order to replace the economic support it once received from Moscow.113
After 1963, the dynamics in the Strait continued to change, although the 
ROC-PRC relationship remained acrimonious. Chapter VI will illustrate these 
changes, as well as illustrating the same issues noted in this chapter, but 
continuing through the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96. This will cover the 
remainder of the period under study in this research, bringing the dissertation to 
the final chapter.
113. Clubb, “Sino-American Relations and the Future of Formosa,” 18.
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CHAPTER VI 
SHIFTING DYNAMICS IN THE STRAIT: 1963-1996
Chapter V  discussed the political, military, economic, and social factors 
that affected power, alliances, and security in the Taiwan Strait through the early 
1960s. This chapter is a continuation of that discussion, and it illustrates a 
turning point in the United States-China-Taiwan relationship. It highlights the 
shifting dynamics in the trilateral relationship that followed the 1962 crisis through 
the 1995-96 crisis, which disrupted over 30 years of relative stability in the Strait, 
and it includes the key documents that helped to re-write the trilateral 
relationship. Each of these issues are important in understanding the role of 
holistic pivotal deterrence in the region.
THE POWER SHIFT BETWEEN CRISES
For more than three decades following the 1962 crisis, Sino-American 
relations seemed to grow closer as the goal of the Nationalists shifted from 
regaining control of mainland China to gaining independence from the Mainland 
altogether. The PRC, however, maintained its position that Taiwan should not 
seek independence and that the matter was an internal domestic issue; not an 
international one. But for the United States, the matter remained a thorn in the 
side of policymakers and interest groups, each seeking to further their own 
agendas.
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Plummer notes that The United States adopted “a new policy of reducing 
the size of the armed forces” of Taiwan in 1969. He notes that “U.S. military 
advisors have long urged a reduction in the size of the 600,000-man force 
sometimes described as ‘too large for the defense of Taiwan and too small for an 
invasion of the Mainland.”1
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Garver argues, there was a substantive 
relationship between Taiwan and the Soviet Union,2 but that as long as the 
United States was
willing to continue its role as guarantor of Taiwan’s security, there [was] no 
impelling need for Taiwan to seek a substantial, or a military, 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Were the [United States], one way 
or another, to abandon its role as Taiwan’s protector, Taiwan’s situation 
would be different.... At some level, however, ties between the Soviet 
Union and Taiwan would become counterproductive ... they would 
provoke the PRC to adopt a more militant position towards Taiwan, and 
would begin to scare off investors.3
But mainland China’s relations with the Soviet Union had worsened by the late 
1960s, according to Barnett, with the Soviet Union replacing the United States as 
China’s “principal enemy”; leading Mao to explore improving relations with the 
United States as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.4
China’s Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1964 to 1966, provided 
numerous opportunities for exploitation. Mao’s policy of turning against both
1. Mark Plummer, “Taiwan: Toward a Second Generation of Mainland Rule,” 
Asian Survey 10, no. 1 (January 1970): 23.
2. John Garver, “Taiwan’s Russian Option: Image and Reality,” Asian Survey 18, 
no. 7 (July 1978): 757.
3. Ibid., 760.
4. A. Doak Barnett, China Policy: Old Problems and New Challenges 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977): 3-4.
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intellectualism and the Party bureaucracy resulted in governmental 
disorganization and public unrest, although the PRC’s economy seemed to be 
holding fairly steady in 1966, according to a National Intelligence Estimate 
produced at the time.5 Uhalley notes, however, that Taiwan’s response in 1967 
was one of “praiseworthy restraint,” stating that “there has been an almost 
surprising minimum of insistence on taking advantage of the Mainland turmoil by 
means of an armed attack.”6 He presents the possibility that “the Nationalists 
have accurately assessed the prospects of American support, without which any 
return is impossible,” arguing that, in the end, “the renaissance has been a clear- 
cut failure.”7
Chiang Kai-shek by 1967 started showing clearer signs of backing away 
from the idea of reclaiming the Mainland by force and began to adopt a more 
pragmatic approach to the situation, stating in his New Year’s Day speech that 
“political action is a more effective facet of the war at this stage.”8 This was a 
significant departure from his previous rhetoric, but one that Chiang probably 
viewed as a necessary measure to maintain the support of the United States, as 
well as to maintain credibility with the newest generation of Taiwanese, who had 
no memory or history of life on the Mainland and could not understand or support 
the historical basis for armed conflict with China. And by August 1968, Taipei
5. National Intelligence Estimate, “The Chinese Cultural Revolution,” 25 May 
1967 (NIE 13-7-67) Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council (Approved 
for Release May 2004): 8.
6. Stephen Uhalley, Jr., “Taiwan’s Response to the Cultural Revolution,” Asian 
Survey 7, no. 11 (November 1967): 824.
7. Ibid., 824, 827.
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finally realized Washington’s concern that the Nationalists’ armed forces had 
grown “larger than necessary for the defense of Taiwan and [were] imposing an 
increasing burden on its economic development given declining U.S. military 
assistance and the cessation [in 1966] of grant economic assistance.”9 
This situation lent impetus to U.S. measures to reduce its military 
presence in the region, and to take a more negative position toward Nationalist 
guerrilla anti-Communist activities; emphasizing the “undesirability of any hostile 
action even on [a] very limited scale,” such as a mid-July 1969 raid against 
Chinese Communists’ boats off the coast of Fukien.10 And by late 1969, the 
United States informed Taiwan that it was “necessary to modify [the] Taiwan 
Strait patrol” by only manning it “on an intermittent basis as Commander Seventh 
Fleet can make forces available for this purpose.”11 While this reduction did not 
remove the U.S. Navy’s presence altogether, it obviously was not in Taipei’s 
interests, as it had already related its concern that the Chinese Communists were 
bound to strike, and this would weaken the Nationalists’ relative position.
8. China Post (2 January 1967), 4, in Stephen Uhalley, “Taiwan’s Response to 
the Cultural Revolution,” Asian Survey 7, no. 11 (November 1967): 824.
9. United States Department of State, “Memorandum From Richard L. Sneider of 
the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Kissinger),” 25 January 1969 (Doc 1: Memorandum), Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 17, China, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2006): 1.
10. United States Department of State, “Telegram from the Embassy in the 
Republic of China to the Department of State,” 4 July 1969 (Doc 16: Telegram), Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, y ol. 17, China, 1969-1972 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006): 43.
11. United States Department of State, “Telegram from the Department of State 
to the Embassy in the Republic of China and Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense 
Command,” 23 September 1969 (Doc 34: Telegram), Foreign Relations of the United
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The next several decades would bring great change in the region. From 
1952 to 1974, as Bellows notes, Taiwan shifted from a principally agricultural 
country to one with a diversified agricultural and industrial base, with an 
emphasis on foreign trade. In fact, he argues, Taiwan’s economic position and 
its emphasis on foreign trade became a major factor in the ROC’s survival.12 
Taiwan adopted a more flexible foreign policy in 1971, and as of 1973 it “had 
diplomatic relations with only one of [its] top ten trading partners; the United 
States,” but its trade with West Germany tripled between 1972 and 1975. Even 
after Japan recognized the PRC in September 1972, Bellows notes that “Taipei 
and Tokyo staffed organizations in the opposite capitals which were responsible 
for practically the identical work previously handled by the embassies.”13
Between 1953 and 1988, as Chan and Clark note, Taiwan “accomplished 
one of the most rapid and sustained rates of economic growth in the world, 
producing an average annual increase of 6.2 percent in GNP per capita. 
Consequently, it was transformed from a poor agricultural economy with an 
income per capita of $100 [USD] to an industrial and urban economy with an 
income per capita of $7,500.” This was due largely to export-led growth, and 
resulted in Taiwan developing its economic independence.14 Without this growth, 
Taiwan would have had much more trouble maintaining its international standing.
States, 1969-1976, Vol. 17, China, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2006): 88.
12. Bellows, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy in the 1970s”, 598.
13. Ibid., 605-07.
14. Steve Chan and Cal Clark, “Economic Growth and Popular Well-Being in 
Taiwan: A Time-Series Examination of Some Preliminary Hypotheses,” The Western 
Political Quarterly 44, no. 3 (September 1991): 561.
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THE 1970S: SHIFTING RELATIONS
This decade was more about political, than military, power for the trilateral 
security relationship. But whereas the United States had already expressed its 
interest in improving ties with the PRC, the decade did bring some difficulty for 
Taiwan. It was becoming more difficult for Washington to maintain its support for 
Taipei as Beijing was recovering from “the violent phase of the Cultural 
Revolution,” which had previously “halted the trend toward increased 
international support” for Communist China.15 The Nixon administration made a 
historic gesture by removing some travel barriers with China in 1970, and 
referred to the Mainland as “the People’s Republic of China” in 1971 for the first 
time; proposing a more serious dialogue with Beijing.16 This was an important 
period also because the United States announced new, relaxed trade policies 
with China.17 Washington had publicly started to shy away from Taipei, 
illustrated by such acts as Nixon’s visit to Beijing and the Shanghai Communique 
in 1972, announcing the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1978, and 
U.S. diplomatic recognition of the PRC in 1979; each described below.
Chen Qimao notes that Taipei faced another round of humiliation when 
the United Nations on 25 October 1971 passed Resolution 2758, which some 
argue endorsed the legitimate rights of the PRC in the UN, and also endorsed
15. United States Department of State, “Draft Response to National Security 
Study Memorandum,” 16 February 1971 (Doc 105: Position Paper), Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 17, China, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 2006): 259-60.
16. Sheldon L. Appleton, “Taiwan: The Year it Finally Happened." Asian Survey 
12, no. 1 (January 1972), 32-33.
17. Ibid.
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China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.18 It is relevant to note, however, that the actual 
wording of the resolution makes no such endorsement. Rather, it simply restored 
all rights to the PRC, and recognized its representatives “as the only legitimate 
representatives of China to the United Nations” and expelled Chiang’s 
representatives from the UN and “all organizations related to it.”19 It did not, 
however, directly mention Taiwan.
During a conversation with PRC Prime Minister Chou Enlai in July 1971, 
Henry Kissinger emphasized the difference in the United States’ perspective 
between 1954 and 1971, stating that “in 1954, Secretary Dulles believed that it 
was America’s mission to fight Communism all around the world and for the U.S. 
to be the principal force, to engage itself in every struggle at every point of the 
world at any point of time. President Nixon operates on a different philosophy. 
[The United States does] not deal with Communism in the abstract, but with 
specific Communist states on the basis of their specific actions toward us, and 
not as an abstract crusade.”20
The United States was not the only actor whose perspectives on 
Communist China had changed during this period; the United Nations in October 
1971 voted to give the ROC’s seat to the PRC. This drove ROC Vice Foreign
18. Chen Qimao, “The Taiwan Issue and Sino-U.S. Relations: A PRC View,” 
Asian Survey 27, no. 11 (November 1987): 1166.
19. United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, “Restoration of the 
Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations,” 25 October 1971, 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf7Ope 
nElement (accessed 3 September 2006).
20. United States Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 9 July 
1971 (Doc 139: Transcript), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 17, 
China, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006): 377.
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Minister Yang to declare to Chiang Kai-shek that “it is of paramount importance 
to issue in the near future a formal declaration to the world that the government 
on Taiwan is entirely separate and apart from the government on the Mainland, 
[and that] the declaration should prescribe a new designation for the government 
here, namely “the Chinese Republic of Taiwan.’”21 Although there is no 
indication that Chiang supported this view, the timing of the UN vote “became a 
source of concern” for Washington, as President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were 
planning their trip to mainland China to establish a joint communique, as 
described below.22
Prior to continuing with this chapter, the author would like to emphasize 
that while this section focuses on the diplomatic efforts—communiques and other 
legislation—directly related to the trilateral relationship, there were many other 
issues taking place. Each of these elements is important, however, because 
they demonstrate the foundation and development of the United States’ relations 
with the PRC.
1972 Shanghai Communique
The Nixon administration in 1972 reached a breakthrough in Sino- 
American relations, establishing formal, high-level contacts with Beijing for the
21. United States Department of State, “Telegram From the Embassy in the 
Republic of China to the Department of State,” 30 November 1971 (Doc 174: Telegram), 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 17, China, 1969-1972 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006): 600.
22. United States Department of State, “Editorial Note,” Undated (Doc 167:
Note), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 17, China, 1969-1972 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006): 573.
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first time since 1949. While the United States had not yet reestablished official 
diplomatic relations with the PRC, this was a unique opportunity for establishing 
trade, cultural, academic, and other exchanges at levels that were 
unprecedented in over 25 years. Nixon’s trip to China in 1972 “maximized the 
immediate impact of the opening” of Sino-American relations, demonstrating “in a 
highly visible way that [the United States] wished to end the two-decade-old 
pattern” of confrontation and, even if not ready to offer full diplomatic recognition 
of the PRC, was “ready at least to begin the process of normalization.”23 
President Nixon, at the invitation of Premier Chou Enlai, met in late 
February 1972 with Communist Chinese leaders in Shanghai to discuss the state 
of relations between the two countries and to establish the Joint Communique 
between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America—  
commonly known as the “Shanghai Communique.” In this document, the 
Chinese denounced hegemony, power politics, and Chinese superpower 
aspirations, and supported Chinese opposition to “foreign aggression, 
interference, control, and subversion.”24 The U.S. position, however, expressed 
the requirement of both sides’ efforts to “reduce immediate tensions and to 
eliminate the basic causes of conflict,” while it continued “working for peace and
23. Barnett, China Policy, 5.
24. United States and China, “Joint Communique of the United States of America 
and the People's Republic of China," 28 February 1972, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap 
/Archive_lndex/joint_communique_1972.html (accessed 21 November 2006).
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security, freedom of the peoples of the world, and to improving communication 
between countries that have different ideologies.”25
President Nixon told Mao Zedong and Chou Enlai that, “as we look at the 
whole world, and the balance of power in the world, there is no reason for the 
[PRC] and the United States of America to be enemies, and there are many 
reasons why the [PRC] and the United States should work together for a 
peaceful Pacific and a peaceful world.”26 Although both Washington and Beijing 
would benefit from the political opportunity that the Communique presented, 
essential differences in their foreign policies remained. Mao stated that 
“wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want 
independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution ... all 
nations, big or small, should be equal: big nations should not bully the small and 
strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and 
it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind,” asserting that all foreign 
troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.27
Nixon stated his position that peace in Asia, as well as throughout the 
world, “requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the 
basic causes of conflict,” and that the United States would work for a just peace 
that “fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress,” and
25. Ibid.
26. United States Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 21 
February 1972 (Doc 195: Memorandum), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 
1976, Vol. 17, China, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006): 
687.
27. United States and China, “Joint Communique of the United States of America 
and the People's Republic of China,” 28 February 1972.
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for a secure peace that “removes the danger of foreign aggression.” He asserted 
that the United States supports “individual freedom and social progress for all the 
peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention,” and that the effort 
to reduce tensions is served by “improving communication between countries 
that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through 
accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding.”28
Finding common ground among these issues, Nixon and Mao both agreed 
that, despite differences in social systems, states should rely on “the principles of 
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression 
against other states non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence,” and that international 
conflict should be resolved without the use or threat of force.29 With these 
principles of international relations in mind, the two sides stated that “progress 
toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in 
the interests of all countries, [that] both wish to reduce the danger of international 
military conflict, [that] neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region 
and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to 
establish such hegemony,” and that “neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of 
any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other 
directed at other states.”30 Both sides also agreed that “it would be against the 
interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
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against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres 
of interest.”31
The two sides reviewed the long-standing disputes between China and the 
United States on the issue of Taiwan, which had become a cornerstone of the 
Sino-American relationship. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position that the 
Taiwan question was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations 
between China and the United States; that the Government of the People's 
Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; that Taiwan is a 
province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; that the 
liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the 
right to interfere; and that all American forces and military installations must be 
withdrawn from Taiwan. It firmly opposed any activities aimed at the creation of 
"one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an 
"independent Taiwan" or advocated that "the status of Taiwan remains to be 
determined".32
The United States responded by acknowledging that all Chinese on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a 
part of China, and that the U.S. Government did not challenge that position. It 
also reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the 
Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirmed the ultimate objective 
of the withdrawal of all American forces and military installations from Taiwan. In
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
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the meantime, it would progressively reduce its forces and military installations 
on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminished.
The two sides expressed their position that it is desirable to broaden the 
understanding between the peoples of the United States and China. They also 
discussed specific areas in such fields as bilateral trade, science, technology, 
culture, sports and journalism, in which person-to-person contacts and 
exchanges would be mutually beneficial. And each side pledged to facilitate the 
further development of such contacts and exchanges.
Chen notes that the 1972 Communique is “a document of both clarity and 
ambiguity; clarity, because both China and the United States hold the same 
position that all [U.S.] forces and military installations will be withdrawn from 
Taiwan; ambiguity, because both sides have not agreed on how the Taiwan 
issue should be settled.” And of the top seven important issues facing China in 
1977, Chen ranked Taiwan’s normalization third, and its liberalization seventh.33
Ta Jen Liu notes that this communique was a sign that the “triangular 
relationship that Nixon had been angling to establish was finally taking shape,” 
and that while Washington and Beijing maintained separate positions in regard to 
Taipei, Beijing was willing to compromise in understanding that the United States 
would maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei.34 Cheng posits that “many China 
watchers had interpreted the Shanghai Communique as an effort to promote
32. Ibid.
33. King C. Chen, “Peking’s Attitude toward Taiwan,” Asian Survey 17, no. 10 
(October 1977): 906, 915.
34. Ta Jen Liu, U.S.-China Relations, 310.
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conversations among Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait; yet no such 
talks emerged” as of the end of 1974.35 He also notes that while 3,000 U.S. 
troops still remained on Taiwan by mid-1975, Beijing continued tolerating the 
contrived ambiguity over Taiwan’s status; probably because of worsening Sino- 
Soviet relations and the internal problems of political succession.36
1979 Communique
The second U.S.-China communique—which established diplomatic 
relations as of 1 January 1979—spelled out the two sides’ desire to exchange 
ambassadors on 1 March of that year and affirmed that the People’s Republic of 
China is the sole legal government of China and that there is only one China, 
while maintaining cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the 
people of Taiwan. Supporting the position that “normalization of Sino-American 
relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also 
contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world,” Washington and Beijing 
reaffirmed the principles of the 1972 Communique, including the mutual desire to 
reduce the chances of international conflict and the mutual opposition to 
hegemony. Washington agreed to continue supporting Beijing in these views, 
and both agreed that neither should “negotiate on behalf of any third party or to
35. Peter P. Cheng, “Taiwan: Protective Adjustment Economy,” Asian Survey 15, 
no. 1 (January 1975): 21.
36. Peter P. Cheng, “Taiwan 1975: A Year of Transition,” Asian Survey 16, no. 1 
(January 1976): 64-55.
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enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other 
states.”37
Ever since Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, Chang notes, “Beijing has been 
using its American ‘connection’ to diplomatically isolate” Taipei, with efforts 
including supporting a massive effort in 1981 to press the Reagan administration 
to cut off arms sales to Taiwan.38 He goes on to state that despite Beijing’s nine- 
point proposal that included “an offer to let Taiwan keep its armed forces, 
autonomy, and socioeconomic system, and an invitation to KMT officials for joint 
leadership in running China,” Taipei repeatedly rejected the offers, thereby 
making Taipei appear to be the source of the problems in the Strait.39
The wording of documents like this and other communiques is very 
important for maintaining a political balance. Throughout the period of 
normalization, Hickey notes, “American officials have always been very careful to 
state only that the [United States] seeks a peaceful ‘resolution’ of the Taiwan 
issue, rather than a peaceful ‘reunification’ of China.” This wording probably is 
deliberately ambiguous, he argues, “and leaves open many possibilities for the 
ultimate gate of Taiwan.”40 But as Thompson notes, such documents are not
37. United States and China, Joint Communique on the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of 
America," 1 January 1979, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_lndex/joint_communique 
_1982.html (accessed 9 June 2005).
38. Parris Chang, “Taiwan in 1982: Diplomatic Setback Abroad and Demands for 
Reforms at Home,” Asian Survey 23, no. 1 (January 1983): 38.
39. Ibid., 40.
40. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “America’s Two-Point Policy and the Future of 
Taiwan,” Asian Survey 28, no. 8 (August 1988): 896.
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inherently self-fulfilling; they are only relevant so long as they serve the interests
of their signatories. He states that
in practice, the [United States] and Taiwan no longer [had] mutual 
interests which [made] the 1954 treaty viable. Whereas in the past those 
interests only approximated a Cold War ideal in a hostile attitude toward 
the Peking regime, [in 1976 it was] little more than delusion to speak of a 
congruence of interests between Washington and Taipei. America’s 
interests have become more diverse and complex than in the 1950s. 
Taiwan is no longer a military threat to the Peking regime but concerns 
itself with the economic development of a de facto state for which the 
Kuomintang regime hopes to be able to guarantee physical security.41
Taking the point further, Hungdah Chiu argues that it was no surprise that 
China’s offers of peaceful reunification and “liberation” were not taken seriously 
after normalization. Beijing continued to advocate peacefully liberating Taiwan, 
but never explained precisely what benefits the Taiwanese would gain or how 
Taiwan would maintain its high standard of living once its capitalist system was 
inevitably demolished—to include foreign investment and enterprise 42
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act
Going against the rhetoric of the three China communiques, the 1979 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was a congressional response to the Carter 
administration’s break in relations with Taipei. The TRA was written “to help 
maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the
41. Thomas N. Thompson, “Taiwan’s Ambiguous Destiny,” Asian Survey 16, no. 
7 (July 1976): 613.
42. Hungdah Chiu, “Prospects for the Unification of China: An Analysis of the 
Views of the Republic of China on Taiwan,” Asian Survey 23, no. 10 (October 1983): 
1081.
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foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, 
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the 
people on Taiwan, and for other purposes.”43 Mann notes that leaders in Beijing 
were outraged at this display of American protection being presented to the very 
government that had just lost its diplomatic recognition, but [Congress passed 
the act] with an overwhelming margin, effectively making it “veto-proof.”44
King-yuh Chang points out that the TRA illustrates several unique aspects 
of U.S. security policy in the Strait: (1) America’s commitment was unilateral, in 
that the security provisions were more elaborate than in the 1954 MDT; (2) 
security threats to Taiwan were subject to U.S. action, but threats to Taiwan’s 
social or economic system could also have brought about other forms of 
assistance; and (3) when action was required, the United States “retained the 
right to determine what was sufficient.”45 McClaran further asserts that the 
United States maintained its position that the TRA “[guided] its actions” and that 
U.S. arms sales were “consistent with the Communique because they were 
defensive in nature” and that they came “in response to PRC military efforts that 
threaten Taiwan.”46
Some argue that many in Congress felt the Carter administration was 
abandoning Taiwan for closer relations with China, and that the TRA established
43. United States Congress, “Taiwan Relations Act,” Public Law 96-8, 6th 
Congress, 1 January 1979, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_lndex/Taiwan_Relations 
_Act.html (accessed 9 June 2006).
44. James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with 
China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 95.
45. King-yuh Chang, “Partnership in Transition,” 615.
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an implied commitment by the United States to intervene in China’s internal 
relations by supplying Taiwan with defensive military armaments, thereby making 
available to Taiwan “such defense services in such quantity as may be 
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”47 
Others argue that the TRA, which was originally designed to serve specific 
operational purposes, became a political document; and that while this caused a 
great deal of argument within the United States Government, a policy dealing 
with the security of Taiwan was eventually agreed upon as a fundamental 
element of Sino-American relations 48 Jacobs notes that the TRA provided a 
more secure basis for Taiwan’s foreign relations because nations no longer had 
to choose between Taipei or Beijing, since both capitals now rejected “two China” 
or “one China, one Taiwan” policies. Yet now both Beijing and Taipei had de 
facto accepted a “one China, one Taiwan” arrangement49
THE 1980S
As of the early 1980s, Taiwan’s economy was in its worst recession in 
three decades.50 Myers notes that its rapid transformation from a predominantly 
rural to an urban society—without great social unrest and with minimal
46. John P. McClaran, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Implications for the Future of 
the Sino-U.S. Relationship,” Asian Survey 40, no. 4 (July-August 2000): 626.
47. Colin Jones, “United States Arms Exports to Taiwan under the Taiwan 
Relations Act: the Failed Rule of Law in United States Foreign Relations.” Connecticut 
Journal of International Law 9, (1993): 57, quoted in Jian Yang, Congress and U.S.
China Policy: 1989-1999, 63.
48. Tucker, China Confidential, 333-334.
49. J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1979: ‘Normalcy’ after ‘Normalization,’” Asian 
Survey 20, no. 1 (January 1980): 86.
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deterioration of public morality— had produced higher living standards, greater 
national wealth and a more equal distribution of income.51 As Dreyer notes, 
Taipei’s economy was growing rapidly at the end of 1989 and unemployment 
was negligible.52 And by the mid 1980s, Taiwan’s dependence upon the U.S. 
security umbrella declined somewhat as a result of Taiwan’s military 
modernization, the de facto armed truce in the Strait, and Washington’s detente 
with Beijing. But Clark notes that “politico-military ties and dependence 
[remained] very significant,”53 suggesting that Taipei still could not manage its 
security alone.
All of these developments were leading to the inevitable conclusion that 
China was changing, which would also have implications for its relationship with 
the United States. By 1982, the PRC was no longer ruled by totalitarian 
revolutionaries who “had acted upon their belief that rapid, violent, and 
comprehensive transformation of elites and institutions was the most effective 
mode of change.” Rather, the PRC leadership appeared “committed to gradual 
and peaceful change within a framework of continuity of elites and institutions”54 
(see Table 1).
50. Chang, “Taiwan in 1982,” 45.
51. Ramon H. Myers, “The Economic Transformation of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, no. 99 (September 1984): 527.
52. June Teufel Dreyer, “Taiwan in 1989: Democratization and Economic 
Growth,” Asian Survey 30, no. 1 (January 1990): 52.
53. Clark, “The Taiwan Exception,” 335.
54. Michael Oskenberg and Richard Bush, “China’s Political Evolution, 1972- 
1982,” in Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, eds., The China Reader: The Reform 
Era (New York: Random House, 1999), 8.
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Table 1. Evolution of the Chinese political system: 1972-82
Attribute 1972 1982
Method of change 
preferred by the 
leaders
Revolution Reform
How leaders viewed the 
process of change
Dialectical Linear





Rule by bureaucracy; 
regularity
State intrusiveness Total Pursuit of some 


















Low; rule of men rather 
than institutions
Low; major efforts 
underway to rebuild 
Institutions





factions and opinion 
groups governed by 
unwritten rules
Rule at top One-man rule Collective leadership














Army, public security 
forces, party 
propaganda
Party committee chain 




Ministry of Finance, 
army, public security 
forces
Source: Oskenberg and Bush, in Schell and Shambaugh: 18.
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1982 Communique
The Joint Communique between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China, dated 17 August 1982, further pledged to reduce arms sales
to Taiwan, suggesting that the ideological ties of the 1950s and 60s had given
way to more pragmatic geopolitics. This communique reaffirmed the declarations
of the previous two (from 1972 and 1979) regarding the “one China” policy,
including maintaining “cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the
people of Taiwan,” and continued diplomatic relations with China— reiterating that
“it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or
interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one
China, one Taiwan.’”55
As the basis for the 1982 Communique, Ye Jianying—the Chairman of the
Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress—on 30 September
1981 put forward a nine-point proposal for bringing about the peaceful
reunification of the Mainland and Taiwan, officially stating at the time that
after China is reunified, Taiwan may become a special administrative 
region. It may enjoy a high degree of autonomy and may keep its military 
forces. The national government will not intervene in the local affairs of 
Taiwan. Taiwan's current social and economic systems will remain 
unchanged, its way of life will not change, and its economic and cultural 
ties with foreign countries will not change. A provision on setting up 
special administrative region was added to the Constitution of the People's 
Republic of China passed at the Fifth Session of the National People's
55. United States and China, “Joint Communique of the United States of America 
and the People's Republic of China,” 17 August 1982, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap 
/Archive_lndex/joint_communique_1982.html (accessed 20 March 2004).
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Congress in 1982, providing legal basis for accomplishing “one country,
two systems.”56
This new communique, which denounced aggression and expansion, also 
reaffirmed the parties’ position that the development of Sino-American relations 
based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit was of interest to both 
parties—as well as to the rest of the world—for the promotion of peace and 
stability. It stated that economic, cultural, educational, scientific, and 
technological ties—as well as advances in other fields—would only benefit 
relations between the United States and China.57
This communique included language on an issue that the others did not; 
arms sales to Taipei. While previously recognized as an important and 
contentious issue, China decided that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan should be 
postponed until after normalization, and the two parties discussed this issue in 
October 1981. The United States explicitly stated in this latest communique that 
it “does not seek a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales 
... will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those 
supplied in recent years since [1979]... and that it intends to gradually reduce its 
sale of arms to Taiwan, leading ... to a final resolution.”58 While meant to provide
56. China, “A Policy of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ on Taiwan,” 17 November 
2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov 
.cn/eng/ziliao /3602/3604/t18027.htm (accessed 26 May 2006).
57. United States and China, “Joint Communique of the United States of America 
and the People's Republic of China,” August 17, 1982.
58. Ibid, The U.S. Government reiterated that it has no intention of infringing on 
Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or 
pursuing a policy of “two Chinas,” or “one China, one Taiwan.”
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the means for the United States to slowly end its support of arms to Taiwan, this 
statement would become an issue of even greater contention in the near future.
McClaran notes that Beijing considers U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to be “a 
flagrant violation of [China’s] sovereignty and that the vaguely defined 
quantitative and qualitative ceilings on such sales agreed to by the United States 
in the 1982 Joint Communique have left it vulnerable to harsh criticism from 
Beijing.59 And Robinson notes that although the language of the communique 
constrained Taipei’s military activities from 1982 and 1992, many nations—  
including the United States— nevertheless continued to supply military arms to 
Taipei.60 And while Taiwan’s economy had grown tremendously—along with a 
rise in its average living standards and a greater equalization of incomes—as a 
result of rural industrialization, it also faced some uncertainties, according to 
Thompson.61 Glaring scandals and setbacks included murder plots, corruption, 
and panic-driven investment withdrawals; all of which damaged Taiwan’s image 
in 1985.62
1986 was a good year for Taiwan—the economy made it the number one 
nation in the world in economic performance for the year, even when calculated 
over a twenty-year period, according to Copper.63 As of November 1986, Taipei 
had diplomatic relations with 23 countries and increased commercial and
59. McClaran, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan,” 622.
60. Thomas W. Robinson, “America in Taiwan’s Post Cold-War Foreign 
Relations,” The China Quarterly, no. 148 (December 1996): 1349.
61. Stuart E. Thompson, “Taiwan: Rural Society,” The China Quarterly, no. 99 
(September 1984): 568.
62. James C. Hsiung, “Taiwan in 1985: Scandals and Setbacks,” Asian Survey 
26, no. 1 (January 1986): 93.
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unofficial relations with others64 But even with these advances, Drifte notes, no 
European government in the mid-1980s wanted “to risk its relationship with 
Beijing, since all [agreed] that their greater economic interests, at least in the 
long term, [were] on the Chinese Mainland.”65
ALTERNATIVE ELEMENTS OF INFLUENCE SINCE 1962
Looking beyond military force, the power of ideas and ideologies have 
played important roles in the region of the Strait. By waging a battle of 
perceptions, both the PRC and the ROC have sought to obtain and maintain a 
particular position in the eyes of the international community. Both sides 
achieved varied results throughout the years, but this recognition remains a 
significant aspect of relations for both countries.
Perceptions and Power
Until at least the late 1980s, the Chinese publication People’s Daily 
continued to promote a negative image of the Taiwanese government, according 
to Siu-nam Lee. He presents a possible explanation, stating that “it becomes 
difficult, if not impossible, for the CPP to justify peaceful reunification with a place 
ruled by what is portrayed as an adversary regime,” suggesting that negative 
propaganda may be an indicator that China is preparing to use force in response
63. Copper, “Taiwan in 1986,” 81.
64. Ibid., 85.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
to Taipei’s rejection of its “supposedly generous offers.”66 And Ya-li Lu argues 
that, because both sides of the Strait in 1985 contended that there was only one 
China, “unification” was not the issue. Rather, the problems occurred when 
attempting to address “how, when, and under what conditions unification should 
proceed.”67
The propaganda battle had become more important in the late 1980s. “In 
relations with other countries,” Seymour argues, “Beijing has been gradually 
outmaneuvering Taipei. No longer having formal diplomatic relations with many 
countries, Taiwan had placed great emphasis on unofficial and propaganda 
efforts.”68 Between 1950 and 1984, Taiwan was nearly isolated politically: 
whereas Taipei was once supported by a majority of the United Nations 
members as the de jure  government of China, by 1984 it maintained relations 
with only 23 states.69 Weng argued at the time that Taiwan did not appear to 
have “the subjective will to become independent of China,” and Taipei had little 
power or influence in international affairs at its command. Since the early 1970s, 
“Taiwan has been forced to live with the irregularities of its international status.
65. Reinhard Drifte, “European and Soviet Perspectives on Future Responses in 
Taiwan to International and Regional Developments,” Asian Survey 25, no. 11 
(November 1985): 1121.
66. Paul Siu-nam Lee, “The Official Chinese Image of Taiwan,” The Australian 
Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 24 (July 1990): 161.
67. Alexander Ya-li Lu, “Future Domestic Developments in the Republic of China 
on Taiwan,” Asian Survey 25, no. 11 (November 1985): 1092.
68. James D. Seymour, “Taiwan in 1987: A Year of Political Bombshells,” Asian 
Survey 28, no. 1 (January 1988): 76.
69. Byron S.J. Weng, “Taiwan’s International Status Today,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 99 (September 1984): 462.
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Taipei’s ‘One China policy’ has not only tied its own hands but also the hands of 
its allies and friends.”70
Deng Xiaoping, in a telephone call to Sir Yugang Bao on 20 December 
1984, stated that “the problem between China and the United States was the 
Taiwan question. The Sino-British joint declaration concerning [Hong Kong] has 
removed the shadow between China and Great Britain. Resolving the Taiwan 
question [would] also remove the shadow between China and the United States.” 
He further stated that “since the [Korean War] in 1950 the Chinese Communists 
have continued to blame American interference or ‘conspiracy’ as the sole factor 
that created and [that] maintains the present ‘two Chinas’ situation.”71
Until at least 1986, the political institutions that were established in China 
in 1947 were all transferred to, and maintained in, Taiwan. This was despite the 
fact that native Taiwanese, who made up 85% of the population, had fewer than 
10% of the seats in national Taiwanese legislative bodies; the Taiwanese voice 
had been nearly silenced by martial law since 1949.72 As of 1980, Chi-wu Wang 
notes, a number of American observers, both in and out of government service, 
maintained that the breakup of the 1954 MDT and of United States-Taiwan 
diplomatic relations did not damage Taiwan’s security position and, in fact,
70. Ibid., 463-64.
71. C.L. Chiou, “Dilemmas in China’s Reunification Policy toward Taiwan,” Asian 
Survey 26, no. 4 (April 1986): 474.
72. Trong Chai, “The Future of Taiwan,” 1310.
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reduced its security needs; the situation was calmer in 1981 than at any point in 
the previous three decades.73
Copper notes that Taiwan in 1980 faced the challenge of institutionalizing 
a democratic government without creating instability, and also of trying to get 
native Taiwanese and those who came from the Mainland to agree on goals for 
the future by focusing on Taiwan’s foreign, domestic, and defense policies, which 
underscored Taiwan’s future apart from, or as another, China.74 Once the KMT 
won the 1983 elections, Chang notes, it could have won confidence among 
Taiwan’s citizens by displaying greater tolerance for dissent, but it failed to do 
so.75 Lee Teng-hui came to power because Chiang Ching-kuo in 1983 was 
aging and debilitated by sugar diabetes, as Chao and Myers note, and needed a 
Taiwanese successor who could elicit popular support for the KMT. Chiang 
Ching-kuo chose Lee as his vice-presidential running mate in 1984, and shared 
with him his vision and plan for political reform, thereby ensuring political 
succession after his own death.76
While there is no physical symbol on Taiwan to match the iconic status of 
the Great Wall on the Mainland, Chun argues, the KMT “has consistently
73. Chi-wu Wang, “Military Preparedness and Security Needs: Perceptions from 
the Republic of China on Taiwan,” Asian Survey 21, no. 6 (June 1981): 651.
74. Copper, “Taiwan in 1980,” 51.
75. Parris Chang, “Taiwan in 1983: Setting the Stage for Power Transition,” 
Asian Survey 24, no. 1 (January 1984): 123.
76. Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, “The First Chinese Democracy; Political 
Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1986-1994," Asian Survey 34, no. 3 
(March 1994): 218-19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
211
maintained its role as the guardian of traditional Chinese culture.”77 By 
attempting to impose a common language and ideology, Taipei hoped to 
“naturalize the imagination of a Chinese nation-state” by making it a normal part 
of everyday life on Taiwan.”78 Having moved away from the untenable concept 
of military conquest, Taiwan since the late 1980s “has stressed the principle of 
flexible diplomacy,” according to Domes, “by which it means it is no longer 
concentrating on the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with other 
countries, but rather emphasizes ‘substantial relations,’ through para-diplomatic 
institutions in Taiwan and in foreign capitals.”79
Dreyer posits that this approach, to which he refers as Taiwan’s “elastic 
diplomacy,” was the most significant international development for the region in
1989. He states that this approach “reversed the pattern of the past wherein 
Taipei would immediately break relations with any country that recognized the 
Beijing government and would withdraw or become inactive in international 
organizations that admitted the PRC”; it also resulted in Taipei “upgrading 
relations with states that did not have formal diplomatic ties” to the level of those 
it maintained with the United States.80 This approach started paying dividends in
1990, he posits, as “foreign nations seemed increasingly willing to ignore
77. Allen Chun, “From Nationalism to Nationalizing: Cultural Imagination and 
State Formation in Postwar Taiwan,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 31 
(January 1994): 55.
78. Ibid., 69.
79. Jurgen Domes, “Taiwan in 1991: Searching for Political Consensus,” Asian 
Survey 32, no. 1 (January 1992): 43-44.
80. Dreyer, “Taiwan in 1989,” 55.
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Beijing’s protests over their dealings with Taipei.”81 U.S. relations with the PRC, 
however, remained relatively routine.
Chong-Pin Lin notes that while Beijing launched a diplomatic counter­
offensive to salvage its international image after the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
incident, it continued to assert that any Taiwanese move toward independence 
was “a road to disaster.” But he also notes that Taipei “surprisingly not only 
continued the thawing of its Mainland policy but also, after a while, proceeded at 
an accelerated pace.”82 This was an unprecedented break from previous 
decades, suggesting a change in the overall political perspective in Taipei. 
Kindermann posits that “U.S. foreign policy decision-makers and leading 
American China experts had good reason to believe that no Government of 
China— Imperial, Kuomintang, or Maoist—would voluntarily ever give up China’s 
claim to the rich and strategically important island of Taiwan.”83 Such 
perceptions, however, presented little hope for progress unless there was an 
honest renunciation of force on both sides of the Strait.
Some argue that Taipei’s role in maintaining regional stability is often 
overlooked, according to Hsia Chang, who notes several potential initiatives 
Taipei could have undertaken “that could have easily de-stabilized the political 
equilibrium of the entire region”: a unilateral declaration of independence, a 
decision to develop a nuclear capability, or an effort to enter into some kind of
81. Ibid., 60.
82. Chong-Pin Lin, “Beijing and Taipei: Dialectics in Post-Tiananmen 
Interactions,” The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 774-78.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
213
accommodation with the Soviet Union.84 Yu-Shan Wu notes that “the top priority 
of the ROC’s foreign policy in 1993 was to gain international recognition.” This 
was partially due to the fact that “economic interaction across the Taiwan Strait 
was dragging the island closer to mainland China. In fear of being swallowed up, 
not only economically but politically, Taiwan looked for countervailing 
connections with the international community.”85
Crane posits that, of the five conditions that would have provoked a 
Chinese military attack in the early 1990s—a Taiwanese nuclear capability, a 
Taiwan-Russian entente, an outbreak of extreme political disorder in Taiwan, a 
declaration of Taiwan’s independence, or an extended rejection of reunification 
talks—the threat to retaliate against obtaining a nuclear weapon is the most 
credible, as such capabilities would bolster any claim to Taiwan’s independence. 
Beijing was not happy that the United States agreed to provide Taipei with 150 F- 
16 fighters, but may have been more concerned about the principle of restraining 
Western arms sales than about the balance of military forces, in which China 
maintained a superior position vis-a-vis Taiwan.86 The military balance between 
Taiwan and mainland China was relative, however, and China had an enormous 
arms production capability in the early 1990s. And though some may question 
the quality of Chinese weapons, which largely were copied from Soviet designs,
83. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, “Washington between Beijing and Taipei: The 
Restructured Triangle 1978-80,” Asian Survey 20, no. 5 (May 1980): 462.
84. Marisa Hsia Chang, “Political Succession in the Republic of China on 
Taiwan,” Asian Survey 24, no. 4 (April 1984): 423.
85. Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwan in 1993: Attempting a Diplomatic Breakthrough,” Asian 
Survey 34, no. 1 (January 1994): 52.
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Hyer notes a balancing factor, in that “unsophisticated Chinese weapons 
systems are much easier to operate and maintain” than the more modern 
Western systems because they involve less-complex technology.87
Tensions between Taiwan and the Mainland had eased between 1987 
and 1995, Myers notes, largely because of economic integration. By 1995, 
however, President Lee’s moves toward establishing independence from the 
Mainland raised tensions between Taipei and Beijing,88 and Jia Quingguo posits 
that Beijing was troubled by what it saw as “the tolerance and encouragement 
the new Taiwan authorities have shown toward Taiwan independence activities 
on the island.89 Despite the troubles his actions provoked, Lee Teng-hui, at least 
initially, proved to be an extremely popular president among the Taiwanese, with 
public opinion surveys giving him approval ratings of 80 percent or higher, 
according to Ts’ai Ling and Myers.90
Economic factors
Li Cheng and White argue that “elite transformations correlate with 
changes of social ideology and economic structures. A comparison of ideological
86. George T. Crane, “China and Taiwan: Not Yet ‘Greater China,’” International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 69, no. 4 (October 1993): 721.
87. Eric Hyer, “China’s Arms Merchants: Profits in Command,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 132 (December 1992): 1105-06.
88. Ramon H. Myers, “A New Chinese Civilization: The Evolution of the Republic 
of China on Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, no. 148 (December 1996): 1089.
89. Jia Qingguo, “Changing Relations across the Taiwan Strait: Beijing’s 
Perceptions,” Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (March 1992): 285.
90. Ts’ai Ling and Ramon H. Myers, “Surviving the Rough-and-Tumble of 
Presidential Politics in an Emerging Democracy: The 1990 Elections in the Republic of 
China on Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, no. 129 (March 1992): 130.
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shifts and system evolution on mainland China and Taiwan in 1990 show what 
clear distinctions between socialism and capitalism were coming to an end in 
both places.”91 They posit that “modern history shows that conflicts and wars 
can occur between nations that have similar political systems.... But future 
relations between the Mainland and Taiwan are unlikely to be determined by 
ideological issues; they may well depend on domestic economic interests and the 
international economic environment.”92
Throughout the years between the KMT’s flight to Taipei and the shift in 
U.S.-Chinese relations, Taiwan experienced significant economic growth (see 
Table 2). Kirby notes that many of the most prominent individuals associated 
with Taiwan’s economic policy had roots in the pre-1949 economic 
bureaucracy.”93 In the years leading up to 1968, according to Amsden, Taiwan 
witnessed annual growth rates that were impressive by any standard.94 Largely 
attributed to success in agriculture, she argues, Taiwan’s industrial capital gained 
a labor force, a surplus, and foreign exchange—even during the immediate 
postwar years. Contrary to dependency theory, however, foreign exchange did 
not create a Third World-level of dependency, where trade and foreign 
investment often determine what is produced. The difference, Amsden notes,
91. Li Cheng and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in 
Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 121 (March 1990): 34.
92. Ibid.
93. William C. Kirby, “Continuity and Change in Modern China: Economic 
Planning on the Mainland and on Taiwan, 1943-1958,” The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, no. 24 (July 1990): 137.
94. Amsden, Alice H. “Taiwan’s Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a 
Challenge to Dependency Theory,” Modern China 5, no. 3 (July 1979): 363.
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Table 2. Real GDP in Taiwan: average annual growth rates
1949-60 1960-68 1968-73
7.3% 8.5% 10.6%
Source: Alice Amsden, “Taiwan’s Economic History” Source: Taiwan Economic Planning 
Council, 1976.
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may lie in the “scientific advances which agriculture made in Taiwan under 
Japanese imperialism and the subsequent success of the 1953 land reform.”95
Some argue, as does Klatt, that the speedy recovery of Taiwan’s war-torn 
economy was largely attributed to “American aid, given on a large scale and over 
many years,” and that it “set in motion a process of modernization second to 
none among the developing countries of the area.”96 Barrett and Whyte note that 
there is no clear consensus on the impact of massive American aid to Taiwan in 
the 1950s and 60s; some see it as contributing to capital formation and economic 
growth, whereas others feel it did not serve this purpose.” Overall, however, they 
argue that dependency did not result in slow economic growth for Taiwan.97
Ho notes that by the early 1970s, the optimism created by Taiwan’s 
economic performance in the previous decade was quickly being overshadowed 
by international political and economic events, such as losing both its seat at the 
United Nations and its diplomatic relations with Canada, Nixon’s visit to Beijing, 
and America’s promise to reduce its presence in Taiwan.98 Chen Fu Chang 
argues that the influx of capital from the U.S. to Taiwan in the early 1970s helped 
to finance and balance trade account deficit payments, which provided additional 
resources for domestic capital formation. With economic growth geared
95. Ibid., 363-73.
96. W. Klatt, “Taiwan and the Foreign Investor,” Pacific Affairs 50, no. 4 (Winter 
1977-78): 645-46.
97. Richard E. Barrett and Martin King Whyte, “Dependency Theory and Taiwan: 
Analysis of a Deviant Case,” The American Journal of Sociology 87, no. 5 (March 1982): 
1064-65, 1079.
98. Samuel P.S. Ho, “Industrialization in Taiwan: Recent Trends and Problems,” 
Pacific Affairs 48, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 33-34.
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especially toward exports, Taiwan’s exports eventually exceeded its imports, 
resulting in an account surplus."
Overholt noted as far back as 1974 that in both international and domestic 
matters, Communist China makes few explicit agreements, and that it keeps its 
own concessions as vague as possible; making negotiations difficult.100 He 
posits, “What would be the incentives to Taiwan to negotiate any substantial 
concessions to the PRC? Taiwan’s bargaining position would be weak.... The 
likely outcome of direct negotiations which envisioned any kind of legal, 
economic or political incorporation of Taiwan into the Mainland would likely be 
domestic unrest and international weakness.”101
While Taiwan’s economic independence continued to grow throughout the 
1980s and into the 1990s, it had dissolved neither its interest in, nor its reliance 
upon, the United States. In fact, as Ash and Kueh note, its economic integration 
with the Mainland formed a bond of interest between Taipei and Beijing. Many 
Taiwanese firms moved to the Mainland “in an attempt to reduce export costs 
and to take advantage of cheap labor and land, possibly assisted by more 
stringent government legislation to control pollution, as well as greater self- 
awareness and even militancy on the part of the labor force.”102 But if this rapid 
expansion of trade boosted Taiwan’s export growth, it also led to increasing
99. Chen Fu Chang, “The Balance of Payments of Taiwan, 1966-72,” Asian 
Survey 14, no. 6 (June 1974): 546.
100. William H. Overholt, “Would Chiang Find Mao an Unacceptably Strange 
Bedfellow?” Asian Survey 14, no. 8 (August 1974): 689.
101. Ibid., 694.
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dependence on Chinese markets.103 By 1994, “the number of Taiwan-invested 
factories and establishments in China was estimated to be approximately 15,000 
with about $4 billion [USD] in new investment under contract from January to 
May,” according to Xiangming Chen. He posits that as of 1996, rough estimates 
gauged the “cumulative stock of Taiwanese investment in China ... in a range of 
$20-25 billion involving between 25,000 and 30,000 ventures.”104 This growing 
economic interdependence could indicate the potential for future cooperation and 
easing of tensions between the two governments.
Chow notes that the PRC experienced little or no technological growth 
from the end of “economic cooperation with the Soviet Union in the 1960s until at 
least 1980,”105 but Gurtov notes that it had some impressive economic results in 
the early 1990s, stemming from the conversion of military resources—such as 
microelectronics, nuclear energy, aerospace, lasers and nautical science; a shift 
from materials-based to information-based production; and investment in 
advanced industrial countries in technology industry clusters—to civilian use.106 
This growth placed Taipei in a greater position of self-reliance, although the 
United States remained a large contributor to its success. But this period still 
was not free from U.S. economic pressure. Yangmin Wang notes that the United
102. Robert F. Ash and Y.Y. Kueh, “Economic Integration within Greater China: 
Trade and Investment Flows between China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 711-18.
103. Ibid., 742.
104. Xiangming Chen, “Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia: ‘Go 
West, but Also go South,” Asian Survey 36, no. 5 (May 1996): 451.
105. Gregory C. Chow, “Capital Formation and Economic Growth in China,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 3 (August 1993): 841.
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States Trade Representative in 1992, largely in response to China’s human 
rights record— brought to international attention after the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown, “threatened to impose punitive tariffs of up to 100% on [USD] $3.9 
billion worth of Chinese goods” if it did not bring down barriers to U.S. imports.107
By 1996, Cabestan argues, Taiwan’s economy had become increasingly 
dependent upon the PRC. 30,000 “Taiwanese companies [were] represented 
and over 100,000 [Taiwanese] nationals [lived] on a permanent basis in mainland 
China,” which the “three links” would eventually cause to grow.108 And Howe 
posits that the 1995-96 crisis “has drawn attention to the political vulnerability of 
the Taiwanese economy to offensive naval quarantine action.” He notes, 
however, that economic interdependence has linked many other ASEAN states 
with Taiwan’s economy, and that the PRC would have to consider the 
implications of any action on the economies of these other states.109
Social Dynamics in the Strait
Nationalism can be an important element in establishing a people’s 
identity. Gold notes that a “way to capture Taiwan’s social cleavages is by 
distinguishing Taiwanese’ and ‘Mainlanders,’ referring to when people or their
106. Melvin Gurtov, “Swords into Market Shares: China’s Conversion of Military 
Industry to Civilian Production,” The China Quarterly, no. 134 (June 1993): 214, 220.
107. Yangmin Wang, “The Politics of U.S-China Economic Relations: MFN, 
Constructive Engagement, and the Trade Issue Proper.” Asian Survey 33, no. 5 (May 
1993): 459.
108. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy: Normalization, Yes; 
Reunification Later,” The China Quarterly, no. 148 (December 1996): 1272.
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ancestors ... migrated to the island from China: respectively, prior to Taiwan’s 
retrocession to Chinese Mainland administrative control in 1945, or after.”110
On revolution, Appleton posits that “militant generations in the past, 
revolutionary or otherwise, have not always proved highly successful in 
reproducing a generation in their own image.... This may prove a critical problem 
for those among Taiwan’s leadership, to whom ‘return to the Mainland’ is an 
article of active faith.”111 He also discusses the aspect of being “Chinese,” 
arguing that “perhaps the most frequent questions about Taiwan asked by non­
specialists are those concerning the relationship of ‘native’ Taiwanese to those of 
recent Mainland origin ... are Taiwanese and Mainlanders one ‘people’ or two?” 
Appleton found that “the people of Taiwan are essentially Chinese in their social 
and political outlooks as well as in their ancestry ... what is remarkable is that 
differences and feelings of hostility between Mainlanders and Taiwanese are not 
greater than [in his student sample, at least] they appear to be.”112
Gold posits that different generations of Taiwanese have differing 
perspectives about reunification, stating that Taiwan’s situation forces younger 
men to think about mainland China from a “very different perspective than their 
parents.” And that even for older generations of former Mainlanders on Taiwan,
109. Christopher Howe, “The Taiwan Economy: The Transition to Maturity and 
the Political Economy of Its Changing International Status,” The China Quarterly, no. 148 
(December 1996): 1193.
110. Thomas B. Gold, “Taiwan Society at the Fin de Siecle,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 148 (December 1996): 1104.
111. Sheldon L. Appleton, “Silent Students and the Future of Taiwan,” Pacific 
Affairs 43, no. 2 (Summer, 1970): 239.
112. Sheldon L. Appleton, “Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan: A Survey of 
Student Attitudes,” The China Quarterly, no. 44 (October-December 1970): 38, 56-57.
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“memories of the Mainland have faded considerably and most now consider 
Taiwan their home. Though possibly interested in a return visit to one’s 
hometown and relatives, this is not a strong enough pull to mobilize them in 
support of reunification.”113 Winckler notes that while the Nationalists on Taiwan 
have expressed more than their share of authoritarian totalitarianism, at least 
they are better than many Latin American countries, and may even one day 
become more like Japan. But in any case, he argues, the ROC is definitely not 
the PRC.114 And ultimately, they are probably better off for it.
Taiwan’s 1994 “White Paper on Relations across the Taiwan Strait” laid 
out Taipei’s conception of cross-Strait relations, as expressed in its 1991 
“Guidelines for National Unification.”115 It suggested the idea of “one China, two 
equal political entities,” and referred to “one China” as “a historical, geographical, 
cultural, and racial entity.” It also rejected the idea of “one country, two systems,” 
and claimed that it amounted “to nothing more than annexing Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen, and Matsu in the name of unifying China.”116 Cabestan posits that the 
common denominator of these statements was “normalization, yes; reunification, 
later.”117
113. Thomas B. Gold, “The Status Quo is Not Static: Mainland-Taiwan 
Relations,” Asian Survey 27, no. 3 (March 1987): 306-07.
114. Edwin A. Winckler, “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From 
Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?” The China Quarterly, no. 99 (September 1984): 499.
115. Taiwan, “Taiwan’s Guidelines for National Unification,” 23 February 1991, 
Taiwan’s National Unification Council, http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/Appendix%2059.htm 
(accessed 30 July 2006).
116. Taiwan, “Taiwan White Paper on Relations across the Taiwan Straits,” July 
1994, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/Appendix%2073 
.htm (accessed 30 July 2006).
117. Cabestan, “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” 1282.
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THE 1995-96 CRISIS: RENEWED TENSIONS
Even more important than China’s growing power, Cabestan posits, is the 
perception of its power. For some time, the PRC managed to convince most 
Western countries and its neighbors that it is a great power. But he notes that “a 
closer look at mainland China’s military capabilities and force projections tends to 
show that far from being a world power, it is gradually becoming a regional 
power,” and China in 1996 was much less powerful than many perceived at the 
time.118
Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 speech at Cornell angered and upset Chinese and 
American officials due to his repeated references to the “Republic of China on 
Taiwan.” These references essentially double-crossed many U.S. officials who 
were assured that the speech would be purely non-political and cover only 
economic reforms in Taiwan. Following this speech, China initiated military 
exercises in the Taiwan Strait, which Scobell describes below:
China conducted a series of military exercises and missile tests in 
the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait between July 1995 and March 1996. On 
[18 July 1995], Beijing announced that missile tests would be conducted 
targeting an area some 90 miles off the coast of northern Taiwan. Then, 
on three consecutive days, [21, 22, and 23 July 1995], a total of six DF-15 
missiles were launched from sites in Fijian province—two per day. The 
following month, after a five-day advance warning, PLA naval vessels and 
aircraft conducted ten days of live-fire tests off the coast of Fujian.
Further military exercises were conducted in mid-November to the 
south of the Strait, including joint operations involving air, land, and naval 
arms of the PLA. On [5 March 1996], Beijing announced it would soon 
begin another round of missile tests. This time they were to be targeted at 
seas less than fifty miles from Taiwan’s busiest ports. On [8 March], three 
DF-15 missiles were fired from bases in Fujian. Five days later, another 
DF-15 missile was launched. Finally, also after advanced warning, live-
118. Ibid., 1278, 1283.
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fire tests and war games were conducted off the coast of Fujian to the 
north of the Strait and to the south of the Strait between [12 and 15 
March], The maneuvers included amphibious landing exercises and aerial 
bombing. Some forty naval vessels, two hundred and sixty aircraft, and 
an estimated 150,000 troops participated.119
Shambaugh described the 1995 missile tests in greater detail: On 21 July 
1995, the first of two PRC missile exercises commenced 95 miles north of 
Taiwan. Over the next five days, the PLA test-fired six M-9 medium-range 
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles into the sea; each nuclear-capable, with a 
range of 600 kilometers. The PLA fired another round of missiles in mid-August 
1995, and this time included Chinese copies of French Exocets— highly accurate 
anti-ship missiles— launched from PRC naval destroyers in the East China 
Sea.120
He also argues that the possibility of American intervention had to be 
taken seriously; “particularly if the United States [determined] that a PRC attack 
was unprovoked. The dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups and 
resolutions by the U.S. Congress during the March 1996 ‘crisis’ suggest that 
American intervention on behalf of Taiwan [was] a distinct possibility under 
certain conditions.”121 He also notes that this was the first crisis of the post-Deng 
Xiaoping era.122 These actions, however, brought United States-China relations
119. Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait 
Crisis,” (Working paper, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, January 
1999): 5.
120. Shambaugh, “Taiwan’s Security,” 1285.
121. Ibid., 1303-04.
122. Ibid., 6. Also, Scobell points out that Deng was still alive at this point but his 
state of health was so poor that he was incapable of playing any significant role in the 
events that took place during this crisis.
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to the low point in the decade. Although two U.S. aircraft carriers and their battle 
groups moved into the Taiwan Strait region to “monitor” the events, tensions 
subsided without a serious escalation in the conflict.123
Bush posits that “Beijing chose to go to the mat over [Lee’s speech at] 
Cornell not only because of what Lee had said, but also because he said it in the 
United States. His American visit created concern not only because more high- 
level travel might be in the offering, but also, and more important, because 
Beijing chose to include within its definition of separatism any Taiwan efforts to 
gain international support for the idea that the Republic of China existed as an 
equal Chinese government.”124
Nathan asserts that, while China in 1996 felt like it needed to rein in 
Taiwan’s growing autonomy, America’s ambiguous policy in the Strait 
simultaneously told Taipei “Don’t count on us to rescue you,” and told Beijing 
“Don’t count on our not getting involved,” in the hopes of deterring both sides 
from taking action.125 Naturally, this policy runs an inherent risk of failure. 
O’Hanlon argues that any war in the Strait could easily involve the United States, 
and that the 1995-96 crisis “showed that the United States does not take its 
interest in Taiwan’s security lightly.”126 While the United States probably was the
123. Federation of American Scientists, “Taiwan Strait: 21 July to 23 March 
1996,” http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/ops/taiwan_strait.htm (accessed 10 October 
2001; site now discontinued).
124 Richard Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2005), 53.
125. Andrew Nathan, “China’s Goals in the Taiwan Strait,” The China Journal, 
no. 36 (July 1996): 87, 92.
126. Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International 
Security 25, no. 2 (Autumn 2000): 52.
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only country that could adequately assist Taiwan in the event of a war with China
during this crisis, many Taiwanese were unsure of America’s commitment to
such an event, Cabestan argues. This crisis helped to support a U.S.
commitment to the ROC, but it also made Taiwan even more dependent upon
the United States— both for its security and its political legitimacy.127
Chinese president Jiang Zemin presented an Eight-Point Proposal on 30
January 1996 designed to end the decades of tension and separation between
Taiwan and the Mainland. Hung-mao Tien describes the proposal as “an
apparent effort to break the stalemate in low-level cross-Strait talks,” noting that
the proposal called for leaders on both sides to meet and for negotiations 
to end the state of mutual hostility. Although its eight points contained few 
new initiatives, the document was significant for at least two reasons.
First, it emphasized the negotiating mode for conflict resolution, and 
second, it formally incorporated Beijing’s various messages, such as 
diplomatic exchange, cessation of mutual hostility to preclude military 
action, and negotiation for the legal protection of [Taiwanese] investors on 
the Mainland.1
Pollack notes that Taiwan’s strategy is ever-changing. He argues that Lee 
Teng-hui’s primary goal was to prevent Beijing from achieving control over 
Taipei’s fate, and that Lee pursued this by all possible means. This included 
upgrading U.S. military sales to Taiwan in the early 1990s, improving Taipei’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, and improving economic 
ties between China and Taiwan to a point where maintaining the status quo
127. Cabestan, “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” 1279-83.
128. Hung-mao Tien, “Taiwan in 1995: Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait 
Relations,” Asian Survey 36, no. 1 (January 1996): 34.
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became Beijing’s interest.129 He also argues that the 1995-96 crisis was China’s
attempt to break Teng-hui’s progress, stating that
Chinese leaders [hoped] that their resumption of military exercises [would] 
send an important signal to the outside world. By reactivating the military 
option in a more potent way, Beijing [was] seeking to convey the message 
that its spectrum of alternatives [had] broadened rather than narrowed, 
notwithstanding the economic linkages between Taiwan and the Mainland 
and despite China’s broader initiatives to pursue a stable regional 
environment. Military exercises clearly state intentions, capability, and 
purpose in a way that words alone cannot. Chinese officials may well 
have recognized that they would pay a political cost for their military 
exercises, but prevailing sentiment among the leadership was that less 
obtrusive behavior would fail to send the required signal.130
Chen Qimao notes that Taipei in 1996 “rejected the ‘one country two 
systems’ formula, regarding it as a measure to relegate Taipei to the status of a 
local government under the PRC and an excuse to annex Taiwan eventually.”131 
But Wo-Lap Lam argues that “the focal point of Beijing’s foreign policy in the 
foreseeable future is anti-containment, or ways and means to frustrate 
Washington’s perceived efforts to use ‘pawns’ such as Taiwan ... to prevent 
China from assuming the quasi-superpower status it thinks it deserves.”132 He 
posits that “Washington no longer needs to play the China card against Moscow; 
and Beijing’s ability to secure arms from Russia has boosted its resolve to stand 
up to the [United States], It is, however, important to remember that Sino- 
American relations since the mid-1970s have experienced swings between
129. Jonathan D. Pollack, “China’s Taiwan Strategy: A Point of No Return?” The 
China Journal, no. 36 (July 1996): 112-13.
130. Ibid.
131. Chen Qimao, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions,” Asian 
Survey 36, no. 11 (November 1996): 1057.
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extremes,” and that “factional dynamics within the CPP ... is a key determinant of 
bilateral ties.”133
Harris notes that, until 1995, China would have preferred to maintain the 
status quo, but felt pressured to take action as a direct result of Teng-hui’s move 
to improve Taipei’s international standing. “Although China had not been totally 
relaxed about the relationship, it accepted the continuation of ambiguity in both 
US-Taiwan and Taiwan-China relations while holding to its two basic conditions: 
no declaration of independence, no foreign interference (as well as a third— no 
internal chaos within Taiwan).”134 Until this time, Taiwan had effectively 
established de facto independence, although it could not promote it as such.
While the status quo was not guaranteed to hold, some viewed change 
skeptically. Hood views the growth of true democracy in Taiwan as having 
potentially contradictory effects, arguing that as Taiwan’s democracy matures, it 
“will become increasingly independent of the Mainland, thus heightening 
concerns in Beijing. At the same time, democracy is Taiwan’s greatest defense 
against any hostile attempt by China to reunite the island with the Mainland.... 
Similarities of language, custom, history, and philosophical tradition are no longer 
enough to keep Taiwan and China together, and democracy has become the 
strongest incentive for the people of Taiwan to seek independence.”135
132. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “The Factional Dynamics in China’s Taiwan Policy,” The 
China Journal, no. 36 (July 1996): 117.
133. Ibid., 117-18.
134. Harris, “The Taiwan Crisis: Some Basic Realities,” 129-32.
135. Steven J. Hood, “Political Change in Taiwan: The Rise of Kuomintang 
Factions,” Asian Survey 36, no. 5 (May 1996): 482.
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Adding to the tension in the region, Yu-Shan Wu notes that the military 
maneuvers China conducted “on its southeastern coast near Taiwan” between 
August and November 1994 strained cross-Strait relations even further.136 But 
Yahuda notes that Taiwan’s actions in the 1990s drove China to take action. “By 
seeking to be treated as a separate state that was distinct from mainland China,” 
he states, “Taiwan was embarking on a new approach that confronted the Beijing 
government with what it saw as the totally unacceptable prospect of secession by 
a renegade province that would in effect subvert China’s unity and national 
coherence.”137 But Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts were not yielding the results it 
might have hoped. By 1995, only 27 states formally recognized Taipei (see 
Table 3).
Shao-chuan Leng and Cheng-yi Lin posit that the end of the Cold War 
brought with it the demise of Communism and the resurgence of separatism, 
arguing that “those who advocate Taiwan independence have been encouraged 
by the independence of the three Baltic states and other former Soviet republics 
and their later admission into the United Nations.”138 While this should have 
been viewed as a positive development, Brecher notes that “polycentrism 
imposed fewer constraints on state behavior, including resort to violence,” which 
brought about “more uncertainty about hostile coalitions, given the large number
136. Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwan in 1994: Managing a Critical Relationship,” Asian 
Survey 35, no. 1 (January 1995): 65.
137. Michael Yahuda, “The International Standing of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan,” The China Quarterly, no. 148 (December 1996): 1319.
138. Shao-chuan Leng and Cheng-yi Lin, “Political Change on Taiwan: Transition 
to Democracy?” The China Quarterly, no. 136 (December 1993): 826.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
230
Table 3. States that recognized the ROC as of 1995
Region Name Date of Recognition
Asia-Pacific Kingdom of Tonoga 10 April 1972
Solomon Islands 24 March 1983
Tuvalu 19 September 1979
Republic of Nauru 4 May 1980
Africa Burkina Faso 2 February 1994
Central African Republic 8 July 1991
Gambia 13 July 1995
Liberia 9 October 1989
Malawi pre-1971




Cent/South Amer. Bahamas 10 January 1989
Belize October 1989
Costa Rica pre-1971
Dominican Republic 10 May 1983
El Salvador pre-1971






St. Christopher & Nevis October 1983
St. Lucia May 1984
St. Vincent and Grenadines pre-1971
Source: Yahuda, “The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan,” 1327.
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of unaligned states in the global system.”139 And Cabestan argues that Taiwan’s 
democratization created additional tensions with mainland China that have 
“greatly widened the gap between the two Chinas” and “has clearly made 
impossible not only a German-style unification of the Chinese nation, but also the 
unsuccessful implementation of [the] ‘one country, two systems’ formula.” He 
argues that economic necessity, commercial interests, and growing human links 
across the Strait, however, have forced Taipei to communicate and negotiate 
with Beijing on any number of issues.140
Although Beijing had placed priorities alternately on military coercion and 
peaceful offense in its national reunification strategy, Suishing Zhao posits that 
peaceful reunification has been the most desirable approach and that the use of 
force had been reserved as a last resort for Beijing’s leaders, but he also argues 
that this preference should not lead one to assume that a war is unthinkable.
The situation remained difficult to manage, and the PRC refused to back away 
from its stated goals. Beijing has clearly stated that “it will not give up the use of 
force should the situation require it,” and has long made clear that “if any of the 
‘three conditions’— i.e., independence, invasion by foreign forces or 
disturbance—emerge on Taiwan, it would recover Taiwan by force.” The 
missiles in 1995-96 “carried a message: do not force our hand.”141
139. Michael Brecher, “Crisis Escalation: Model and Findings,” International 
Political Science Review 17, no. 2 (April 1996): 218.
140. Cabestan, “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” 1261.
141. Suishing Zhao, “Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing’s Strategy 
of National Reunification with Taiwan,” Pacific Affairs 72, No. 4 (Winter 1999-2000): 
509-10.
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SUMMARY
This chapter illustrated the significant changes in the military, diplomatic, 
and economic factors in the region since the 1962 crisis that directly and 
indirectly affected the security situation in the Strait. These factors are important 
elements in assessing the role of pivotal deterrence in the trilateral relationship, 
since they also illustrate how both China and Taiwan underwent changes in 
capabilities, alliances, economic independence, and diplomatic recognition; all 
things that can affect how one actor perceives another vis-a-vis its own situation.
Whereas Chapter V illustrated the United States’ allegiance to the KMT in 
response to the Korean conflict and the shift in Taiwan’s focus from reclamation 
to independence, this chapter highlighted the shift in U.S. policy toward a 
Communist China detente that took hold during the Nixon administration. The 
early 1970s saw an unprecedented level of effort toward a less ambiguous policy 
with the PRC, but U.S. interests in the ROC remained strong, and could not be 
ignored. Nixon seemed to hold a true desire to open communications with the 
Communists, but since his second term was ended prematurely in August 1974, 
his efforts were also more limited than he and the PRC leadership might have 
expected. Despite disruptions in U.S. political circles, mainland China’s role in, 
and relationship with, the international community had changed greatly by 1996. 
Taiwan’s goal of returning to the Mainland also had changed in favor of 
becoming an independent state; an option that the Mainland did not hold in favor.
The following, final chapter revisits the hypotheses presented in Chapter 
II, and addresses each one by demonstrating how the empirical data from this
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and previous chapters support or refute their fundamental assertions. It 
concludes with an overall assessment of the validity of pivotal deterrence as a 
model for explaining events in the Taiwan Strait in the last half of the 20th 
century, and offers some options for further study.
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF THE MODEL
This dissertation examined the role of ambiguity in U.S. security policy in 
the Taiwan Strait during periods of crisis and political change, and its application 
to the model of pivotal deterrence. Chapter I introduced the research, Chapter II 
discussed the methodology; Chapter III discussed the framework for the pivotal 
deterrence model used here; Chapter IV reviewed the literature on the trilateral 
relationship; and Chapters V and VI presented the empirical data on the political, 
military, economic, and social factors that shaped U.S. policy in the region.
This chapter summarizes the findings on the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954- 
55, 1958, 1962, and 1995-96. It then examines the hypotheses laid out in 
Chapter II. In the final section, this chapter offers an evaluation of the model’s 
strengths and weaknesses, provides explanations for them, and presents 
alternatives to strengthen the model. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
what can be taken away from these findings.
Throughout the process of compiling, reviewing, and presenting the 
empirical data related to the trilateral relationship and applying it to the pivotal 
deterrence model, this research sought to identify information that would either 
support or refute several key concepts: first, for as well as the model reflects the 
reality of the situation at the time of the crises, that it would provide an 
explanation for stability in the Strait; second, in instances where the model faces 
problems, that it would illustrate weaknesses in this relationship; and third, if
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there were additional data that did not fit into the model, that it would provide an 
alternative explanation, thereby building upon the pivotal deterrence model.
The research provided the empirical data, described in previous chapters, 
which served as the basis in assessing the key factors of moral hazard, 
alignment, interests, and benefits. These assessments, while somewhat 
subjective, present the strengths and weaknesses of the pivotal deterrence 
model as applied to the Strait.
Throughout the crises, this research shows that holistic pivotal deterrence 
had varying degrees of applicability. The power of the United States, combined 
with its policy of deliberate ambiguity, effectively prevented China from assessing 
that the U.S. would not intervene to save Taiwan, while it also successfully 
prevented Taiwan from assessing that it had the unqualified support of American 
power. The findings on the factors of moral hazard, alignment, interests, and 
benefits also illustrate the varied applicability, as discussed below (see Table 4).
The situation in the Strait meets the four requirements for pivotal 
deterrence to apply, as noted in Chapter II: The United States held power 
significantly greater than both China and Taiwan combined; the United States 
preferred that both maintain the status quo; the United States believed that both 
China and Taiwan held revisionist aims against each other; and both China and 
Taiwan viewed each other’s potential actions as more threatening than they 
viewed the United States.
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1954-55 1958 1962 1995-96
China: A A D A
Insured? n/a n/a n/a Possibly
Alignment Options Few Few Few Some
U.S. Interests Secondary Secondary Secondary Secondary
Prefer U.S. Benefits? No No No Yes
Expressed Desire for Action? Yes Yes No Yes
Action Taken Limited Limited None Limited
Taiwan: D D A D
Insured? Yes Yes No n/a
Alignment Options Few Few Few Few
U.S. Interests Secondary Secondary Secondary Secondary
Prefer U.S. Benefits? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Expressed Desire for Action? Yes Yes Yes No
Action Taken Limited Limited None None
Note: A = Aggressor, D = Defender, n/a = Not Applicable. “Defender” in this context does not 
refer to the pivot, but to the target of the primary aggressor.
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As noted in Chapter II, the reader should recall that the model does not 
require that all of the independent variables apply equally relative to each other; 
one may be stronger than, and make up for weaknesses in, another. Nor does 
the model require that all of the variables apply to both aggressors at once, or for 
them to apply to both aggressors equally.
ASSESSMENT OF THE 1954-55 CRISIS
When the PLA shelled ROC forces on the offshore islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu, the United States considered it an act of Communist aggression and 
viewed the islands as stepping stones for attacking Taiwan. Even though Chiang 
Kai-shek ruled with a rather dictatorial style that did not reflect U.S. perceptions 
of true democracy, several factors had set the United States’ focus on 
maintaining their support: (1) the Chinese Communists’ violent overthrow of the 
Nationalists in 1949 and incursion into Korea in 1950 to fight against U.S. troops, 
(2) the fact that John Foster Dulles held Chiang in high regard as a “good 
Christian Gentleman,” and (3) the fear of Communism advancing the “domino 
theory.” Sending the U.S. Navy to the Strait was meant both as a protective 
measure for ROC forces and as a signal of U.S. intent to prevent mainland China 
from taking Taiwan by force. Bush notes that the U.S. commitment to protecting 
ROK forces, which had remained positioned on the offshore islands since the
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1949 split, was unclear, and that the United States did not know what would be 
required of it if it were to extend its protection to Quemoy and Matsu1
Insurance/Moral Hazard: 1954
The United States’ “unleashing” of Chiang in 1953 probably contributed to 
his increasing the number of Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu. Chiang 
strongly desired to reclaim the Mainland from the Communists in 1954, and 
authorized various military actions to pave the way for full military operations. At 
the same time, Mao felt just as strongly about taking control of Taiwan in order to 
make China whole again. But after the United States suffered such great losses 
in Korea as a direct result of the Chinese Communists’ entry into the conflict,
U.S. support for the Nationalists’ military action against the Communists on the 
Mainland may have appeared a foregone conclusion.
The United States, realizing the Nationalists did not have the military 
capability to successfully reclaim the Mainland, and not seeking another war in 
Asia so soon, provided only tacit support for Taiwan’s aggressive actions. While 
maintaining a distance from Chiang, some view sending the U.S. Navy as a clear 
message to Mao that the United States would not permit a Communist takeover 
of Taiwan. The United States did not, however, give Chiang free reign to pursue 
actions that would have resulted in committing U.S. forces to fight against 
mainland China.
1. Richard Bush, China specialist, Brookings Institution, interview by author, 7 
March 2007, Washington, D.C.
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China would have been more likely to take further steps toward liberating 
Taiwan if U.S. forces were not present in the Strait in 1954. Though Communist 
China did not have a strong maritime capability, they had previously proven their 
tenacity in conducting difficult operations in the face of logistical problems during 
the Korean War. Their operations in the early 1950s demonstrated their ability to 
conduct successful guerilla warfare, as well as their ability to operate 
successfully without conventional military logistical support. Considering these 
factors, it is conceivable that the PRC would have attempted to use force against 
Taiwan, despite a lack of what most would consider an “adequate” capability.
Alignment: 1954
Almost immediately following the Communists’ victory on the Mainland, 
Mao sent offers of diplomacy to nations throughout the world; many, including the 
Soviet Union, quickly shifted diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Many 
others, however, to include the United States, maintained relations with Taipei 
and the KMT as the official Government of China.
China maintained the support of the Soviet Union, which may have 
provided Beijing with the confidence to conduct aggressive operations against 
Taipei if it so desired, though it still is not certain to what extent Moscow would 
have been willing to become actively involved in such a conflict—particularly if 
the United States was likely to defend Taiwan against attack. It appears that the 
Soviets did provide some material support, but distanced itself from becoming 
too directly involved in Communist China’s operations. This probably was a
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precaution to avoid becoming enmeshed in a situation in which it could not easily 
separate itself if events turned against its own interests.
Taipei maintained diplomatic relations with more states in 1954 than did 
China, but the numerical balance was slowly slipping away. But whether aligning 
with the PRC or the ROC, few countries held adequate levels of power to come 
close to competing with the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. Even Great Britain had little to 
offer in this regard, as it was still recovering from WWII. Thus, neither Taiwan 
nor mainland China had significant alignment options.
Interests: 1954
While the United States paid little attention to Taiwan prior to the start of 
the Korean War, Washington was not happy to see Mao’s CPP in control of the 
Mainland. Taipei represented the face of anti-Communism in the region, and 
supporting Taiwan served a symbolic, if not highly strategic, purpose. The 
United States maintained an interest in containing the spread of Communism 
throughout the world, and viewed Taiwan as a bastion of “democratic” rule in the 
region, and a “domino” that it did not want to see fall.
Protecting Taiwan in the aftermath of China’s 1950 intervention in the 
Korean War presented a situation from which the United States could not easily 
turn away. The spread of Communism presented a serious ideological threat to 
the West, pushing the Eisenhower administration to the point of threatening—  
albeit weakly—to use nuclear weapons in defense of Chiang’s Nationalists. The 
Taiwan Strait provided convenient shipping lanes, and Taipei’s potential fall to
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Communism presented a serious ideological threat to democracy, but the 
strategic balance probably would not have been significantly affected had Taiwan 
fallen to the Mainland in a PLA military attack, and the Strait was not necessarily 
critical to international commerce, which could take the longer route around 
Taiwan’s eastern coast, if necessary.
If Taiwan did fall to the Communists, many regional specialists argue that 
the loss would have been more symbolic than real: While some also argue that 
China theoretically could have used the island to launch attacks against Japan, 
the Philippines, or other areas, the United States did not depend upon Taipei for 
logistical military support, and it did not factor into the United States’ political 
independence. Despite all of the political and ideological reasons for supporting 
and protecting Taiwan against the growing threat from Communist China, it is 
clear that Taiwan in 1954 was a U.S. secondary interest. This is because there is 
no evidence to support the counter-assertion that Taiwan’s loss to Communist 
China would have had a significant effect on the United States’ security, 
economy, or power.
To say that the United States in 1954 did not have an interest in mainland 
China as a whole would be incorrect, but protecting it from the Nationalists was 
not a primary factor. The KMT’s return to the Mainland would have been a 
positive turn in the eyes of Washington, but the main consideration in preventing 
Taiwan from attacking mainland China was not protecting of the Communists; 
rather, it was protecting the Nationalists from making a foolish and self­
destructive move. The Nationalists would most likely have faced a devastating
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defeat unless the U.S. military became involved. In this instance, China probably 
was uncertain at the time exactly how far the United States would go to protect 
Taiwan; a situation that would not have been as ambiguous if Taiwan was a vital 
interest.
Benefits: 1954
Taiwan’s dependence upon the United States in 1954 was practically 
absolute. There were no alternative sources for those benefits Taiwan needed 
for its continued economic, military, and political development. U.S. military 
equipment, economic grants, trade flows, diplomatic recognition, and physical 
protection were just some of the factors upon which Taipei based its symbiotic 
relationship with the United States.
The United States did not maintain trade relations with Communist China 
at this juncture. It was receiving no significant benefits from the United States in 
1954, and relied mainly upon the Soviet Bloc for its foreign trade, as well as upon 
some European and African countries. While the CPP initially made efforts to 
maintain trade relations with anyone previously doing business with the 
Mainland, it eventually took steps to gain control over many foreign companies 
operating in China. Overall, this research found little evidence that the PRC was 
beholden to any Western states’ benefits for its survival; this element of pivotal 
deterrence, therefore, probably does not apply to the Mainland as effectively as it 
does in other areas.
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ASSESSMENT OF THE 1958 CRISIS
The situation during this crisis was very similar to the previous crisis in 
1954: the PI_A was shelling the ROC forces, which remained on the offshore 
islands; the United States sent naval forces into the Strait to provide an element 
of support to the KMT’s resupply efforts; and U.S. and Communist Chinese 
forces did not directly engage each other.
Insurance/Moral Hazard: 1958
The United States in 1958 remained strongly opposed to Communist 
aggression, and Taipei may have viewed the passing of the 1954 Mutual 
Defense Treaty during the previous crisis as an indicator that Taiwan could 
continue its attempts to control Quemoy and Matsu by force. And since the U.S. 
Navy came to the Nationalists’ rescue in September 1954, Taipei could have 
been relatively confident that the United States would provide military backing 
again. However, while the Eisenhower administration seemed to support small- 
scale, primarily covert, Nationalist military operations against the Mainland and 
would provide military equipment to Taiwan, there are no obvious indicators that 
the administration was willing to support escalation beyond those levels, or that it 
would enter into direct conflict with mainland China.
The PRC at this juncture could make several judgments about the United 
States based upon historical and contemporary actions and statements: 
Washington continued its support of the KMT and of Taipei’s claim to the 
legitimate rule of China; the U.S. was willing to put its military forces in harm’s
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way to protect the Nationalist forces; and any hostile action against U.S. forces in 
the Strait was likely to provoke a military response. However, there also were 
few indicators with which to judge the degree to which U.S. forces would 
intervene to protect the Nationalists, how far the Chinese Communists could 
push its offensive actions without provoking the United States, or what response 
would come from a strike—whether accidental or intentional—against U.S. 
military forces that were likely to return to the area.
The PRC most likely held a similar position in 1958 as it did during the 
previous crisis four years earlier. The research has identified no information to 
suggest that Mao’s views had changed since that time, despite the United States 
Navy’s previous intervention in the Strait. Motivations for changing the status 
quo still ran high on both sides of the Strait at this point and both sides probably 
also would have been more likely to take action— regardless of potential success 
rates— if the United States had provided assurances that it would have supported 
such actions.
Alignment: 1958
During the 1958 crisis, Sino-Soviet relations had already started to take a 
turn for the worse, and it seems that Mao was relying on the collective power of 
the Chinese people to carry Beijing through the crisis and into the Great Leap 
Forward. With the PRC’s international status on the line, Mao most likely 
considered it his duty to make Beijing the world leader of the Communist Party. 
This situation did not, however, present China with additional alignment options;
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rhetoric is no substitution for political, economic, diplomatic, or military power—all 
of which Beijing still was lacking toward the end of the decade.
Taipei was faring no better in 1958 than in 1954, as the number of states 
shifting diplomatic recognition to Beijing continued to increase. Although 
Taiwan’s economy continued to grow, providing the benefit of stronger trade 
relations with other countries than the Mainland had at the time, the United 
States remained Taiwan’s primary source of protection and support.
Interests: 1958
With the passing of only several years since the previous crisis, the United 
States still maintained its staunch anti-Communist position and its fear of falling 
dominoes. Chiang may also have built some credibility through several years of 
maintaining the status quo. But despite these factors, nothing had changed in 
regard to Taiwan’s status as a secondary interest. Although the U.S. Navy again 
sent ships to the region, the minimally invasive mission of such a capable military 
force was an indication of Taiwan’s limited importance to the United States.
Benefits: 1958
Taiwan’s economy was doing very well in 1958 as compared to just 
several years earlier, but Taipei remained strongly reliant on U.S. benefits, which 
were largely responsible for its continued economic growth. While reclaiming the 
Mainland remained the primary goal of the ROC, it could not risk losing the 
benefits that the United States provided at the time, as no other country that
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supported Taiwan at this juncture was able to replace what it received from the 
United States.
While continuing to rely on the Soviet Union to some degree, mainland 
China’s economy seemed relatively stable by early1958— prior to the Great Leap 
Forward. Although the Sino-Soviet relationship was already starting to falter, 
possibly causing Beijing to question whether it could continue to support its 
needs on its own or might have to turn to the West as an alternative source, the 
PRC did not rely on benefits from the United States at this point.
ASSESSMENT OF THE 1962 CRISIS
This juncture presented a unique opportunity to Taiwan; presenting 
probably its greatest chance of military success against the Mainland and of 
reclaiming control of its government. But despite this opportunity, the United 
States decided to maintain the status quo in the Strait. This juncture represents 
the start of a new era in the region, and sets the stage for the coming shift in 
Sino-American relations.
Insurance/Moral Hazard: 1962
Taipei in 1962 was determined to strike at mainland China, which was in a 
weakened position following Mao’s failed Great Leap Forward. While the lack of 
accurate information on China’s defensive military capabilities at the time makes 
it difficult to be certain how successful the Nationalist forces could been in any 
such attempt, it is unlikely that they could have been successful without the
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United States. Despite continuing to receive arms from the United States,
Taiwan still probably did not have sufficient military capability to retake mainland 
China on its own, but the data suggests that Chiang most likely would have 
attempted direct action against the PRC if the United States had provided military 
backing. The Kennedy administration refused to support this proposal, however, 
which soon faded away.
Based on the severity of the Great Leap Forward’s negative impact on the 
Mainland, the PRC’s military capabilities may have degraded to a point where 
Chiang had good reason to believe that his forces had a better chance of 
success against the PLA at that time than ever before. But the data suggests 
that the ROC forces would have relied on U.S. military support to successfully 
retake the Mainland in any event.
Alignment: 1962
By this juncture, Taiwan’s diplomatic relations had been slipping on a 
downward slope and there still were few states, whether for or against the ROC, 
that could have backed its move toward reclaiming the Mainland. Taipei still 
maintained relations with a number of states at this point, but none of them could 
provide significant protection in the event of conflict with the Mainland. Chiang 
wanted to exploit China’s weaknesses that the Great Leap Forward created, but 
the United States would not commit to providing offensive or defensive military 
support to Taiwan for such actions. This left Taipei without the powerful alliance 
it needed to seriously consider any large-scale attack against the Mainland.
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Because this research considers Taiwan to be the aggressor at this juncture, this 
factor of holistic pivotal deterrence is considered to have been effective because 
Chiang had no other practical sources of support for conducting attacks against 
mainland China.
Sino-Soviet relations by this juncture had become rocky at best. The PRC 
was making consistent gains in the diplomatic arena, as an increasing number of 
countries had established diplomatic relationships with Beijing since 1958. While 
increasing in number, however, China’s alliances were not bringing significant 
power to the relationship. Although some of these countries maintained military 
capabilities that were adequate for their own national defense, most probably 
would have been incapable of maintaining sufficient forward deployments in the 
Strait.
Interests: 1962
The situation in the Strait remained largely unchanged in regard to U.S. 
interests. Taiwan’s economy and military strength were both growing; primarily 
as a direct result of U.S. support. But despite the large amounts of money the 
United States poured into Taiwan, it still was not a vital interest. In fact, the same 
economic and social devastation on the Mainland that made it an inviting target 
of opportunity to the Nationalists most likely also made the Chinese Communists 
appear less of a threat to the United States. With China in its weakened position, 
the United States would have had even less reason than before to support 
conflict in the Strait.
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The United States had no apparent interest, let alone vital, in allowing 
Chiang to attempt military action against the Mainland at this point. Just as years 
of maintaining the status quo had most likely provided Taipei with an air of 
legitimacy, so too might it have provided Beijing with the same. After 13 years of 
control over the Mainland, the PLA had grown to a level that probably exceeded 
realistic expectations of any possible military action. By this point, maintaining 
the status quo may have overridden any interest the United States might have 
previously held in the KMT’s reclaiming mainland China, thereby supporting the 
holistic pivotal deterrence model.
Benefits: 1962
While the ROC’s economy in 1962 was making progress, Taipei remained 
highly dependent upon U.S. economic, political, and military support, above 
which it could not place its desires to take advantage of the Mainland’s 
weakness. It is fairly clear that Taipei could not have survived without the United 
States backing it up. Even if the KMT could have conducted the military 
operations on its own, however, Taipei’s reliance on other forms of U.S. support 
clearly overshadowed Chiang’s desire to reclaim China and left it largely subject 
to the desires of Washington.
Although Beijing’s list of states with which it held diplomatic relations 
continued to grow, its relations with Moscow by this juncture were severely 
degraded, as probably was the PRC’s confidence in Soviet promises of military 
protection. Despite desperate conditions on the Mainland—where the Great
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Leap Forward had devastated the Mainland’s economy, resulted in countless 
deaths, and most likely caused serious damage to China’s defensive 
capabilities—the PRC maintained its ideology of self-reliance, and did not want 
or need much of significance from the United States.
ASSESSMENT OF THE 1995-96 CRISIS
Social opportunities remained tightly controlled on the Mainland, with the 
government limiting the flow of information in and out of the country, and the 
strain of an ever-growing population. This situation seems to have been a bit 
different than during the previous junctures, however. China during this crisis 
appeared more intent on reminding the international community that it was still 
relevant than on seriously preparing for conflict or on actually applying military 
force against Taiwan. The relatively limited Chinese missile launches and 
military exercises probably did not present a real threat to Taiwan, and most 
likely would have had little effect even if the missiles were armed with explosive 
(non-nuclear) warheads. Beijing’s objective behind these exercises probably 
was directed at alerting Washington as much as, or more than, Taipei.
While many argue that China’s firing of missiles toward Taiwan was 
merely a political statement and was never seriously intended to escalate to war, 
however, one may argue that pivotal deterrence precluded the option from being 
exercised. Sino-American relations had changed by 1996, both diplomatically 
and economically. The United States abandoned recognition of Taipei for Beijing 
in 1972, and while the United States was still the primary supplier of military
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equipment to Taiwan, the PRC had established significant trade balances with 
the United States, and a large portion of its economy relied on U.S. imports of its 
manufactured goods. Lee Teng-hui’s provocative trip to the United States and 
his speech at Cornell University raised legitimate concerns in Beijing that Taiwan 
might take unacceptable action toward liberation, but these probably did not 
warrant a direct conflict.
Insurance/Moral Hazard: 1995-96
Much had changed in the regional dynamic since the previous crisis in 
1962; perhaps the most significant of which was the United States’ shift of 
diplomatic recognition and representation from the ROC to the PRC in 1979. 
While the shift had opened many new economic and political doors to China, 
however, the United States maintained its opposition against mainland China’s 
use of force to reclaim Taiwan. While the Cold War had come to an end, PRC- 
ROC rivalries and conflict had not.
The U.S. position toward Taiwan leading up to the crisis does not appear 
to have been overly emboldening to Taipei. Although the U.S. State Department 
allowed Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States, this research found no indication 
that U.S. policy encouraged or supported Lee’s provocative statements regarding 
Taiwan’s independence. It is not clear whether Lee miscalculated U.S. support 
for such statements or that he made a deliberate, unilateral decision to “test the 
waters” of the independence movement, but the U.S. support for Lee at the time 
does appear to have sent mixed messages, which may have falsely insured him.
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In the end, while this particular crisis ended relatively quietly, there seems little 
reason to doubt that China would take immediate steps to reclaim Taiwan if 
Washington were to disavow itself from Taipei’s security structure.
Alignment: 1995-96
By 1995, the PRC had diplomatic relations with more than 150 countries; 
many of which had become significant military powers. Beijing was now one of 
the five permanent members on the Security Council with veto powers—along 
with the United States, Russia, France, and Great Britain. China still had not 
developed a superpower’s economy, however, and it faced international criticism 
for its poor record on human rights. But while Beijing had become more 
mainstream in the eyes of the international community, it did not have carte 
blanche to push its agendas too far.
Most states that had withdrawn their diplomatic recognition of the ROC still 
maintained quasi- or non-official offices—such as the AIT—which continued 
serving many of the same functions as their prior Embassies. Thus, while 
Taiwan had lost most of its de jure  diplomatic status within the international 
community, its de facto status as an independent body—though many still 
considered it an integral part of China— provided it with increased legitimacy in 
the court of world opinion, and helped it maintain its relevance as an economic 
power separate from the PRC. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
mainland China took the Soviet’s place as the predominant threat to international 
stability. It did not, however, hold strategic international relationships with
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powers that could effectively balance the United States in the region, thereby 
leaving it with few real alignment options.
Interests: 1995-96
Taiwan in 1995 remained important to the United States: Its economy was 
booming, it was an international center for the electronics industry, and it had 
shifted from an authoritarian democracy to a more representative one. The 
historical ties that developed between Taiwan and the United States were very 
strong, and the “China lobby”2 made sure that the U.S. Congress did not forget 
Taiwan’s importance to international commerce and its relevance to the United 
States. It had not, however, become a vital interest, as it was not directly linked 
to the security, economy, or power of the United States.
An often-quoted statement from a Chinese official—possibly PLA General 
Xiong Guangkai—to a U.S. official exemplifies the situation: “You do not have the 
strategic leverage that you had in the 1950s when you threatened nuclear strikes 
on us. You were able to do that because we could not hit back. But if you hit us 
now, we can hit back. So you will not make those threats. In the end you care 
more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.”3 While convincing most 
Americans otherwise would be quite difficult, this truth also emphasized Taiwan’s 
status as a secondary interest to the United States.
2. Recognizing that there are “China lobbies” for both the PRC and ROC, this 
paper uses it in the context of those who lobby for the ROC.
3. Joseph Cirincione, “Did China Threaten to Bomb Los Angeles?” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Brief 4, no. 4, http://www
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Benefits: 1995-96
While Taiwan maintains a relatively modern military, this research found 
no indication that it would be capable of adequately defending itself against a full- 
scale attack from the Mainland unless the U.S. was involved; if not in an active 
role, then at least supporting the Taiwanese forces with logistical and command- 
and-control support. This, along with U.S. arms sales, remains a benefit that it 
can not afford to lose. Of the 27 countries that recognized the ROC at this time, 
none had the means to replace the benefits United States in this regard.
The PRC’s economy had experienced a significant transformation in the 
previous decades, and globalization had tied it to trade with many countries, 
including the United States and Taiwan. While U.S.-Chinese trade made up no 
small segment of China’s economic growth and stability, however, this research 
found no indication that China’s economy was overly dependent upon the United 
States; most likely due to its well-diversified international trade and investments. 
This independence prevented the full application of the variable at this juncture.
REVISITING THE HYPOTHESES
To assess how well the overall model applied to the case studies, this 
section revisits each of the four hypotheses that comprise the independent 
variables in the overall trilateral security relationship. This will illustrate the 
strengths and weaknesses of holistic pivotal deterrence. These assessments are
.carnegieendowment.org/publications.index,cfm?fa=view&id=651 (accessed 5 June 
2006).
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subjective, however, and should be viewed as a window into, and not a complete 
picture of every factor comprising, the trilateral relationship in the Strait.
Hypothesis 1: Insurance/Moral Hazard
This first hypothesis posited that providing protection against the negative 
effects of specific actions will encourage an actor to take actions that they would 
not otherwise take. As applied to the Strait, the hypothesis made the following 
assertion:
Hi: Holistic pivotal deterrence was more likely to fail when the United States
insured China or Taiwan against the risks of their behavior. Conversely, 
holistic pivotal deterrence was more likely to succeed when the United 
States did not insure China or Taiwan against the risks of their behavior.
What exactly it meant for the United States to “insure” a third party held 
different connotations for both Taiwan and China throughout these crises. For 
Taipei, it meant that the United States would have sent military forces to protect 
Taiwan, whether it initiated military action against the Mainland or provoked a 
Chinese Communist military conflict by announcing its independence. For China, 
however, it meant that the United States would have promised to stay out of any 
aggressive actions it took against Taiwan. The empirical data in this research, 
however, shows that the United States insured neither the PRC nor the ROC in 
any of the four crises.
U.S. policy consistently kept both the Chinese Communists and 
Nationalists on a leash by passively condoning limited operations against each
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other, such as artillery strikes and special operations incursions, while not 
condoning extensive military operations that might have provoked an escalation 
by either side toward changing the status quo. Though the United States would 
not have actively supported the PRC in such action, Washington could have 
taken steps to assure Beijing that the United States would not get involved. If the 
United States had provided any such assurance, however, the PRC may have 
been even more aggressive against the ROC.
Hypothesis 2: Alignment
The second hypothesis asserted that whether states will use force in a 
situation that goes against the wishes of a powerful pivot depends upon whether 
the aggressor has other powerful alliance alternatives or is limited in its alliances. 
As applied to the Strait, the hypothesis makes the following assertion:
H2: Deterrence was more likely to succeed when China’s and Taiwan’s
alignment options were scarce. Conversely, deterrence was more likely to 
fail when China’s and Taiwan’s alignment options were abundant.
As noted previously, alignment with others in-and-of itself was insufficient 
as a pivotal deterrence variable; it had to offer a level of support that could offset, 
or balance, the pivot— not simply present a conglomeration of insignificant allies. 
Throughout these crises, China and Taiwan both had limited effective alignment 
options, regardless of their diplomatic relations with other states. The Soviet 
Union—the only other superpower with deployable military forces believed 
capable of balancing the United States— supported China in the 1954 and 1958
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crises, to some extent, but their waning relationship probably restricted any 
support for potential conflict with the United States. According to Oleg Kalugin4 
—a retired Major General from the Soviet KGB and now a U.S. citizen— the 
U.S.S.R. (and later, Russia) would have most likely provided political, and some 
material, support to the PRC in times of crisis, but never would have directly 
intervened in any of the Taiwan Strait crises because it was not in its geopolitical 
interests to do so. The historical record appears to support Kalugin’s assessment 
of the Soviet’s probable potential role.
Despite its becoming an important economic figure in the world, Taiwan 
remained almost totally reliant upon U.S. support and protection throughout each 
of these crises. Taipei’s official relations with other countries continued to 
dwindle since 1949, and although it had few alignment options, it still sought to 
take action against the Mainland until Washington denied its support. This meant 
that it could not afford to break ranks with Washington.
While the research suggests that alignment was a severely limiting factor 
for Taiwan, it probably was less relevant for mainland China, whose national 
focus on ideological struggle, benefits of sacrifice, and duty to service made it 
largely independent of external support. It probably is safe to say that in both the 
1954 and 1958 crises, Taipei also did not have many viable alternatives upon 
which to rely for its protection and survival, aside from the United States. It 
would be highly speculative to assert whether Taipei would have acted differently 
if alternative alignment options were available at the time, but empirical data
4. Oleg Kalugin, former senior KGB official, interview by author, 2 June 2006,
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indicate that Taipei made enough statements advocating aggression to make the 
argument that, were another state more able and willing to support changing the 
status quo, Chiang probably would have attempted to do so.
Hypothesis 3: Alignment
Previous chapters noted that ambiguity is a central element of pivotal 
deterrence. Whereas Crawford’s model argues that “a pivotal deterrence policy 
will be more likely to succeed the more intensely it is motivated by the pivot’s vital 
interests,”5 holistic pivotal deterrence presents the opposite argument; that 
secondary interests invited ambiguity, and vital interests invited clarity of action—  
thus making secondary interests the better indicator for potentially successful 
application of pivotal deterrence. This is expressed in the third hypothesis:
H3: With the United States as a preponderant-power pivot, holistic pivotal
deterrence was more likely to succeed when interests in the Strait were 
secondary. Conversely, holistic pivotal deterrence was less likely to 
succeed when interests were vital (I.e., secondary interests invited 
ambiguity; vital interests invited clarity and insured action).
This research posits that the United States maintained a balance between 
interests and conviction in the Strait, but never leaned so far toward one side as 
to present an unequivocal statement of support for either Beijing or Taipei. This 
gave the United States the flexibility to remain ambiguous as to whether it would
Alexandria, VA.
5. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 32.
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come to Taipei’s rescue with military force if it became too aggressive or pushed 
too far toward independence.
Overall, the data seem to support this hypothesis. Because Taiwan was 
not actually a vital interest to the United States, there was no certainty that 
America would become involved; the Mainland was left to its own judgment as to 
whether the United States would become involved upon any escalation of a 
conflict. Furthermore, and particularly in the early years of the Cold War, the 
United States maintained an interest in containing Communism wherever it 
appeared or threatened to spread; regardless of whether its target was truly 
democratic, which Taipei, incidentally, was not at the time. Also, the continued 
rule of the CPP clearly was not a vital interest to the United States.
Hypothesis 4: Benefits
Crawford’s model of pivotal deterrence focuses on military power as a 
primary element of the model’s independent variables. This model, however, 
also includes non-military elements—the benefits variable. This model’s final 
hypothesis asserts that either actor would avoid aggressive behavior if it meant 
losing something it would otherwise have kept or gained under conditions of non­
violence; it makes the following assertion:
H4: Holistic pivotal deterrence was likely to succeed when China and Taiwan
each wanted to get or keep what benefits the United States could give 
or take away more than what they wanted to take from their rival. 
Conversely, holistic pivotal deterrence was likely to fail when China and
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Taiwan coveted something of their rival’s more than what they would get
or keep from the United States.
This additional variable, which can include any number of tangible and 
intangible factors, takes into consideration non-military elements of deterrence. It 
posits that when benefits are clearly defined, they can be effective tools of a 
holistic pivotal deterrence approach. In the case of Taiwan, the United States 
effectively held all the cards; Taipei desperately needed military support from the 
United States in 1954 and 1958, and was paralyzed without it in 1962 when it 
was the primary aggressor state. But Taiwan was also heavily dependent upon 
the United States for economic support throughout these junctures. By 1996, a 
large proportion of Taiwan’s benefits still came from the United States, but 
throughout all these crises, Taipei has shown that it would take advantage of the 
political situation whenever it saw an opportunity to exploit U.S. benefits. Chiang 
seemed to understand that the United States would let him push the boundaries 
quite far before pulling him back in.
The United States provided few benefits to China in 1954 and 1958, even 
though it probably could have provided a significant amount of support. What the 
PRC did not get from the Soviet Union, it did not seem to need from the United 
States. In fact, there were periods where China seemed willing to risk ruin to 
maintain its goal of reunifying Taiwan with the Mainland. But while this was the 
case during the Mao Zedong era, the United States probably had somewhat 
more influence in this regard in 1996 as a result of globalization, which may have
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leveraged more effectively than in the past.
Beijing generally has never relied on U.S. “carrots”, while it has 
consistently admonished it’s “sticks,” suggesting that China did not need anything 
immediately, and that it could wait to achieve its goals on its own terms, rather 
than accepting America’s. Having demonstrated its willingness to sacrifice its 
well-being for ideology, combined with the limited benefits the U.S. could offer, 
the PRC did not seem constrained by this factor in the earlier crises. In 1996, 
however, it had become more integrated into the international system. While it is 
possible that China’s missile launches and exercises in 1996 might have been 
the full extent of its military intentions, it also is possible that Beijing recognized 
the limit to which it could push military provocation without directly involving the 
United States, and took a calculated risk to remind Taipei and Washington of its 
position.
EXPLAINING THE CALM BETWEEN THE CRISES
If the model explains why the pivot constrained the aggressors from 
escalating the conflicts noted in the case study, what explains the periods of 
relative calm in-between? It is this author’s position that— based on the readings 
and on discussions with regional specialists such as Heer, Culver, Godwin, Bush, 
and Freeman6—that the crises occurred when the aggressors believed the time
6. Paul Heer and John Culver, senior U.S. Government China specialists, 
interview by author, 4 March 2007, Washington, D.C.; Paul Godwin, China specialist, 
National War College (retired), interview by author, 6 March 2007, Telephone; Bush,
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was right for one or the other to test or to push the limits vis-a-vis the status quo.
It is likely that the decisions were based on misperceptions of U.S. support for 
maintaining this status quo. Although these misperceptions did lead to crises, 
however, the aggressors ultimately pulled back after realizing that their testing of 
the limits was a mistake at the time.
After defeating the KMT and driving them from Beijing, Communist China 
was prepared to reclaim Taiwan by force, but the Korean War disrupted 
Communist China’s plans. Consequently, they took the next few years to 
prepare to attack Nationalist forces positioned on the offshore islands. While the 
events of 1954-55 and 1958 were two separate crises from a U.S. viewpoint, the 
period in-between was merely a lull from the Chinese perspective.
After 1958, Chiang needed to regroup and develop a new strategy for 
returning to the Mainland. In the four years leading up to President Kennedy’s 
denial of support, and for a number of years following, it is highly likely that Taipei 
simply did not know how to approach the problem of defeating the PRC without 
clear, credible, and complete U.S. support; particularly without alignment options. 
Chiang openly held onto his goal of returning to the Mainland until his death on 5 
April 1975, but Taipei probably understood long before then that the military 
option was long obsolete. Neither China nor Taiwan held widespread support for 
their aggressive goals, and political change was becoming recognized as the 
only option that would be acceptable in the eyes of the international community.
Interview, (see footnote 1); Chas Freeman, Former Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Affairs, and U.S. State Department Director of Chinese Affairs, 
interview by author, 8 March 2007, Washington, D.C.
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Another explanation for the period of calm between the 1962 and 1995-96 
crises is that Taiwan and China both were experiencing rapid economic and 
political change. Facing a United States-China rapprochement, Taiwan was In 
the midst of “reinventing itself in order to maintain relevance. In short, both 
sides were too busy with the realities of life, which they had at least partially 
ignored, to design and implement a new and effective strategy for disrupting the 
status quo in their favor. This was the case until the events of 1995-96 forced 
China to take action in response to Lee Teng-hui’s rhetoric about an independent 
Taiwan. While Beijing knew it had to do something, its decisions probably were 
not the most effective option it could have chosen.
So while the model explains how the aggressors were constrained when 
they did engage in military operations, the interim periods of calm were the result 
of a great many social, political, economic, and other factors. This is an issue 
best suited for discussion among regional specialists, but for the purposes of this 
dissertation, this author posits that the views presented by the readings and by 
several highly regarded China specialists sufficiently support this explanation.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
Whereas Crawford’s pivotal deterrence model only considered hard 
(military) power as deterrent elements, this research demonstrated how an 
alternative, holistic model can also employ soft power (economic, political, and 
social factors) in a similar pivotal deterrence framework. Chapters IV, V, and VII 
provided the background data to illustrate the many factors that affected the
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trilateral security relationship. By applying this data to the model’s hypotheses, 
this dissertation demonstrated that the pivotal deterrence model can explain the 
absence of full-scale war in the Taiwan Strait crises.
Referring back to Chapter II, the situation in the Strait predominantly 
reflects Scenario 3, in that China would have most likely taken further action 
against Taiwan in 1954, 1958, and 1996 if the United States had remained 
neutral (while, in theory, China would also have taken action if the United States 
aligned with it against Taiwan, such alignment is not realistic in this particular 
relationship). Moreover, Taiwan could not act without the support of the United 
States; that is, it could not take action if the United States remained neutral. 
Scenario 1, therefore, did not apply to Taiwan, and Scenario 2 did not apply to 
mainland China (see Table 5). This is largely because China, in 1954 and 1958, 
did not need the benefits that the pivot—the United States—could provide. While 
relatively strong variables can help to balance one or more relatively weak 
variables, such balancing requires that the aggressor consider the weak variable 
be relevant to some measurable degree.
This research addressed many of the strengths of pivotal deterrence, both 
the original and holistic models, as an alternative to more traditional approaches. 
It demonstrated how, by viewing events through this lens, we can understand 
how and why various factors can affect security relationships, and how 
uncertainty can constrain two aggressors who each have something to lose or 
gain. For all its strengths, however, the holistic pivotal deterrence model remains 
far from perfect for explaining all the dynamics of the Taiwan Strait crises.
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Table 5. Were the holistic pivotal deterrence variables successful in the Strait?
Crisis
Date H1





1954-55 n/a Yes Yes No 3
1958 n/a Yes Yes No 3
1962 n/a Yes Yes n/a 3
1996 Yes Yes Yes Maybe 3
Taiwan
1954-55 Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
1958 Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
1962 Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
1996 n/a Yes Yes Yes 3
Note: n/a = Not applicable
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There are several areas of difficulty with this model as applied to the 
Strait. Because so much has not been widely published or understood about the 
actual dynamics in effect during the crisis junctures—such as exactly what 
Chinese and Taiwanese political and military leaders were thinking as events 
unfolded or how they perceived the situations— any assessment of these 
junctures must accept that much of the available information is biased, 
incomplete, and possibly incorrect. Also, because many events in the Strait 
occurred so long ago and because Chinese-to-English translation of primary 
documents has not progressed very quickly or on a large scale, the reliance on 
secondary data or Western-based primary data can be viewed as a weakness for 
supporting these particular cases.
In the course of conducting this research, the author discovered several 
weaknesses of the holistic pivotal deterrence model, and also recognized 
mitigating factors to limit the effects of these weaknesses. Because the model is 
based largely on perceptions, it is vulnerable to human misperceptions in several 
areas: (1) On the variable of insurance/moral hazard, one or more aggressor 
may falsely believe that the pivot is offering to insure them. This can be 
mitigated by the pivot being engaged with both aggressors, while remaining 
ambiguous as to the level of support it is willing to provide in specific scenarios. 
(2) On the variable of alignment options, one or more aggressor may believe that 
its allies are more powerful than they really are, or may falsely believe that 
powerful allies support them where they do not. This can be mitigated by 
engaging in psychological operations, such as exposing the weaknesses of an
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aggressors’ potential allies. (3) On the variable of interests, one or more 
aggressor may believe it is of vital interest to the pivot where it is not. This can 
be mitigated by the pivot occasionally allowing the aggressor to feel unimportant 
and vulnerable when it expects attention and support. And (4) on the variable of 
benefits, many of the social, political, and economic factors may not apply to non­
developed states or actors that either do not have an applicable infrastructure 
that can benefit or suffer from gains or losses, or that do not exhibit at least a thin 
rationality.
While military force, at some level, can be used nearly universally, it is not 
always effective; and the other factors may not be useful as leverage against 
certain targets of influence. Since these factors are more difficult to actively 
mitigate in situations where the aggressors are considered irrational, the pivot 
must conduct an in-depth assessment of the aggressors prior to applying the 
model. Furthermore, such assessments may help to identify points of 
vulnerability to which one or more variable may be particularly effective. For 
example, the pivot may identify a key need that benefits can leverage, or perhaps 
it can create a dependency in the aggressor. Alternatively, the potential pivot 
may chose to apply a different deterrence approach altogether.
There is a limitation, which is not easily resolved, to applying the 
leverages afforded by this model beyond the theoretical realm and into the reality 
of international geopolitical situations: As Godwin notes, the pivot must be willing 
and able to absorb the costs of applying the leverage it intends to use against the
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aggressors.7 Leverage comes at a price—whether monetary or political—and if 
applied haphazardly, these costs will eventually come to a point of diminishing 
returns where a rational pivot will have to change course. While this might not 
cause the overall deterrence strategy to fail, it will at least weaken the pivot’s 
relative position in the relationship. As such, the pivot must identify those levers 
that it may be forced to use, and to assess the impact they would have on its own 
welfare.
The findings of this research provide examples of, and insight into, how 
the power of ambiguity can combine with the elements of insurance, alignment, 
interests, and benefits to provide a deterrent effect. Future research may identify 
additional or alternative factors that make the model even stronger, but these 
changes most likely will be dependent upon the specific characteristics of the 
actors involved. The examples presented herein can be used in developing and 
applying future security strategies in extended third-party symbiotic deterrence 
relationships by identifying those factors which a pivot can attempt to manipulate 
for maximum leverage. These strategies can apply to relationships reflecting any 
of the three scenarios identified in Chapter II.
While every security situation is unique, and the model presented in this 
dissertation may not be applicable in many cases, this research demonstrated 
how a security strategy based upon a holistic pivotal deterrence model can 
constrain the actions of two aggressor states without the pivot having to rely 
solely on balance of power. In the end, however, it is incumbent upon the pivot
7. Godwin, interview, (see footnote 6).
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to properly assess and manage all of the independent variables before 
determining whether to apply this model to a particular situation. While not 
universal, this model presents one more lens through which academics, 
policymakers, and others may choose to view and approach third-party 
deterrence relationships.
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